CLASSICAL WRITERS

# DEMOSTHENES

S. H. BUTCHER

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
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Lemnos I.
Apollonia
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Thermæ G.
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Achaia
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Laconia
PELOPONNESUS
Longitude East 24 of Greenwich
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Classical Writers

*Edited by* JOHN RICHARD GREEN

# DEMOSTHENES

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# DEMOSTHENES.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES.

In the fifth century B.C., when Greece for the first time had to face a foreign foe, there were silent forces at work which needed only such a crisis to call them into active life. At the time of the Persian invasion, the sentiment of unity took shape under Athenian leadership, and overpowered the instincts of isolation. In the latter half of the fourth century B.C., when Greek freedom was again menaced, no such united front could be offered. The city life, on which Greek civilisation rested, had proved wanting in vital and expansive power, nor was its early promise of confederation fulfilled.

The fall of Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian war had left a void in the Hellenic world which Sparta could not fill. Sparta's claim was that of a liberator; her nominal principle was the independence of all cities, great and small. In effect she knew but one rule of policy—force in its most undisguised and brutal form. She had none of that Athenian generosity and broad culture which had softened, if it had not redeemed, the harshness of empire. The thirty four years of Spartan supremacy, from Aegospotami (405 B.C.) to Leuctra (371 B.C.), were years charged with mischief. Wherever towns or villages were beginning

to unite, Sparta stept in and dissolved each such nascent society into its barest elements. Independence with her meant, what similar professions afterwards meant in the mouth of Macedon and of Rome, isolation and dismemberment. The work of liberation began with vengeance and bloodshed. "The Spartans," says Isocrates, in a weighty indictment[1] against Spartan misrule, "in three months put to death without trial greater numbers than Athens had put on trial during the whole period of her empire." Between the promise and the performance of Sparta there was all the difference between a Brasidas and a Lysander. The peace of Antalcidas (387 B.C.), negotiated by Sparta between Persia and Greece, may be taken as an epitome of her policy. The Greeks of Asia were by it given over to Persia—a deliberate surrender of a sacred Greek tradition. Some seven or eight years later, Isocrates, writing of these Ionians, says:—"They suffer worse outrage, even in their persons, than bought slaves of Athens. No Athenian maltreats his servants as their masters chastise freemen."[2] The same treaty had guaranteed the independence of the European Greeks; and as a comment on this Isocrates recalls how Sparta devastated Mantinea, laid treacherous hands on Thebes, besieged Olynthus and Phlius, levied blackmail on the islands, allied herself with Amyntas of Macedon, Dionysius of Syracuse, and all the despots who threatened Greek freedom. Not the least ruinous part of this treaty was the express recognition of the Great King as having the disposal of Greek affairs, Sparta being made executor of his commands. Already, at a time when Persian gold was needed to replenish the failing exchequers of Greece, he had interfered as paymaster; he now appears as arbiter. The day was not far off when a foreigner yet more dangerous would assume a like office.

[1] *Panegy.* § 113.

[2] *Panegy.* § 123.

Another distinctive act of Spartan policy may be noticed. In 384 B.C., Olynthus in Chalcidice was at the head of a growing league of cities bound together on liberal terms of union. There is a special interest in this, one of the earliest efforts at federal government, and we would gladly know more of the details of organisation than have been told us by Xenophon. This much, however, is clear, that each city of the league, while retaining its own constitution, had laws and franchise in common with the other members, and mutual rights of marriage and of holding property. The neighbouring cities on the coast, and some towns of Macedon, including Pella, took advantage of the security afforded by the league; but two Chalcidic cities, Acanthus and Apollonia, clung to their independence, and, backed by Amyntas II., King of Macedon, applied to Sparta for aid. Sparta, ever jealous of confederation, sent her armies against Olynthus. In 379 B.C. the city was at last surrendered, and the league dissolved. Not till about thirty years later was the fatal meaning of this act discovered. A power which might have stood a firm barrier for the Greeks of the North against Macedonian aggression had been broken down.

Thus Sparta everywhere employed the name of freedom to destroy the reality. Working on illusory hopes, and fostering a narrow communal spirit, she undid in the brief period of her rule whatever had been done for Greece by Athens. The disintegrating forces, which had been for a while arrested, now prevailed. The genius, indeed, of Epaminondas wrought in an opposite direction; and the nine years from Leuctra (371 B.C.) to Mantinea (362 B.C.) were marked by a generous attempt to repair something of this ruin. But with Epaminondas Theban supremacy passed away, and Thebes relapsed into her former self.

Meanwhile a new Naval Confederacy had been

formed at Athens (378 B.C.) on the model of the Confederacy of Delos, but with safeguards against the old abuses. It was joined by Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, Mytilene, and embraced in all about seventy maritime or island cities, whom Spartan harmosts and Persian despots had driven to seek some organised protection. Nothing could well have seemed more hopeful than the league in its beginnings. The internal constitution of each state was left untouched; the odious "tribute" (φόρος) with its imperial associations was exchanged for the "contribution" (σύνταξις); and the amount of each contribution was to be assessed at a representative council held at Athens. Then came the difficulty of maintaining the equal rights of all the members. History began to repeat itself; contingents had to be raised and payment enforced; the Athenian spirit of conquest was revived, and deficiencies of revenue were made up by acts of violence and extortion. The allies soon began to fall away, and in 357 B.C. openly revolted. Once the federal bonds were snapped by the Social War, there was no effective control over the Aegean waters, which were overrun by corsair fleets, and preyed on by Persia or by tyrants of the Asiatic coast. The strength of Athens was fatally impaired, and the permanent disunion of Greece laid bare. Of all this there was one interested spectator. Philip of Macedon, two years before the Social War began, had come to the throne (359 B.C.)

While the Greek states were being detached from the national life of Greece, the tie between each state and its members was similarly loosened. With the decay of Panhellenic patriotism went also the decay of the civic virtues. Our main authorities for this period are the writings of the orators; and, as some one has observed, it would be almost as absurd to form our estimate of ancient society solely from the

works of orators and poets as it would be to judge modern society simply by its sermons. Yet, when writers of such different casts of mind as Isocrates and Demosthenes agree in discovering the same tendencies, and denouncing the same evils—widely as they differ in the cures they prescribe—and when their reflections are borne out by unquestioned facts of history, we may safely accept the outlines of their picture.

The one mortal disease, whose workings can be traced in manifold ways, was the severance of the individual from the state; everywhere private needs were superseding public claims.

A waning interest in political life is seen first in the Athenian Assembly. Thinned by pestilence, war, and exile, the civic body was largely recruited from foreigners; and though the process was a necessary one, it was passionately lamented by Isocrates. In his pamphlet *On the Peace* (355 B.C.) he exclaims: "We who are so proud of our superior birth care less to keep our nobility to ourselves against every new-comer, than do Triballi and Leucani to preserve the doubtful purity of their blood" (§ 50). He lays the blame down to the lust of maritime empire to which the old families, that had survived the days of the tyranny and of the Persian wars, were sacrificed. "Gradually our rulers found that they had filled the public tombs with citizens and the public registers with aliens." Athens had not in the same degree as Rome the power of absorbing strangers, and of making its franchise a privilege to be coveted; and Demosthenes, like Isocrates, complains that Athenian citizenship, once valued, was now degraded.[1] Aristocrats began to look on politics as disreputable; the wealthy merchants, too, many of whom were *metics*, not citizens, took but a slight part in public life. A poorer class now preponderated in the Assembly, which in part consisted

[1] Dem *Aristocr.* § 201.

of a needy rabble, to whom politics and spectacles were daily bread. "One comes and another goes, but no one cares for the public good."[1] Important motions were sometimes carried without any one knowing what had happened. The difficulty, too, of keeping order in the Assembly seems to have become so serious that a special police regulation for the protection of the chair was passed shortly before 345 B.C. The members of the tribe to which the Chairman belonged were ranged round him as a bodyguard.[2] A certain Aristogeiton in particular achieved evil distinction by a persistent and noisy impudence, "overriding the laws, the orders of the day (*τοῦ προγράμματος*), and public decency."[3] Frequent laws were carried to benefit individuals, and these were sometimes made retrospective.[4] Indeed, the statute book was full of contradictory enactments, passed for occasional purposes, and without regular formalities.[5] Demosthenes (*Lept.* § 92) singles it out as one great blot in Athenian government, that decrees of the people had acquired more validity than the laws. And Aristotle (*Polit.* vi. 4) sees here the note of a perverted democracy, such as was in no sense a constitution. Similar in purport is a saying of his recorded by Diogenes Laertius (v. 17), that whereas wheat and laws were among the discoveries of Athens, the wheat was used but the laws were not used.

The growing indifference of the ordinary citizen towards politics tended to leave the administration in inferior hands. After Pericles, there had been a rapid descent to Cleon and Hyperbolus, and the demagogue of the fourth century is drawn for us as one who studied the art of flattering the masses. Demosthenes

[1] Dem. *Embassy*, § 136.
[2] Cf. Aesch. *Timarch.* § 33.
[3] [Dem.] *Aristogeit.* § 9; cf. *Exordium* 53.
[4] Dem. *Timocr.* § 116.
[5] Dem. *Lept.* §§ 90, 91.

describes the people as like some tame animal led about by his keeper, who ministers to his lower wants [1] (p. 74). The Great Beast of Plato, humoured and pampered, occurs to us as the companion picture. Such descriptions do not, indeed, give us the whole truth. A people who revered personal integrity so far as to elect Phocion forty-five times general; who, even after defeat, did not desert Demosthenes; who at the last were guided by Hypereides and Lycurgus, cannot have been as degenerate as has sometimes been supposed. Political tact never wholly failed them; but their moral fibre was weakened, they had many lapses, and could not long sustain themselves at the higher level. Signs were not wanting that the democracy was losing faith in its own virtue and capacity, and was not far from a voluntary abdication of its functions. The forms and vital usages of the constitution were suffered to fall into disuse. Ordinary law was not enforced. Never since the Areopagus was divested of its ancient privileges had that body been so frequently invoked to wield exceptional powers as during the contest with Macedon. The extravagant rewards, too, and the homage paid to political leaders indicated a secret self-contempt [2] on the part of the people—a temper peculiarly dangerous in a city where personal influence was supreme.

At Athens, it must be remembered, there was nothing corresponding exactly to a Ministry in our modern sense. The Assembly had no responsible leaders, and those with whom the real power lay were not necessarily those who held official position. The ordinary magistrates, appointed by lot and for a single year, and subject to dismissal at any moment, could not be expected to carry out any continuous policy or show special competence. The ten generals, though their office was elective, and a certain fitness was so far

[1] *Olynth.* iii. § 31. [2] Dem. *Aristocr.* § 209.

guaranteed, exercised powers that were too much subdivided to be effective. The one official body that had any real control over the details of administration was the Council of Five Hundred. All measures were submitted to them before they could be proposed in the Assembly. At the beginning of each year they examined the accounts of the outgoing magistrates, and prepared a budget for the ensuing year. Many also of the functions now vested in a Board of Public Works or in the Admiralty devolved on them. But they, too, held office only for a year, and owing to their unwieldy size had to work through committees (πρυτάνεις), each of which conducted public business for so many weeks in its turn. The general principles of policy were determined, not by the Council, but by the regular speakers (ῥήτορες) of the Assembly, forming as a rule a small group of ten or twenty men, who led the debates, framed measures, and were the true politicians of Athens. So far as any permanent[1] element entered into the conduct of affairs, it might be traced to these unofficial rulers, to their personal influence and direction. And though ministerial departments in the strict sense were unknown, a man of special aptitude would devote himself to a single branch of the administration; and it was possible to be, as Demosthenes virtually was, Minister of Foreign Affairs for a prolonged period without holding any official appointment beyond an occasional post such as that of ambassador.

Party government, then, strictly so called, did not exist; and party itself was hardly possible where cohesion and principled union were lacking. The

[1] The Treasury was the one department where some administrative continuity was secured. The "Steward of the Public Revenue" (ταμίας τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου)—the nearest approach to our Chancellor of the Exchequer—was elected for a term of four years. Lycurgus held the office for twelve years in all.

Assembly naturally fell under a shifting clique management. Demosthenes tells us of a "certain band of veteran orators"[1] who possessed the ear of the house, and silenced "private members" (οἱ ἰδιῶται). Of another similar faction we elsewhere[2] read: "As though they were not members of a free commonwealth, where each and all have therefore a right to speak, but as if the constitution were an exclusive priesthood of their own, they are indignant if any man speaks up honestly in your presence, and they call him audacious. . . . They bid you crown and not crown whom they choose, and make their own will supreme over the resolutions of the house." It was doubtless to secure the neutrality of the chair, and to prevent the managing committee of the house from asserting a corrupt or despotic influence, that the rules for appointing a Chairman of the Assembly were altered in the fourth century B.C.[3]

A passage in the *Second Olynthiac* gives us an insight into the character of a political clique based on an alliance between generals and orators. The organisation of this coterie is compared to the legal organisation for collecting the property-tax (εἰσφορά) by means of Boards (συμμορίαι), whose Three Hundred wealthiest members advanced the money for the other ratepayers, and so acquired a dominant influence. Each Board was presided over by a chairman (ἡγεμὼν),

[1] *Androt.* § 37.

[2] Dem. (?) *Trierarch. Crown*, §§ 19, 22.

[3] In the fifth century B.C. the managing committee (πρυτάνεις), who, it must be observed, all belonged to the same tribe, appointed the chairman of the day by lot from their own number. Their tribe was called the πρυτανεύουσα φυλή. In the fourth century B.C. the chairman was one of nine *proedri* (πρόεδροι), each of whom represented one of the tribes other than the πρυτανεύουσα φυλή. The tribe to which the chairman now belonged was called the προεδρεύουσα φυλή. Thus the ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων took the place of the ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων.

who had some other official (ἐπιμελητὴ) immediately subordinate to him. Upon similar lines were framed political cliques, presided over by an orator (ῥήτωρ), with a general (στρατηγὸς) whom he patronised. The rival wire-pullers, corresponding on each side to the Three Hundred, raised their shout, and the rank and file of the parties blindly followed their lead.[1] The system has its modern counterpart in certain well-drilled party organisations both here and in America.

The languid life of the Assembly was not reflected in the law-courts. The press of business cannot, indeed, have been what it was under the Athenian hegemony when the causes of the allies were all tried at Athens; yet there were still jurymen eager to serve and litigants ready to supply cases. The judicial fee fixed by Pericles at one obol a day, and trebled probably by Cleon, small as it was, sufficed to attract a needy throng, who might be seen in the morning outside the courts "drawing lots for the doubtful chance of daily bread."[2] Confiscation of property was one of the means employed to help out a failing revenue;[3] and in the time of Lysias corrupt officials often told the jury point-blank that unless they gave an adverse verdict there would be no funds to pay their salaries.[4] Defendants, on the other hand, urged how much more the state would profit if wealth were left in the hands of patriotic owners.[5] This practice of confiscation, which Aristotle speaks of as one of the causes which

[1] Dem. *Olynth.* ii. § 29. "Formerly you used the Board system for taxation (εἰσεφέρετε κατὰ συμμορίας), now you apply the same system to politics (πολιτεύεσθε κατὰ συμμορίας). An orator presides on either side; there is a general under him, and the Three Hundred, who have to shout applause; the rank and file of you are told off to one side or the other."

[2] Isocr. *Areop.* § 54.

[3] Lysias, Or. xxx. § 22.

[4] Lysias, Or. xxvii. § 1.

[5] *e.g.* Lysias, Or. xviii. §§ 13-23.

led to the ruin of democracies,[1] was less frequent in the second half of the fourth century than at the close of the Peloponnesian war; it is mentioned, however, by Demosthenes, as a method still in vogue among "dashing" politicians.[2] As lawsuits had to be got up to provide a pittance for the mob, professional accusers were found to do the work, making lucrative jobs for themselves, and earning a reputation as good democrats.[3] "It is far more dangerous," says Isocrates, "to be suspected of wealth than to be an avowed criminal."[4] Timid but opulent citizens would purchase the silence of the informer rather than face the courts. The praise of poverty in Xenophon's *Symposium*[5] is only half ironical. As a rich man, says Charmides, he was in constant dread of robbers and sycophants. There was always some new tax to pay, and it was impossible to go abroad and escape it. But ever since he has been ruined and his property sold up, his case is very different. "Stretched at full length I sleep comfortably; I am no longer threatened; it is I that threaten others. A free man I go abroad or remain at home. The rich now rise in my honour and give place to me from their seats and on the road. To-day I am like a tyrant; lately I was unmistakably a slave. I then paid tribute to the state; to-day the state pays tribute and supports me. . . . I lose nothing, for I have nothing to lose, and I have always the hope of getting something."

Not only was extortion practised by professional accusers, but the tribunal itself was frequently corrupt. The word denoting the direct bribing of a jury (δεκάζειν) is first found about the beginning of the

[1] Arist. *Pol.* vi. 3.
[2] Dem. *Chers.* § 69.
[3] Isocr. *de Pace*, § 133.
[4] Isocr. *Anticl.* § 160.
[5] Xenoph. *Sympos.* § 30 ff.

fourth century B.C.; and though it is not easy to see how juries consisting of five hundred members or more could be effectively bribed, the fact that they were so is beyond dispute. It was part of the general corruption pervading public life, that disorder with which Greece was "sick even to death." "Envy if a man has taken a bribe, ridicule if he confesses it, pardon if his guilt is proved, and every other appendage of corruption."[1] Bribery itself was no new feature in Greek politics; what was new was that it had become so systematic and was little reprobated. Here was one symptom of the deep disloyalty that was poisoning the sources of Hellenic life. We read of orators who were paid to speak and paid to keep silence; their business was "to earn their pay, not to express views."[2] They trafficked in the honours of the state. "Your privileges and rewards are to them so many trumpery wares to be sold by public auction. They give them away at the lowest possible price, and have a fixed charge for which they draw up any form of decree that their numerous employers may require."[3]

Popular morality, however, established a certain distinction in cases of bribery. To take bribes was pronounced to be wrong, but only when they were taken against the interests of the state. This is explicitly stated by Hypereides.[4] The distinction may sound to us impudent or unmeaning; but there have been periods in our own parliamentary history, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the same idea has prevailed; or, if not the same, the kindred idea, that to *give* bribes in the interest of the state, in other words, of party, was justifiable. The saying ascribed to Walpole, and which at least expresses the theory

[1] Dem. *Olynth.* iii. § 39.
[2] Dem. (?) *Trierarch. Crown*, § 19.
[3] Dem. *Aristocr.* § 201; cf. *Trierarch. Crown*, § 22; and Isocr. *de Pace*, §§ 121-131.
[4] Hypereid. *Agst. Dem.* xxi.

on which he acted, that "every man had his price," was in principle almost equivalent to the more cynical avowal of Demades, that "he took money and intended to take it."[1] Nor must we forget that the Greek orator, who aspired to be a leading statesman, occupied a very peculiar position. It was his duty to be well instructed in the current politics of all the chief cities, to have trustworthy agents abroad, to form friendly ties with foreign potentates, to carry on secret negotiations; and all this as the unofficial unsalaried adviser of his country, unaided even by grants for secret service money. Further, he was expected to be liberal in his home expenditure and in voluntary donations to the state. Many sums, of which it might not be easy to render public account, passed through his hands and yet left them unsoiled; and even the receipt of gifts would not always argue want of patriotism. A private fortune was becoming one of the first conditions of political life, and the Athenians were content that their statesmen, like their generals, should look outside the city to enrich themselves, provided that the public interests were not sacrificed. Yet, whatever might be a statesman's honesty of purpose, the imputation of venal motives was a resource too near to hand not to be made the most of by his opponents. Few escaped suspicion save those who, like Phocion, contemptuously shunned contact with affairs, and whose political action was limited to the bare requirements of duty.

We need not then believe half the charges brought against one another by rival orators; but that the charges should be so lightly bandied is in itself a vicious sign. Politics which, with the progress of knowledge, had first been elevated into an art, were now degraded into a trade. Demosthenes and Isocrates both contrast the statesmen of the elder democracy with those

[1] Deinarch. *Agst. Dem.* § 104.

of their own day. "Politics were not with them a way of making fortunes."[1] "They regarded government not as a mercantile speculation but as a public service."[2] The change was inevitable in a wealthy democratic society where there was no responsible Ministry.

The external face of Athens bore evidence of altered relations existing between the individual and the state. The grandeur of private houses and of all that surrounded private life, was in striking contrast with the meanness of the newly erected public buildings. The Greeks were more sensitive than we are to such a contrast. Greek art in its best days stood in intimate connection with national life and the religious sentiment. In the service of the gods it attached itself to the social activities of man; it did not gratify vulgar display or set off personal ambitions. Once it had issued from the temples its home was in the thoroughfares of civil life. Till the fourth century B.C., the highest efforts of architecture had been spent on the erection of public buildings. But as private fortunes grew, architecture, and after it painting and sculpture, began to minister to private delights and to individual culture. At the beginning of the Periclean age the citizens, from old association, lived chiefly in the country, and wealthy owners prided themselves on their country houses, while their town dwellings were on a much smaller scale.[3] Houses and lands, said Pericles, were merely "the garden of the house, the superfluous ornament of wealth,"[4] possessions to be lightly resigned in obedience to state interests. Soon,

[1] *οὐ γὰρ εἰς περιουσίαν ἐπράττετο αὐτοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως.*—Dem. *Olynth.* iii. § 26.

[2] *οὐ γὰρ ἐμπορίαν ἀλλὰ λειτουργίαν ἐνόμιζον εἶναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν.*—Isocr. *Areop.* § 25.

[3] Isocr. *Areop.* § 52.

[4] Thucyd. ii. 62, Prof. Jowett's translation.

however, the insecurity of life consequent upon war brought a large population inside the walls, and henceforth, as personal luxury grew, the public and private buildings were seen in painful antithesis. Upon this topic Demosthenes dwells with emphatic repetition.[1] "Moreover, former times were times of national prosperity and splendour: no man then stood out above his fellows. The proof of it is this.—Some of you may know the style of house of Themistocles or Miltiades, or of the illustrious men of that day; you see it is no grander than the mass of houses. On the other hand, the public buildings and edifices were of a magnificence and beauty such that posterity cannot surpass them—the gateway of the Acropolis yonder, the docks, the porticoes, and the other permanent adornments of Athens. To-day your statesmen have vast private fortunes: some of them have built for themselves houses grander than many of the public edifices; some again have bought up more land than all of you who are in this court together hold. As for the public buildings which you erect and whitewash, I am ashamed to tell of their meanness and squalor." (*Aristocr.* §§ 207, 208).

The festivals were the only national institution which seemed to retain reality. Demosthenes draws a comparison[2] between the punctual precision with which they were celebrated, and the late and irregular equipment of the armaments; and the comparison is the more pointed because festivals and armaments alike were provided by the wealthier citizens. In the one case all details were "prearranged and definite, nothing was left to chance;" in the other "all was unorganised, unsystematic, and vague" (ἄτακτ'

[1] Dem. *Aristocr.* §§ 206-208; *Olynth.* iii. §§ 25, 26—a passage almost verbally repeated by the imitator who wrote the speech περὶ συντάξεως (§§ 29, 30); cf. also *Androt.* § 76; *Timocr.* § 184.

[2] Dem. *Phil.* i. §§ 35, 36.

ἀδιόρθωτ' ἀόριστ' ἅπαντα). A special fund called the Theoricon had been long ago set past to enable the citizens to attend the festivals and the theatres. By means of this bounty the great public solemnities were brought within the reach of poor as well as rich. Such an equality of noble enjoyments seemed necessary to complete the democratic idea. Grote has shown how the Theoricon had in the first instance a religious aspect; the public worship of Greece was embodied in the festivals, which included sacred processions, banquets, dramatic entertainments, and musical contests. The fund thus appropriated acquired something of the sanctity of a Church Fund. But by degrees the more serious meaning of the festivals became obscured, and at this time they were little more than a form of public amusement. Since the days of Pericles the sums given away as festival money had been trebled; the conditions too under which it was bestowed had been altered. The old laws provided that in time of war the surplus revenue, after the civil expenditure had been defrayed, should go to the military fund.[1] This provision was constantly neglected; the surplus was as a rule carried to the Theoricon in time of war no less than in peace. Before the end of the Peloponnesian war the distribution of festival money had been for the time suspended; it was revived under the restored democracy. But hitherto the payment of the bounty had been dependent on the existence of a surplus in the revenue. A law of Eubulus, passed in 354 B.C., introduced a totally new principle.[2] The festival

[1] [Dem.] *Neaera*, § 4.

[2] The traditional statement that Eubulus attached the penalty of death to any proposal for applying the Theoricon to war purposes rests on the late evidence of a Scholiast. The idea was probably based on an over-literal acceptance of the word ἀπολέσθαι in *Olynth.* iii. § 12.

money was now made a first charge on the revenue. The superintendents of the Theoricon were given a permanent control over the entire finances of the state. If the treasury showed no surplus, an adjustment must be made elsewhere. Some other branch of the public service had to be starved in order to provide the guaranteed dividend. Like the distribution of cheap corn at Rome, this festival dole was among the most demoralising of all the influences of a corrupt age. It was called by Demades the cement (κόλλα) of the democracy (Plut. *Mor.* p. 1011 B); and with still greater aptness it was compared by Aristotle to the sieve of the Danaids (Arist. *Pol.* vii. 5).

The Festival Fund stood, as we have seen, in intimate relation with military affairs, and to these we must now turn. We are here met by a fact of capital importance, which shaped the foreign policy of Athens and reacted powerfully on home affairs. With the growth of mercenary armies, which belongs to this century, the old military organisation broke down. The mercenary system has not been confined to Greece: it has sprung up elsewhere in decadent societies—in Egypt, Carthage, and ancient Rome, as well as in medieval and modern Europe. But nowhere was it so disastrous as at Athens, for nowhere else was the life of thought so closely knit with that of vigorous action.

Owing to long-continued wars military tactics at the opening of the fourth century B.C. had made vast progress: it was found that amateur soldiers could not compete with professionals, and war became a trade. The demand for mercenaries came first from Asia. There the superiority of the trained intelligence of the Greek over the barbarian had been long discovered, and pay and plunder were most plentiful in the Persian service. The custom spread

to the mainland of Greece, and the Corinthian war (394–390 B.C.) marked its beginning. Even Sparta sought the aid of this venal courage. The armies of Greece, like those of Asia, were recruited "from men without cities, from deserters, and from the dregs of the criminal classes,"[1] who enlisted under the highest bidder. "The bodies of the Hellenes," says Lysias, "belong to those who can pay." We have many pictures of the terrible excesses practised by these Greeks, "who were barbarians in all save speech."[2] "Common enemies of mankind" is the title given them by Isocrates,[3] and Demosthenes uses almost identical language.[4] But ruinous as they were to the countries over which they moved, and especially to the seaboard of Asia, Greece herself was in the end the worst sufferer. Of those who thus took service abroad the greater number never came home. The drain upon the population went on in increasing volume. At Issus 40,000 Greek mercenaries fought for Darius. Finally, Greece perished, says Polybius, for want of men.

If we turn to Athens we can trace the working of the change under a double aspect. First, the citizen was no longer a soldier. Legally, indeed, he still continued such; for in the ancient republics the question of compulsory military service was not raised. From primitive times, when the people was the army, the identity between soldier and citizen had been tacitly assumed and laid down by law. Every young man between the age of eighteen and twenty had still to go through a period of short service on the frontier preparatory to admission into the regular army. But here it generally ended. No further military duty was enforced, and foreign service was in the main left to mercenaries. This was not due merely to the desire

[1] Isocr. *de Pace*, § 44.
[2] Isocr. *Ep.* ix. § 8.
[3] *De Pace*, § 46.
[4] *Aristocr.* § 39.

for repose after an exhausting struggle, or to the exigencies of professional warfare. It was one of the many symptoms of the decay of civic loyalty. The citizen ceased to be a soldier when he ceased to be a politician. As the internal government was handed over to a small knot of orators, so the defence of Athens abroad was left to mercenaries. The evil at first appeared under a mitigated form. Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus tempered the mercenary element by a large admixture of citizen troops. Under Chares and Charidemus the new system was in full development.

The case of the fleet differed somewhat from that of the army. In the time of Pericles foreigners had been often employed to man the fleet, but the commander of a vessel and the soldiers on board were citizens. Isocrates says that in his day this practice was inverted. The needy citizens were forced to row, while foreigners served as hoplites. Thus when a descent was made on an enemy's coast, the alien went ashore under arms, the citizen with a cushion.[1]

No attempt was made to regulate the abuse by forming a permanent war fund. The question was a delicate one, whose discussion was avoided. The surplus revenue was passed to the Theoricon; and even before the law of Eubulus (p. 16) had been carried, it would have been bold to venture on questioning the arrangement. The inconsistency of carrying on wars with an impoverished treasury, and at the same time of distributing the yearly bonus, was not honestly faced. The mercenaries had to remunerate themselves as best they could.

When the citizen ceased to be a soldier, the statesman ceased to be a general. Pallas, guardian of Athens, had the double title of goddess of war and

[1] Isocr. *de Pace*, § 48.

of civil life;[1] and the old Homeric ideal of the man who is great in speech and great in action lingered on to the days of Miltiades and Themistocles. Even Pericles united in himself the twofold character, but in him the statesman predominates over the general. With Cleon the new era was ushered in, and by the time of Demosthenes the separation of functions is pretty fully recognised.[2] Phocion is noted by Plutarch as the last who resolved to resort to the elder tradition.[3] This divorce between political and military leadership was the natural outcome of specialised training. The arts of eloquence and of war had been highly cultivated, and a division of labour became not only necessary but desirable. But the change had also a darker side. The professional general was required to lead the professional soldier. This new type of soldier differed little from a freebooter; his leader was almost forced to become a banditti chief. Athenian generals found themselves obliged to conform to the temper of foreign mercenaries, to pay whom was the primary requisite. Regular pay was not supplied from home, and an idea was now current that war should be self-supporting. To the upright Timotheus this maxim meant that the plunder taken from the enemy should serve as a bounty for the soldiers. A Chares or a Charidemus so interpreted it as to raise indiscriminate levies upon enemies and allies alike. These exactions from the allies, as we learn from Demosthenes, went by the euphemism of "benevolences" (εὖνοιαι)[4]—a phrase which has curious parallels both in English and German history—and were the chief cause which brought on the fatal revolt of the allies. Yet pay must come from somewhere. "Can it come from

[1] πολεμικὴ καὶ πολιτική. Plutarch, *Phocion*, ch. vii.
[2] See the complaint of Isocr. *de Pace*, § 54.
[3] *Phocion*, ch. vii.
[4] *Chers.* §§ 24-28.

the skies?" says Demosthenes. "No! the general must go on with what he scrapes together, begs and borrows."[1] A commander in such a position had obviously to humour his men to the utmost, to stimulate the greed of gain and the love of pleasure, to give them the opportunity of squandering what they had, that they might be incited to win more. The nature of the case forbade him to pursue any large or even definite plan of operations; he must live on from hand to mouth, adopting such means as he could to prevent his troops from being tempted away by higher offers. A method of deferred pay was devised by Iphicrates to ensure this end. It is needless to say how greatly the treacherous courage, which could thus be bought, differed from the sustained and disciplined fortitude of a citizen army.

The abuses in the navy were precisely similar in kind. Two speeches, which are of the age if not from the pen of Demosthenes, give us a valuable insight into this department—the speeches *Against Polycles* (L.), and *On the Trierarchic Crown*[2] (LI.) The Trierarchy was an extraordinary public service devolving on the wealthiest citizens. At the period to which both these speeches apparently belong (before 357 B.C.), the office was divided between two trierarchs (συντριήραρχοι), whose legal duty was to maintain and keep in repair a vessel which was provided and equipped by the state. The office lasted for a year, at the end of which time the trierarch in command was bound to hand over the ship in good con-

[1] *Chers.* § 26.

[2] Blass argues forcibly for *The Trierarchic Crown* being the work of Demosthenes. If so, it is his earliest speech on a question that touched politics (its date being between 361 B.C. and 357 B.C.), and has therefore a peculiar interest. Kirchoff's pamphlet on this speech (Berlin, 1865) is an excellent enquiry into certain points connected with the Trierarchy.

dition to a successor. The vessel was generally insufficiently manned at the outset; and if extra oarsmen (ναῦται) were needed, or skilled hands (ὑπηρέται, ὑπηρεσία) employed on board, they had to be paid out of the trierarch's pocket. In the speech *Against Polycles* (359 B.C. or 358 B.C.), we read that Apollodorus, who exceeded the legal requirements in undertaking the office without a colleague, and in equipping a ship at his own expense, had his term of service extended by five months, owing to a defaulting successor, and ultimately received pay for only eight months out of the seventeen. Even the daily rations provided were insufficient. Many of his crew, who were picked men, deserted, seduced by high pay and large bounties. They saw that "my resources were exhausted, that the state was negligent, the allies impoverished, the generals untrustworthy" (§§ 14, 15). The speech *On the Trierarchic Crown* reveals another weakness in the organisation of the fleet. A custom had grown up by which the trierarch contracted with a deputy, who undertook the office as a speculation. The terror of this marauding deputy-trierarch was such that the Athenians, says the speaker (§ 13), were the only people who were "unable to travel anywhere without a herald's staff," as a pledge of peaceful intentions.

The evils of the military system were great when the general was an Athenian, and responsible to the people; they were aggravated when the general, as well as the soldiers, was a foreigner, and like them free from civic scruples. In all cases there was the same tendency to become independent of the state, and to form treasonable connexions abroad. Thus, Iphicrates became son-in-law of the Thracian Cotys, and served him against Athens, Charidemus allied himself with Cersobleptes, and Chares with Artobazus. Yet such men, some of them mere pirates, became

heroes for the time; and Demosthenes observes that victories were now ascribed to the general, and not to the nation. "No one would think of attributing the victory of Salamis to Themistocles, instead of to Athens, or the battle of Marathon to Miltiades instead of to the country. But now it is often said Timotheus took Corcyra, and Iphicrates cut to pieces the Spartan division, and Chabrias won the battle of Naxos. You seem, Athenians, to waive your claim to these achievements by the extravagant distinctions with which you have rewarded each of these generals."[1]

While success was lavishly rewarded, defeat was visited with the like severity. Even Timotheus was made to suffer for results, the causes of which were inherent in a vicious system. The relations thus created between the military and civil leaders were uniquely mischievous. The people took their estimate of the generals from the lips of the orators,[2] whose favour was therefore studiously sought. Chares spent on this object some of the contributions of the allies,[3] and Charidemus seems to have kept paid agents at home to propose honorary votes in his favour.[4] Alliances so insecure needed little to convert them into enmities. The people, quick to suspect guilt when there was failure, looked to the orators to give effect to their displeasure. Accusation might be made a profitable task. The document which is known as *Philip's Letter* (340 B.C.), now generally supposed to be genuine, hits the truth with singular exactness. He points out how it was the interest of the orators, as distinct from that of the people, to maintain war, and proceeds thus: "I am told by persons well acquainted with your government that to them peace is war, and

[1] Dem. *Aristocr.* §§ 198 ff.
[2] Dem. *Aristocr.* § 147; cf. *Trierarch. Crown*, §§ 16-21.
[3] Theopompus ap. *Athen.* xii. 43.
[4] Dem. *Aristocr.* §§ 185-6.

war is peace; for they always get something from the generals either as their tools or their accusers" (§ 19). Thus the division of labour between the civil and military authorities was ready to expand into an open breach.

From what has been said it will be seen that a financial problem was in the age of Demosthenes that which perhaps most pressed for a practical answer. The main source of revenue was dried up, since the tribute of the allies had ceased to flow in; and Athens had to fight for her existence at a moment when she was most impoverished, and when professional armies had made war more than ever costly. The people still insisted on the budget showing a surplus to be devoted to their amusements; and even had it been otherwise, the existing revenue could hardly have sufficed to keep up a war establishment. In days before the institution of a national debt, two methods only of meeting extraordinary expenditure had occurred to the Athenians. One was a direct tax (*εἰσφορά*) upon the property of all citizens except the poorest—a tax which was regarded with ever-increasing aversion—the other was the imposition of a special service upon the wealthy classes, and an appeal to their patriotism to come to the relief of the state. The latter expedient was that which the people most favoured, and on which they mainly depended. Even in 402 B.C. Lysias had said that the surest revenue of the state was the property of the wealthy.[1] But such a system created bitter class jealousies, and at the same time was ineffective. The rich, already harassed in divers ways by the democracy, found ways of evading the burden. Various attempts at reform were made, but the balance had been merely altered and not righted, till the Trierarchic Law of Demosthenes (340 B.C.) satisfied conflicting claims. But in truth the

[1] Lysias, Or. xxi. § 113.

demands on patriotism had been overstrained at Athens; what in its nature could only be exceptional was expected to be normal; the state looked for a sustained and high-wrought spirit of self-sacrifice, in times when the individual was daily drifting away from the current of civic life.

The attitude of thinking men towards politics had in it no healing influence. Between philosophy and Greek life there had always existed a latent antagonism, though in the Periclean age the signs of the future schism were as yet few. Long ago the philosophers had attacked the polytheistic religion—one of the two principles on which Greek society was based; by degrees it pronounced also against the other principle, that of the City itself. It is recorded of Anaxagoras that when some one said to him, "You don't care for your country," he answered, "I care greatly for my country," and pointed to the heaven.[1] Similarly Socrates, when asked ironically "What is your country?" replied, "My country is the world."[2] The story about Socrates, whether true or false, shows the spirit of the Socratic school, whose nascent instincts of cosmopolitanism were hampered by the narrow limits of the city. The sight too of politics degraded into faction, and of a public morality which sanctioned what private morality condemned, was repugnant to thinkers for whom individual virtue was of the highest moment. The proved impotence of all known governments, and of democracy in particular, to restrain excess and foster habits of virtue, created in the noblest spirits a profound despair. We catch its tones in the well-known passage of Plato, describing the man who, reflecting upon the evil times on which he had fallen, "holds his peace and does his own business;" "who is like

[1] Diog. Laert. ii. 7.

[2] Plutarch *de Exsilio*, ch. 5; Cic. *Tusc.* v. 37. There is a play on the double meaning of the word κόσμιος.

one who retires under the shelter of a wall in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along; and when he sees the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good will with bright hopes."[1]

Philosophy did not, however, openly assail existing systems, or attempt to head a popular and revolutionary movement. It stood aside in aristocratic seclusion, slowly moulding an educated opinion whose centre was in Athens, but whose branches were throughout Greece. The newly awakened desires for larger unions were turning dimly towards monarchy. As the world was not yet prepared to make the philosopher a king, the next best thing was to turn the king into a philosopher. Panegyrics on monarchy were written by students, and that which was at first a vague aspiration was becoming an idea that might touch practical politics. Some, like Isocrates, sought for a ruler of Greek blood who should bind together the Hellenes in some great military enterprise. Others thought of more peaceful triumphs. Any hope, indeed, with which Plato may have looked to Syracuse was rudely disappointed by the younger Dionysius; Plato's followers, however, entered into close alliance with the Macedonian court, which had for many years given a welcome to Greek philosophers. The new intellectual intercourse which now sprang up between Athens and Macedon was one fresh solvent introduced into civic life, and must have helped to bring about that final divorce between thought and action which indicated the ruin of free Greece.

[1] Plato, *Rep.* B. vi. p. 496; Prof. Jowett's translation.

## CHAPTER II.

### HIS PUBLIC LIFE AND SPEECHES. EARLY PERIOD.

DEMOSTHENES was born probably in the year 484 B.C. Like many eminent Athenians he came of a mixed marriage. His father was a well-to-do manufacturer of the deme Paeania, who had two establishments, one for cutlery, the other for upholstery. On his mother's side he had foreign blood in his veins. She was the daughter of Gylon, an Athenian citizen who had settled in the Crimea, and taken a wife from that region. Hence the reproach afterwards levelled against Demosthenes that he was a barbarian and a Scythian. He was seven years old when his father died leaving property estimated at fourteen talents (about £3400), in those days a very respectable fortune. His guardians were Aphobus and Demophon, nephews of his father, and Therippides, a friend of the family. During a minority of ten years the property might well have doubled in value, but between fraud and mismanagement on the part of the guardians, little more than one-tenth of the capital bequeathed was handed over to Demosthenes when he came of age. Of his early years we know but little; he seems to have passed a joyless and companionless boyhood. A delicate and sickly child, with a studious bent of mind, he took no part in the ordinary athletic training of a Greek; he lived at home with his mother

and a younger sister. With his sensitive nature and precocious intelligence he must soon have become aware that things were going amiss. Gradually the resolve to redress the wrongs of his house took definite shape in his mind, and henceforth, doubtless, he was an eager listener in the law courts. Tradition records the deep impression made on him by the orator Callistratus pleading for his life; and the wonder with which he observed the sovereign influence of speech. To carry out his purpose he had to acquire a knowledge of law and some rhetorical skill. The teacher he applied to was Isaeus, the well-known speech-writer, and a great legal authority, especially in cases of inheritance. Demosthenes was now eighteen years old. The three or four years he spent under Isaeus were a time of bracing discipleship, a period whose ripe results were seen in the comprehensive knowledge of law, and the grasp of legal principles, hereafter characteristic of Demosthenes, and in a faculty of rigorous reasoning at close quarters in which the pupil surpassed the master.

At the age of twenty he commenced the suit against his guardians, in an action against Aphobus (363 B.C.), in which he pleaded his own case. The full sum claimed was awarded him, but payment was as far off as ever. Under the Athenian law of debt it was not easy for a creditor to enforce his rights. Aphobus, who had already refused to abide by an arbitrator's decision, and had otherwise shown himself an adept at artifice, resolved to defeat the judgment of the court. He succeeded in delaying the issue by creating out of the present trial two fresh suits. The more important of these was that of Demosthenes against Onetor, the wealthy brother-in-law of Aphobus. A pretended mortgage had been made to him of a farm belonging to Aphobus, as a means of preventing Demosthenes from seizing the farm in execution of the judgment.

The amount finally recovered by Demosthenes is not known; it can have been but a remnant of his patrimony, enough to secure him a competence and no more.

The speeches **Against Aphobus,** and **Against Onetor,** show the marked influence of Isaeus, not only in certain borrowed commonplaces and similar turns of expression, but in their general spirit and structure. It may well be that Isaeus aided in their composition, but we cannot infer, with some ancient critics, that the speeches were written by him. The features in which they recall Isaeus are for the most part features common to Isaeus and Demosthenes; —lucid reasoning, cogent and elaborate proof, narrative and proof interwoven, more emotional warmth, a more rapid and nervous phrase, than is commonly found in the earlier forensic oratory. More distinctively Demosthenic are the recapitulations, the frequent use of the dilemma, the persuasive earnestness of tone. The perorations claim special notice. The two speeches *Against Onetor* end in a peculiarly Isaean manner,—in an argument powerfully thrust home. In the two speeches *Against Aphobus* the deep indignation of the young man kindles him into a final appeal more pathetic than Attic usage sanctioned.

These years of painful effort were a fit training for the struggle of after life. It is true they may have helped to make Demosthenes an ungenial person, to turn seriousness into sourness, a reserved into a morose temper. But without the absorbing passion that occupied his boyhood, and the obstacles that he had to encounter single-handed, we should perhaps never have had the great qualities that marked the mature man. In the tenacity of purpose, the self-concentrated energy with which he pursued his end, there was the promise of future greatness.

"You have not yet," says Demosthenes, at the end

of his second speech against Aphobus, "proved me, and you cannot know what service I may do you: but at least you may hope that I shall not be a worse man than my father." Already, perhaps, the young man had some stirrings of ambition; by the time the suit against his guardians was over he was certainly becoming conscious of his powers. But he had many natural defects to remedy. His articulation was defective, his manner clumsy, his voice weak and ill-managed. On his first appearance in the assembly he sat down amid laughter and uproar. With indomitable patience he strove to subdue his rebellious organs. Demetrius of Phalerum heard from his own lips how with pebbles in his mouth he had recited verses, how he had declaimed while running, or as he walked up hill, and how he had practised his gestures in front of a mirror. Other more sensational exercises are not so well attested. He also had recourse to the lessons of actors, and formed himself on their model. The grave dignity of the Periclean oratory had given way to a more dramatic and impassioned manner. Demosthenes conformed himself to the prevailing taste, but fastidious critics always found something overdone in his delivery. His early difficulties left some permanent trace. He never seems to have attained perfect certainty and self-control in extempore speech, and for this, among other reasons, he seldom rose, even in answer to a clamorous demand, save after careful premeditation. Yet rare occasions are recorded on which his improvised eloquence achieved signal success.

His first regular work was speech-writing for the law courts—at Athens a frequent stepping-stone to public life, as was the profession of an advocate at Rome. Even in later years, and at the height of his political activity, he never wholly gave up this work. Most, however, of the speeches he wrote for others

belong to the years 362–354 B.C. For seven years after his own lawsuit it does not appear that he again spoke in court. He was slowly perfecting himself in private. His spare hours he spent in practice with the pen, in the study of law and of Athenian history, and in mastering the practical politics of the day, especially questions concerning the navy and finance. After hearing a speech he would come home and resume its main outlines by himself, and even recall its periods. Passing events and law cases afforded him matter for solitary discussion; in his own chamber he recounted the facts and argued doubtful points.

His earliest court speeches were in private (or, as we should say, in civil) cases. But by degrees his forensic labours brought him into contact with public life. The Athenian law courts stood in a peculiar relation to the legislature. The responsibility for a measure rested during a year, not with the body that passed it, but with the author of the measure. Within that time he might be indicted for an "unconstitutional proposal" (γραφὴ παρανόμων), that is, for proposing a measure inconsistent with existing laws. The tribunal had in each case to determine the vague phrase "unconstitutional." Many questions of party politics were thus fought out in the law courts. The forensic speeches of Demosthenes in these public causes must be taken as an exposition of his general policy. Even when he is writing for others, himself remaining hidden behind the scenes, the voice is still that of Demosthenes. His strong personality, his sincerity of conviction, breaks through dramatic disguises. The speeches composed for political trials from 355 to 352 B.C.—*Against Androtion*, *Against Leptines*, *Against Timocrates*, *Against Aristocrates*—all exhibit the formed purpose of a statesman. They may be read as the prelude to his political career. Already

he had set himself the task of his life—to assert for Athens her proper place in the Greek world, to reform domestic abuses, to rouse again the civic spirit, which appeared to him to be slumbering, not dead.

The speech **Against Androtion** (355 B.C.), written for Diodorus, is a blow aimed by Demosthenes against the existing administration. Androtion had proposed that the outgoing Council should receive, as usual, a golden crown. Diodorus and Euctemon jointly attacked the measure as illegal. Euctemon had spoken first. The main issues are supposed to have been already dealt with, and the second speaker assumes the right to a freer handling. Of the legal arguments against the proposal, the first, which is technical, is passed over lightly. The second is more seriously urged, that there was a law prohibiting the bestowal of the crown in cases where the Council in its year of office had not added new ships to the navy. Demosthenes appeals, as his manner is, to history to show that the state of the navy had a decisive influence for good or evil on Athenian affairs. As a further objection to the proposal it is argued that Androtion, being a man of infamous character and a state debtor, was disqualified from speaking in the assembly. These personal imputations, which would have been relevant only if backed up by legal decisions, lead up to an account of Androtion's public administration. An indignant force animates this part of the speech, and reveals the true voice of Demosthenes behind that of the speaker. The special charge, which is narrow and in part technical, broadens out into an attack upon a mischievous system. Demosthenes, it is clear, has put his heart into the case. He inveighs against Androtion as one of a corrupt school, whose financial policy was showy and unsound, and who imagined that they might override the laws at their will and pleasure. The argumentative subtle-

ties with which the speech abounds rest upon the thought that constitutional forms must be jealously guarded. The concluding passage (§§ 69-78) resembles in tone the great political speeches that are to come. Demosthenes has already formed his own conception, hereafter to be enlarged but not essentially altered, of what the spirit of Athens truly is. That spirit Androtion has misread. He did not see that "this people has never striven to acquire riches, but always to win renown. Once the wealthiest of the states of Greece, it spent all in the cause of honour. Hence it has won treasure imperishable, alike in the memory of noble deeds and in the splendour of the monuments which enshrine them (§ 76). The mingled irony and indignation with which the speech ends are strikingly unlike the ordinary calm of the Attic peroration.

The verdict was given in favour of Androtion.

The speech **Against Leptines** marks the first occasion on which Demosthenes appeared in court on a political question. Leptines had carried a law withdrawing the hereditary immunities which had been bestowed on public benefactors, and attaching a penal prohibition to the proposal of similar immunities for the future. The descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton were alone exempted. A year had expired since the law had been passed. The author of it was therefore no longer personally responsible, but the law itself might still be arraigned as unconstitutional.[1] Those whom Demosthenes supported in this trial proposed in its stead a law which should regulate but not abolish such honorary grants. There were, however, plausible arguments on the other side. The moment was one of financial embarrassment at the end of the Social War; the measure of Leptines,

[1] Hence the title of this speech, *πρὸς Λεπτίνην*, not *κατὰ Λεπτίνου*.

removing privilege and equalising burdens, was in apparent harmony with democratic principles; and cases existed where the disproportion between reward and merit was conspicuous. The measure too was popular, for it secured the people in their amusements, the exemptions in question being exemptions only from the "ordinary liturgies," that is from those state burdens which were connected with the festivals. The speech of Demosthenes subjects the measure to a detailed but comprehensive treatment. Various threads of argument are interwoven. He contends that the law is dishonourable, impolitic, unjust, and unconstitutional. But there are no symmetrical divisions corresponding to these several lines of thought. He sometimes combines the points of view, sometimes passes by easy transitions from one to the other. The presiding thought is that the law is a violation of public faith. It is inconsistent with the spirit of Athens. Athens had always valued a good name above riches. Commercial morality was protected by strict legislation: was the national credit to be more lightly esteemed? So nice and jealous had been the honour of the Athenians that they had paid debts contracted in their name even by usurpers such as the Thirty Tyrants. The saving effected by this law was after all slight; but were it far greater, it would be too dearly purchased. Such a parsimony was not economy. If the state was impoverished, all the more ought they to guard their credit, the one treasure that was their own. "You must beware," says Demosthenes, "not to be found guilty as a nation of acts from which you would shrink as individuals" (§ 136) They might be tempted in the name of religion to repudiate their promises. The festivals, it might be said, are religious services, obligatory upon all. But the pretext of religion could not justify a dishonesty

which human morality condemned. Besides, nothing was so abhorrent to Athens as meanness or pettiness of soul. Let her retain her large generosity, and still hold forth high inducements to patriotism: who could say when she might again need a liberator, and wish to recompense him? At the end of the speech Demosthenes employs an illustration which tradition had ascribed to Solon, and which the orator himself works out more fully elsewhere (*Timocr.* § 212): "Those who debase the coinage you punish with death: strange indeed will it be if you give ear to those who debase the whole commonwealth and render it untrustworthy" (§ 167). Such are briefly the great principles which Demosthenes conceived to be at stake. "My main point," he says, "is not the question of the immunity. I maintain that the law introduces a vicious practice, the result of which will be to create a distrust of all the grants conferred by the people" (§ 124). The speech must be read in order to appreciate the variety of argument which he brings to bear upon this central idea. The style is that of calm reasoning. It never quite rises into the language of passion, but a moral elevation of view does the persuasive work of passion. This and a certain subtle delicacy of expression are the two features of the speech which most impressed the ancients.

On turning to this speech after *The Androtion* we recognise here a new feature—a quiet self-mastery and studied moderation. There is no invective; at most there are touches of courteous irony. In general it may be observed of the early speeches of Demosthenes, that those which he delivered himself, whether forensic or deliberative, differ from the forensic speeches which he composed for others. The former are on the whole guarded and temperate, the latter are more abrupt, impassioned, and personal. It may

be that he grew warm and even violent as he put his thoughts on paper; that as a speech-writer for others he yielded to this tendency; but that in his first public appearances he resolved not recklessly to prejudice his career by making personal enemies.

In the same year (354 B.C.), at the age of thirty, he came forward and spoke in the Assembly. Tradition tells us of previous attempts which were failures, but the specch **On the Symmories** or **Navy Boards** is the first political harangue of which we have a record. The speech had a double motive. The question under immediate discussion was war with Persia. Demosthenes connects it with a measure for the reform of the Navy, whence the speech derives its title. Rumours were afloat of an intended invasion of Greece by Artaxerxes Ochus, King of Persia, and a burst of warlike patriotism was awakened. The Athenians had recently aided a revolted Satrap, and were quick to detect a coming vengeance. The Persian preparations were in truth directed against rebellious subjects; but at Athens there were some who told of the vast armament already on its way, of the 1200 camels laden with gold which the king was bringing; how he would raise a large army of Greek mercenaries, and how the faithless Thebans would again join him as of old. Demosthenes had to cool the misdirected ardour of his countrymen, and he seized the moment to lay down some broad lines of foreign policy. He saw, as is evident from various indications in the speech, that Persia was no longer a serious menace to Greece. But while restoring public confidence, he does not seek to remove all apprehension for the future. Fear was preferable to apathy, and was capable of being turned into a healthy stimulant. The Greeks, he pointed out, might combine for a defensive war; they could not, and ought not, for a war of aggression. Their fear

of Persia was for the time neutralised by mutual hatred. "Your ambassadors will simply go on a rhapsodising mission from town to town" (§ 12). To force the states into a premature union would be to drive the weaker among them into the arms of Persia.

Athens was the guardian of Panhellenic interests, and had exceptional obligations. "Many of the other Greek states may prosecute private interests of their own to the neglect of Greece at large: for you it would be dishonourable even to take vengeance for your wrongs in such a way as to bring the wrong-doers under the barbarian yoke" (§ 6). Danger was not now imminent. Their immediate need was to husband their resources, and take precautionary measures against the evil day. This leads him to his practical proposal, which he introduces with a characteristic preface. "The head and front of your preparation consists in a frame of mind such that each man among you shall be willing and eager to do his duty. Whenever you have been united in your aims, and each individual has regarded the task of execution as devolving upon himself, nothing has ever slipped from your grasp. On the other hand, whenever you have formed a determination, and then looked at one another, each expecting his neighbour to act while he was to remain idle, everything has failed you" (§§ 14, 15). The key-note of the *Philippics* is here struck. He proceeds to explain his scheme of navy reform. The scheme has, as he himself says, been laboriously thought out, and it is precise in every detail. It is based on the existing organisation of the *Symmories*, and aims at ensuring the better despatch of armaments by bringing the departments of the navy into a closer and better defined relation to one another. For this purpose the larger boards are broken into smaller groups; to each group is assigned a corresponding division of

the fleet, and its proper share of the funds. Definite duties are substituted for vague and diffused responsibility. He did not now ask them to raise money; the money would be forthcoming when the danger was more real (§§ 16-23). The orator then returns to the main topic, and reinforces his previous arguments. We may refer in passing to his sentiment about Thebes, which is far removed from narrow prejudice: "I know it is difficult to say anything to you about that people. You hate them so that you would not like to hear anything to their credit, even if it were true." He then declares his belief that "so far from them ever being likely to join the Persian king in an invasion of Greece, they would give vast sums, if they could, to atone for their past offences against her" (§ 33). The substance of his advice is resumed thus: "Do not then expose the maladies of the Greek world by convoking its members when they will not listen to you, and going to war when you will be unable to carry it on. Rather keep quiet, maintain your courage, and make preparations" (§ 38).

No previous speaker had urged this course of action, and throughout the debate Demosthenes was almost unsupported. The invasion of Persia by a united Greece had long been a popular theme for rhetoricians and declaimers. It had a special charm for a people who lived, as the Athenians did, almost wholly on the memories of the past. Isocrates had, two years before, urged the plan with an almost pathetic earnestness as the only cure for their manifold ills. And now it seemed to meet the crisis and to fall in with the temper of the people. Demosthenes, with that sense of the possible which is one of the first requisites of statesmanship, marked firmly the limits within which such an idea was applicable. And the people, in answer to this convincing

wisdom, gave up a futile enterprise. The positive side of the orator's counsel did not meet with equal favour. No alteration was made in the navy till sixteen years later, when he himself carried a more simple and thorough reform.

This speech is a remarkable instance of Demosthenes' earlier manner. A long study of Thucydides, whose influence can hardly be traced in the court speeches of the same period, has here left its manifest mark. The style may perhaps in part be explained by the scrupulous premeditation of a young man before facing the Assembly. Be that as it may, there is a stiff dignity in the language and an extreme compression of thought differing from his later style.

One fact remains to be noted. Nowhere in this speech is Philip named. An allusion to him has been generally supposed in the repeated mention of existing and acknowledged foes (§§ 11 and 41), as opposed to contingent enemies such as Persia. Mr. Mahaffy (Greek Lit., ii. 315) has, I think, shown from the context itself good reason for doubting this reference. This much, however, is beyond dispute, that the gravity of the danger from Macedon was not as yet apprehended by Demosthenes any more than by other politicians.

In the course of the next year (353 B.C.) Peloponnesian affairs engaged attention. Epaminondas had left behind him two creations in the Peloponnese—an independent Messene, and a new city, Megalopolis, into which were incorporated the scattered villages of the Arcadian league. These young communities had grown up under the shelter of Thebes, but Sparta bitterly resented her lost dominion, and ever since the battle of Mantinea had watched her moment for recovering it. Thebes was now hard pressed in the Phocian war, and Sparta's opportunity seemed to have come. But her designs must be decently

veiled. She proposed a general restoration of ancient rights, by which all possessions held by the several Greek states before the disturbing period of Theban supremacy should be resumed. Athens among other states would profit by it. She was allured by the promise of the border town of Oropus, an old and coveted possession now in the hands of Thebes. The gain to Sparta herself was kept in the background, but it was not far to seek. Messenia was again to be Sparta's, and Megalopolis was to be dissolved under the pretext of communal independence. Athens had already, in 355 B.C., undertaken to help Messene in the event of a Spartan invasion. Megalopolis, now threatened by Spartan arms, and unable to look to her natural protector Thebes, sent an embassy to Athens. A counter-embassy arrived at the same time from Sparta.

Each cause found heated advocates, and Demosthenes, at the beginning of the speech **For the Megalopolitans,** says that one might fancy the speakers in the debate to be Arcadian and Lacedæmonian delegates, not Athenian advisers. The anti-Theban feeling was at this time dominant at Athens, and to plead for Theban allies was to uphold a losing cause. Demosthenes adopted a line of professed neutrality, but in effect he supported the application of Megalopolis. His primary thought is that the balance of power must be maintained (an idea which recurs in the speech *Against Aristocrates*, § 102). Athens could not afford to allow either Thebes or Sparta to become menacing to herself. His opponents had laid stress on the inconsistency of which Athens would be guilty, if, after deliberately siding with Sparta at Mantinea against Thebes and her Arcadian allies, she were now to dissolve this friendship. To this objection Demosthenes opposes first the threatening ambition of Sparta, who has violated the compact (§§ 6-10), and then the

constant tradition of Athens to protect the oppressed (§§ 14, 15). "Circumstances will be found to shift with changing ambitions, but the policy of Athens is the same" (§ 15). He discerns in the specious proposals of Sparta a revival of old methods. It was "too late in the day for her to become generous." That "each state should possess its own" was a phrase with a well-known historical meaning. Rather than help Sparta to regain her former ascendency, Athens should, if necessary, renounce the hope of Oropus. It would be a grave mistake to reject now, as was once done before, the suit of the Arcadians, and again to drive them to seek other aid.

War between Sparta and Megalopolis followed. The Athenians, whatever vote they may have passed (of that we have no record), stood aloof from the contest. Some years later, when the Arcadians were again in distress, they looked not to Athens but to Philip. In him they found a willing protector, and they became among the trustiest of his allies.

The speech **For the Liberty of the Rhodians** is another utterance upon foreign policy, and may be taken in this connection. It is akin to the speech *On the Symmories* as touching the attitude of Athens to Persia; to that *For the Megalopolitans*, as being the answer to another appeal against oppression. At the end of the Social War (355 B.C.) Rhodes was subjected to Mausolus, prince of Caria, a vassal of Persia, and an oligarchy dependent on him was established. On the death of Mausolus, who was succeeded by his widow Artemisia, the democratic exiles besought Athens to aid them in freeing their country from the Carian yoke. There was a strong popular feeling against Rhodes, which had led the revolt of the allies against Athens (357 B.C.), and her humiliation was hailed as a well-earned chastisement.

Demosthenes had to take account of this feeling, and to treat it with delicacy and management. He pointedly disclaims being the official patron of the Rhodians (οὔτε γὰρ προξενῶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, § 15). In order to put himself *en rapport* with his hearers, he even assumes a tone of rejoicing over Rhodian misfortunes. Yet in Athenian interest, and that only, he bids them forget old grudges (μὴ μνησικακεῖν, §§ 15, 16). Then he unfolds to them the larger aspects of the question. The cause was that of democracy against oligarchy, of freedom against oppression. A contest with oligarchy was a contest with an armed doctrine, one in which no quarter was given (§§ 17-21). Having carried his hearers with him through the political argument, he is able to go one step farther, and to venture now upon a touch of human sympathy. "Though it may be said that the Rhodians are justly punished, the occasion is not one for exultation. The prosperous should always show an unselfish concern for the distressed, seeing that the future is dark to all men" (§ 21). But definite objections had also to be met. It was said that interference with Rhodes would probably entangle Athens in war with Artemisia, and perhaps with Persia. Demosthenes deals twice with this point (§§ 11-13 and §§ 22-24). He gives reason for thinking that Artemisia would remain neutral. As for the Persian king, his hostility, judging by recent history, was not formidable, but in any case it ought to be braved. This advice the orator shows (§§ 7-10) not to be inconsistent with the position taken up in the speech *On the Symmories*. But a question of right was also raised. Treaty engagements were urged which bound Athens to non-intervention. Demosthenes denies that there would be here any infraction of right; but maintains that, even were it otherwise, Athens could not alone support treaty rights which all other powers had agreed to violate. "When every other

state is only seeking the means of wrong-doing, for us alone to allege pleas of justice, in order to avoid serious effort, I count not justice but cowardice" (§ 28). Towards the close of the speech a lively attack is made on an anti-democratic party in the state. It is an anticipation of later and more scathing onslaughts upon the leading politicians. The people are themselves in part to blame; they keep in their confidence proved partisans of the enemy. "You should have regarded a man's post in politics exactly as you do his post in war. You hold that the man who deserts the post assigned him by his general, ought to be degraded and to forfeit his public privileges. Similarly those who desert the political post inherited from their ancestors, and who support an oligarchical policy, ought to be disqualified from acting as your counsellors."

Once again Demosthenes failed. From various passages in the speech (§ 1, § 30, §§ 34, 35) it appears that he had good hopes that the resolution would pass; he doubted whether it would be executed. From a later speech (*On the Peace*, § 25) we learn incidentally that Rhodes was in 344 B.C. still under Carian rule.

The speech *For the Rhodians* has been traditionally assigned, on the authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, to the same year as the *First Philippic* (351 B.C.), and to a later period in that year. I have never understood how the statesman who spoke the *First Philippic* could within a few months revert to an earlier point of view. Philip is indeed mentioned once, but it is only a passing reference. "Some of you, I see, constantly disparage Philip as of no account, and dread the Persian king as a powerful foe, when he chooses to be such. If we are to despise the one too much to repel him, and are to fear the other so far as to yield him everything, against

whom, Athenians, shall we take the field?" (§ 24). This is an advance upon some earlier speeches, but its tone is very different from that of the *First Philippic.* Dionysius is not always accurate as a historian, and I am disposed to think, with Mr. Mahaffy, that the speech ought to be brought forward either into the same year as the speech *For the Megalopolitans* (353 B.C.) or at latest into the year following.[1] As an independent argument it may be added that the manner in which the orator, appealing to the recollection of his audience (§ 6), repeats the very phrases he had used in the speech *On the Symmories* seems to imply less of an interval between the speeches than is commonly supposed. At any rate, the received chronology breaks the orderly development of Demosthenes' thought, and offers nothing to account for the retrograde view taken in the speech *For the Rhodians.*

We must here turn back from the Assembly to the law-courts, and observe again the activity of Demosthenes during this period in purifying home affairs. In 353 B.C. he is once more in conflict with Androtion, who had escaped condemnation in the former trial. Androtion and certain of his fellows had been called on to refund public moneys which they had embezzled; in default of payment they were liable to imprisonment as state-debtors. Timocrates brought forward in their interest a measure essentially altering the existing law, by extending the time after which state-debtors became liable to arrest. This measure was to be retrospective. It was pushed through the

[1] In this case we may accept the date given by Diodorus for the death of Mausolus (353 B.C.)—an event which from the speech itself we infer to have recently happened—as against Pliny's date (351 B.C.) The chronology of other eastern events alluded to is uncertain, but there is nothing, I believe, in it fatal to the view put forward above.

Assembly, but within a year after it passed Diodorus and Euctemon indicted the proposer. Under these circumstances Demosthenes composed the speech **Against Timocrates** for Diodorus. Several passages of it are verbally repeated from the *Androtion;* the speech is a long one, and raises many curious points of law. Demosthenes contends that the law of Timocrates was carried informally, that it was in substance unconstitutional, and would be mischievous in its working. The arguments are by no means all of equal value. Some seem to depend on oversights in the drafting (§§ 79-81, and perhaps §§ 82, 83), others are downright captious (§§ 85–87, and still more obviously §§ 88, 89), while others remain that are powerful and subtle. But from § 91 onwards he leaves mere technicalities and verbal criticisms, and grapples with the question in its wider issues. He shows how the public services will suffer if the state has no prompt method of enforcing its claims (§§ 91-95). At the best of times it is no easy matter to keep pace with the sudden calls of war, but under this new statute "will the enemy, think you, wait the subterfuges and artifices of rogues at home?" The system of internal finance will also be deranged, for no adequate provision is made for current expenditure (§§ 96-101). He exposes the evils of retrospective legislation, devised to shield political associates. "To frame statutes about the past is not to legislate but to protect criminals" (§ 116; cf. § 123). Towards the end of the speech he uses a vivid illustration: "Suppose that at this very moment you were to hear a cry raised close to the court, and that you were told 'The prison is opened, the prisoners are escaping,' there is not one of you, however old or indifferent, but would lend what help he could. Suppose, further, that some one came up and said, 'It is Timocrates who has set them free,' at that

instant and without a hearing Timocrates would be arrested and put to death. Well, Athenians, this man you have now in your hands: not by stealth has he done this deed, but in broad day by cheating and cajoling you he has passed a law, which does not open the prison-house but demolishes it, and with the prison, the tribunals" (§§ 208, 209). The peroration is a dignified statement of the duty of Athens above all states to guard her laws and especially her penal code.

The last forensic speech belonging to this early period is the speech **Against Aristocrates** (352 B.C.) Apart from its intrinsic excellence it has a special and twofold interest. It is our chief authority on the law of homicide at Athens; it also presents a detailed picture of *condottieri* life in this century (p. 20). Aristocrates had carried a resolution in the Council declaring the person of Charidemus to be inviolable, and any one who attempted his life to be an outlaw from the dominions of Athens and her allies. Charidemus was a soldier of fortune, a native of Oreus in Eubœa, who at this stage of his chequered careeı was established as minister, commander-in-chief, and brother-in-law to the Thracian prince Cersobleptes. The Athenians, still grieving for the loss of Amphipolis, were impressed by the assurance that Charidemus would recover it for them (§ 14), though it was by his faithlessness that it had once already slipped from their grasp (§ 149). The proposal was checked before it reached the Assembly, being impeached as illegal by Euthycles, for whom Demosthenes composed this speech.

The structure of the speech is unusually symmetrical for Demosthenes. There is a formal threefold division, according to which it will be shown, first, that the proposal is illegal; secondly, that it is against the public interest; thirdly, that Charidemus does not

deserve such a distinction (§ 18). The arguments, however, under the second and third head overlap and interlace in the Demosthenic manner. The legal case is stated from §§ 23-99. The Draconian law of homicide is quoted and lucidly interpreted. The law itself is a remarkable survival of a primitive period. It forms the earliest of the *strata* out of which Athenian criminal law was composed, and came down from a time when private vengeance still existed, and expiatory rites were blended with punishment. The orator proves, apparently with overwhelming force, that the proposal of Aristocrates contravenes all the principles of this code. Not having the text of the proposal, we cannot be sure that such was the intention of its author; but the quotations reveal, at least, serious ambiguities of phrase, and of these Demosthenes avails himself to the uttermost. Under the second head (§§ 100-143) the main contention is that the Chersonese is endangered by the proposal. Here, as had been said at the outset (§ 1), lay the vital point for deliberation. The jealousy of the Thracian princes was the safeguard of the Chersonese; a strong monarchy in that quarter might be fatal to Athenian interests, and the decree of Aristocrates, being virtually in favour of Cersobleptes, would give him a preponderant power over his rivals. Cersobleptes was perhaps friendly at present, but bitter experience had shown the value of friendships with semi-barbarian potentates. Others, moreover, with as good a claim as Charidemus, would apply for a like honour. Was the state to become the bodyguard of every such adventurer? The proposed decree tended as little to the honour of Athens as to her interest. European Greeks were by it made over to Cersobleptes in the same way as the Asiatic Greeks were, by the peace of Antalcidas, surrendered to Persia. Throughout this division of the speech the argument is enforced by an apposite use of historical

examples—an instrument which no one wields with more effect than Demosthenes. The third topic is the past life of Charidemus—how he had been in Athenian, Olynthiac, Asiatic, and Thracian service, and had played false to pretty nearly each employer in turn.

In the epilogue Demosthenes broadly reviews different principles of reward and punishment. He contrasts the wise economy observed by the elder democracy in the distribution of honours with the lavishness of later days. Nor were previous deserts then allowed to atone for subsequent disloyalty, whereas the chastisement of offenders was "an idea now extinct in Athens" (§ 204). Amongst the visible signs of this decline was the private magnificence that stood beside public indigence. "Now our administrators have risen from beggary to wealth, and are abundantly provided for years to come, while you have not in the treasury sustenance even for one day's march; but the moment for action comes, and the means are wanting. For in old days the people was the master of its statesmen; now it is their servant. The fault is theirs who draw up resolutions like these, and accustom you to despise yourselves, and to look up to one or two individuals. Then they enter into the heritage of your glory and your wealth. As for you, you have no enjoyment of them; you witness the blessings of others, while your only part is that of dupes. Oh! how greatly would they groan, those men of old, who died for freedom and for glory, who left behind them memorials of many a noble deed, could they but know that Athens has attained to the style and rank of a dependant, and is taking counsel whether she is to guard the person of Charidemus! Charidemus! woe the day!" (§§ 209, 210). The spirit of Athenian eloquence forbade the orator to end here The reason of the jury must be won, their

feelings must not seem to be stormed. So the key is altered. The peroration of the speech is a calm summary of the legal arguments (§§ 215-219).

It would appear that the proposal of Aristocrates was confirmed in spite of Demosthenes. In the next year Charidemus was in the Athenian service, and was sent on a mission to aid Cersobleptes. Amadocus, a rival prince, had meantime sought the protection of Philip, who, entering Thrace, soon imposed his will on him and Cersobleptes alike. Henceforth it was against Macedon that Athens had to defend the Chersonese.

## CHAPTER III.

### HIS PUBLIC LIFE AND SPEECHES. FROM THE RISE OF MACEDON TO THE FALL OF OLYNTHUS (348 B.C.)

The power of Macedon had now been growing for seven years, but had excited little observation. The first mention of Philip in Demosthenes is in the speech *Against Leptines* (354 B.C.); it is little more than a sigh over lost possessions, Pydna and Potidæa. In the speech *On the Symmories* (354 B.C.) the allusion to Philip is, at best, very doubtful (p. 39); in the speech *For the Megalopolitans* there is none. The speech *On the Rhodians* makes cursory mention of Philip. In the speech *Against Aristocrates* (352 B.C.) he emerges more distinctly as the enemy of Athens (§§ 111, 112, § 116, § 121), but it is difficult not to read something of contempt in the words *ἴστε δήπου Φίλιππον τουτονὶ τὸν* Μακεδόνα (§ 111), "I need not ask whether you know of that Macedonian Philip." He is then cited as an instance of restless but short-sighted ambition, and that only by way of comment on the Thracian prince Cersobleptes. Nor does a later passage (§§ 118-121), in which he is made to point a warning against faithless friendships, betray any serious alarm.

The blindness of the Greek world to the rise of the Macedonian power may be puzzling to us who know the sequel. But we must take into account

first the contempt of the Greek for the barbarian, which tended to obscure events. Macedon was outside the Hellenic pale. Thessaly might at a stretch be included within it, but Mount Olympus was the farthest limit. The Macedonian language was indeed allied to the Greek, but a mixture of foreign elements had almost effaced its Hellenic kinship. Far more important than differences of language was the different mode of life. The basis of Macedonian life was not the city (πόλις), but the tribe (ἔθνος). The people, instead of being self-governed, were under the rule of a king; and though their monarchy was probably a relic of the heroic age, and differed widely from Asiatic despotism, yet civilised Greece considered it essentially barbarous. It was useless to point to the true blood which ran in the veins of the kings, who were descended from Heracles and the Temenids of Argos, and one of whom, Alexander I., so long ago as the time of the Persian invasion, had run in the foot-race at Olympia, and as victor had been celebrated by Pindar.

The first civilising efforts were made by Archelaus I. (413–399 B.C.), the Peter the Great of this Russia of the ancient world. He organised the army, fortified towns, and opened up the country with roads; but the elements of civil life, and the industries of peace, remained foreign to the people. Still less could the higher culture of Greece make its way among them. Archelaus gathered to his court Greek artists like Zeuxis, dramatists like Euripides and Agathon, musicians like Timotheus; he even sought to attract thither Socrates. But whatever the court circle may have acquired of refined tastes, the heart of the people was untouched. Upon Archelaus' death there followed anarchy and civil war for forty years. Macedon was still an outlying district of barbarism.

Moreover, Macedon had not hitherto been strong

enough to take an independent course of action. Surrounded by enemies, it had waited upon the turns of Greek politics, attaching itself now to Athens, now to Sparta, as passing needs required. A tradition of astute diplomacy had been created, but no great statesman had yet appeared. Macedon had come to be regarded as a makeweight which might turn the doubtful scale of Greek ambitions, but not as an independent force. It was by the aid of Sparta that Amyntas, Philip's father, had been able to keep his crown. Macedonian towns had till quite recently been tributary to Athens. Philip himself and his brother had been brought (369 B.C.) by the dethroned Eurydice as suppliants to the knees of the Athenian general Iphicrates.

In 368 B.C., Philip, at the age of fifteen, was taken by Pelopidas as a hostage to Thebes. There, during three years of exile, he acquired all that Greek culture could give. He observed closely the shifting scenes of Greek politics, and the forces moving behind them; and above all, he learned military tactics from the great Epaminondas. In 360 B.C. he became regent for his nephew, and presently took the sovereignty for himself (359 B.C.) Within less than two years from his regency he had overcome enormous difficulties. He had cheered the spirit of a people broken by defeat, he had curbed a proud nobility, he had set aside rival claimants to the throne, and had thrust back his enemies from two frontiers. He now set himself to reconstitute the army, drawing closer the ties of military fellowship, and turning to account the lessons of Epaminondas in the organisation of the Macedonian phalanx, which remained unconquered till it met the Roman legion. But if Macedon was ever to become more than a petty state, it was necessary for her, as it was for Russia in later history, to push her borders to the

sea. At present Greek colonies barred the way. Three powers commanded the northern waters of the Ægean,—Athens, Amphipolis, and the revived Olynthus. A coalition between any two of these might have been fatal to Philip's projects. From the first he pursued one consistent policy, that of isolating his enemies, and playing off the jealousies of state against state. Not until the arts of intrigue and diplomacy were exhausted, would he resort to force.

Amphipolis first engaged his attention. This town was strongly situated near the mouth of the Strymon. It held the main road from east to west, and gave access to the gold mines and the timber of Thrace. It was a colony planted by Pericles in 437 B.C., as an outpost of Athenian influence in that quarter. It had been taken by Brasidas in the Peloponnesian war (424 B.C.), and repeated efforts to recover it had failed. Philip, on his accession, anxious to conciliate the Athenians, withdrew the garrison placed there by his predecessor, and renounced his claim. But Athens neglected to occupy the town. Meanwhile Philip, relieved from pressing dangers at home, seized a pretext for attacking it. Envoys were sent to Athens beseeching aid; but secret negotiations had been in progress between Philip and Athens, the purport of which was that Athens should restore Pydna, which had been wrested from Macedon, and in return receive Amphipolis. With the embassy from Amphipolis came a letter from Philip, and renewed assurances of good will. He was besieging Amphipolis, he said, in the Athenian interest, and intended to restore it to them as rightful owners. The Athenians agreed to the treacherous bargain, and were duped. Philip took and kept Amphipolis (357 B.C.)

The Olynthians, now alarmed at the course of events, made overtures to Athens. Philip's deputies were also at hand to counterwork the petition. The

king, they said, was still minded to restore Amphipolis, but the Athenians had not yet fulfilled their part of the compact, the transfer of Pydna. At this moment Athens was almost destitute of resources and of allies, for the Social War had lately broken out. The Athenians were the less inclined to alienate Philip and to renounce the hope of Amphipolis, and therefore rejected the Olynthian overtures. Olynthus, estranged from Athens, welcomed Philip's advances. He entered into alliance with them, and ceded Anthemus, a disputed possession lying between Olynthus and Macedon. Then he boldly laid hands on Pydna (357 B.C.), and besieged Potidæa, an Athenian town which held the isthmus of Pallene. Succour was sent from Athens, but too late to be of any avail. After a protracted siege Potidæa surrendered, and Philip made it over to Olynthus as a further pledge of their new friendship. The Athenian garrison he dismissed home, with a declaration of peaceable intentions towards Athens.

Thus Philip had robbed Athens of all her seaports save one on the Thermaic Gulf, and had opened a wide breach between his two most formidable opponents. Amphipolis, his greatest prize, he now turned to good account. In the neighbourhood he founded a new city, Philippi, among the mines of Mount Pangæus, from which the yield of gold was a thousand talents a year, sufficient to maintain his wars and pay his agents. Timber for the construction of a fleet was supplied from the mountains. The year 356 B.C. was signalised by three events of good omen for Philip, following one upon another—the defeat of the Illyrians by Parmenio, an Olympic victory in the chariot race, and the birth of a son, Alexander.

For the next three years Philip was consolidating his victories in the north. His apparent inaction seems to have disarmed suspicion, and even to have

lulled the vigilance of Demosthenes. But in 356 B.C. the Athenians lost Methone, their last town on the Macedonian coast, and Philip was brought within reach of Thessaly, which was to be his stepping-stone into Greece. Fortune gave him an opportunity such as he loved, the Sacred War, which broke out in 355 B.C., being his pretext. The Amphictyonic Council, at the instigation of Thebes, had imposed a fine on the Phocians for sacrilege. The Phocians seized the temple of Delphi, and soon applied the treasures of the god to support their mercenaries. They then allied themselves with the tyrants of Pheræ. Philip was thus able to appear as the champion at once of freedom and of religion. A great victory in 352 B.C. made him master of Thessaly. From the port of Pagasæ he dominated Eubœa and menaced Athens. Corsair ships issued hence, harassing the allies, pillaging Lemnos and Imbros, and capturing Athenian merchantmen. A sacred trireme was on one occasion carried off from the bay of Marathon.

Philip now conceived a more daring project, to penetrate into Greece itself, and chastise the Phocians in the heart of their own country. The news of his march to Thermopylæ roused the Athenians for once to vigorous action. A citizen force was despatched, and Philip found the gates of Greece closed against him. For years to come this prompt deliverance was a theme for orators, and a memory on which the people complacently reposed.

In the latter half of the same year (352 B.C.), Philip, seeing that events were not yet ripe for him in Greece, fell back upon Thrace. He received the submission of the Thracian princes, and advanced towards the Thracian Chersonese, which Athens had not long since recovered (357 B.C.) The news that he was besieging Heræon Teichos, a fort on the Propontis, arrived in Athens in November 352 B.C. There was a panic in

the city. At all hazards they must keep their hold on the Chersonese, and secure their corn supplies from the Euxine. An armament was voted, to be manned with Athenian citizens. Reports then came that Philip was ill—some said he was dead. The expedition was given up, and the old torpor returned. But rumour was soon again busy with Philip and his movements. He was meditating, it was said, the overthrow of Thebes in combination with Sparta—he had sent an embassy to Persia—he was fortifying towns in Illyria (*Phil.* i. § 48). Splendid resolutions were carried, but no action was taken. At length, after a series of idle debates, Demosthenes, in the second half of 351 B.C., surprised the Assembly by coming forward before the recognised leaders of the house, calling on the people to break once and for all with the old system.

The **First Philippic** marked the beginning of a long struggle between opposing principles. Hitherto Demosthenes had attacked the existing administration indirectly in the law courts; now he placed himself in open and personal antagonism to it. He felt the delicacy of his position, as we see from some apologetic tones in the speech (§§ 1, 15, 51). He begins with a reference to the futile guidance of his opponents as his own excuse for speaking, but personal bitterness there is none. The events of the past year had revealed to Demosthenes, with terrible distinctness, that the danger was great and imminent. But he alone had eyes to see. The peace policy, instituted after the Social War, was still cherished by the people. The chief spokesman of this party was Eubulus, who in 354 B.C. had become Steward of the Treasury. An able financier, he had adapted his whole system to one end,—the renunciation of foreign politics, the encouragement of home industry, and the comfort and amusement of the citizens. Upright

and patriotic himself, he lent his influence to foster the selfish and pleasure-seeking instincts of the Athenians. His programme not only made no provision for war, but almost consciously excluded it. Among his followers was found Phocion, who, with his stronger character and greater attainments, might have been expected to leave his mark on the age. Of all men in Athens he was most respected for a stern virtue. But a philosophic training had left him clear-sighted and despairing. Half-heartedly he mixed in public life, and accepted with an undisguised contempt the honours thrust on him by his countrymen. The leader of aristocrats and men of intellect, he allied himself also with Eubulus and baser associates, and upheld abuses which he had not the courage to mend. Isocrates, too, the elegant but unstatesmanlike pamphleteer, was one of the peace party. Four years ago he had put forth his views on home and foreign policy. He probed the sores of Athenian life with a sure touch, but his proposed remedies were almost childish, and the nerveless rhetoric in which he expounded these remedies failed to make a single convert. The *First Philippic* draws a picture of Athenian character in many respects identical with that of Isocrates. The improvident city is portrayed with its make-shift policy, devoid of all intelligence and scope, its bursts of barren emotion with relapses into indifference, its blows that are struck too late. The speech is a stirring call, no longer "to do battle by resolutions and despatches" (§ 31), but to act vigorously and with a plan. Its object is to provide for the future, not to meet a passing danger. Nowhere else are the shortcomings of the people so unsparingly handled, but correction is tempered with consolation, and the effect of the whole is to stimulate, not to benumb. In style the *First Philippic* is in Demosthenes' most

distinctive manner; rapid, clear, incisive; vigorously reasoned, but instinct with passion; with one central and recurring thought led up to by converging lines of argument.

The orator starts with the plain truth that the Athenians must follow other counsels than those which had prevailed. All had indeed gone ill with them, but there was one element of hope for the future, that they themselves were to blame for the past; and that they had not yet put forth their strength. He reminds them how not so long ago they had risen successfully against Spartan domination; he sets before them the example of their enemy, Philip, who out of weakness had waxed great by vigilance and energy. "He saw well that all the places he seized are the open prizes of war, that those who are present are the natural owners of the goods of the absent, those who are willing to venture and to toil, of the possessions of the careless" (§ 5). But there was no divinity about his greatness. Even now at the eleventh hour they might retrieve the past if only they would one and all shake off their apathy. "Philip is not a man to rest satisfied with conquests won, he is ever enlarging his circle, and whilst we wait and fold our hands, he envelopes us on all sides with his toils. When then, Athenians, when will you do your duty? What are you waiting for? For necessity? Then what are we to think of present events? To my mind, the strongest necessity a free man knows is shame for his cause. Or tell me, do you prefer to stroll about and ask one another, Is there any news? Why, what newer thing could there be than a Macedonian subjugating Athenians, and ordering the affairs of Greece? Is Philip dead? No, he is only ill. Dead or ill, what difference to you? If anything should befall him you will soon raise up another Philip for yourselves" (§§ 7-11).

Demosthenes then proceeds to explain his own scheme, which is composed of two parts. First a fleet of fifty triremes must be equipped, which shall be kept in reserve, always ready to sail at short notice, and forestall Philip's descents on the coast. Citizens must serve on board the fleet (§§ 16-18). This part of the plan stands in somewhat loose connection with the rest. It is mentioned briefly, and is hardly an essential point, for it does not enter into the financial statement which follows. The orator passes rapidly to the second part, which contains the pith of the speech (§§ 19-30). A small standing army must be kept up for offensive operations, consisting in part of citizens. "Talk not of your 10,000 or 20,000 mercenaries, mere forces on paper" (ἐπιστολιμαίους δυνάμεις, lit. "forces that exist in despatches," § 19). His proposal, he is aware, was a modest one compared to more ambitious but unexecuted projects; it was, however, as much as their present resources could bear, and it was capable of expansion. All he asks for is 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry, but he insists that one-fourth of each arm shall be Athenian citizens. He shows from experience how necessary this was. The officers too should be Athenians, and chosen not for show but for service. "Putting aside some one general whom you send to the field, your generals all parade in the processions with the masters of the ceremonies. Like modellers of wax figures, you choose your infantry and cavalry officers for the market and not for war" (§ 26). (A financial statement follows. A scheme finding ways and means was here read out, but not being an integral part of the speech, it has not been preserved.)

In the third division of the speech (§§ 31-50) he reverts again to his central topic—a permanent force and personal exertions—and approaches it from another side. The Athenians could not at any

moment send succours northward, owing to the northerly winds of summer and the storms of winter. They must therefore station their armament throughout the year at Lemnos, Imbros, or some adjoining island, from which they could annoy Philip and protect the allies. Thus they would no longer lose place after place by arriving too late. "It is the part of skilled strategists not to follow upon events, but to direct them" (§ 39). Athenian warfare is, however, like barbarian boxing. "When a barbarian is struck, he always feels for the blow; strike him elsewhere, and there go his hands; parry the blow and look his adversary in the face he cannot and will not" (§ 40). Philip's restlessness seemed to be providentially ordained as a spur to quicken their slow intent; it could not but rouse them unless they had fallen into a last despair. A war that had been begun to chastise Philip had become a war of self-defence. It was time for them once more to fight their own battles (here again he strikes the dominant note), to do more than send out empty galleys and idle hopes from the platform—armaments which excited the laughter of the enemy and the deadly apprehension of the allies. They need only go forth, and "the war itself would discover the weak places of Philip's power" (§ 44). "Citizens of Athens should be at once soldiers in the field, witnesses of the conduct of the war, and judges of the general on his return" (§ 47). They might then hope for a better stamp of general, not one that "braved death two or three times over in the law-courts, but never once dared to face death on the battlefield" (§ 47). They had had enough of accusation and news-mongering: "Away with such talk! Sure we are of this, that Philip is our enemy, that he robs us of our own, that he has long insulted us, that all we have trusted to others to do for us has turned out to have been done against us, that what

remains depends upon ourselves, that unless we are now willing to fight him abroad, we may be compelled to fight him here" (§ 50).

The *First Philippic* is one of a series of Philippics on which we now enter. The series naturally falls into two groups. The first includes the speeches delivered while Philip was still a foreign power seeking admission into Greece—the *First Philippic* (351 B.C.), and the three *Olynthiacs* (349 B.C.) The second group belongs to the period subsequent to the peace of Philocrates (346 B.C.), and comprises the speech *On the Peace* (346 B.C.), the *Second Philippic* (344 B.C.), the speech *On the Embassy* (343 B.C.), *On the Chersonese* (341 B.C.), and the *Third Philippic* (341 B.C.) Philip had by that time secured a foothold in Greece, and been received into the Amphictyonic Council.

During the earlier period (351 to 346 B.C.) Demosthenes stood almost alone in Athens. Ranged against him were all easy-going citizens, with their leaders, the philosophers and men of letters, the commercial classes, the short-sighted patriots, and as the years went on an increasing band of Philip's hirelings. In the speeches of this period he is at once combating Philip, and a more insidious foe, the Athenian people. His voice has many tones—indignation, scorn, warning, encouragement—but the theme is always one. He appeals to the αὐτὸς ἕκαστος, to the individual man, to the will and to the conscience; and strives to kindle a spirit capable of sustained effort. But he sees that he is pursuing a fugitive object. The people, once assembled, seem to be alive with generous sentiments; they love to hear of the past and of great deeds which they may emulate. Decrees are carried and there is an illusory sense of duty done. No sooner has the intoxication passed off than each man seeks how to

shirk his own part. The emotion which is spent upon itself weakens the capacity for genuine action. Demosthenes attempts to shame his hearers by pointing to Philip. He is the embodiment of action, they excel in barren talk. He possesses the very qualities for which they once were famed. In the mouth of an adversary we read this description of Athenian character in Thucydides (i. 70): "They are equally quick in the conception and execution of every new plan. . . . They are bold beyond their strength; they run risks which prudence would condemn; and in the midst of misfortune they are full of hope. . . . Their bodies they devote to their country, as though they belonged to other men; their true self is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. . . . To do their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as disagreeable as the most tiresome business." Personal service is now the one thing they grudge to their country.

Of Philip's movements for the next two years we know little. He was working darkly, though doubtless with an aim; and his apparent inaction may have been partly meant to quiet suspicion. When next he comes into view he is engaged in a design which must have been long premeditated. He had already established three main points of contact with the sea,—at Amphipolis on the Strymonic Gulf (Gulf of Contessa), at Methone on the Thermaic Gulf (Gulf of Salonica), and at Pagasæ (Volo) in Thessaly. But between the two gulfs mentioned there lay the unsubdued promontory of Chalcidice, separating his kingdom from Thrace and the Euxine, and studded with Greek colonies. We have already seen how the Olynthian confederacy was broken up by Sparta, (p. 3). At the accession of Philip the league was partially restored, though Athens as well as Macedon

had done her best to crush its growth (364 B.C.) We have also seen how Athens in 357 B.C. rejected the suit of Olynthus, and the bribes by which Philip bought her friendship. But the Olynthians now saw themselves hemmed in by the encroachments of Macedon ; Thrace was being subjugated, Thessaly had succumbed, and their turn must come next. In 352 B.C. they made peace with Athens and an alliance was discussed (*Aristocr.* § 109), at which Philip marked his displeasure by making a demonstration against Olynthus. The alliance fell through, and Philip, contenting himself with this, retired for a while into Illyria and Epirus. Though capable, as few men have been, of swift decisive movements, he also knew how to wait. He had many agents in the Chalcidic towns working upon the discordant interests of the league, and in Olynthus itself he had gained influential citizens. It was probably midsummer 349 B.C. when he entered Chalcidice with an army, and besieged some of the confederate towns. Up to the last professions of peace were on his lips (*Chers.* § 59; *Phil.* iii. § 11). Olynthus now sent an embassy to Athens, proposing alliance and beseeching help. Events had of late marched rapidly, and the blindness which had led the people to reject the prayer of Amphipolis in 357 B.C. was no longer possible. On this occasion the **First Olynthiac** was spoken.

The chronology and sequence of the Olynthiac orations cannot be determined with certainty. The discussion is too minute for this place, but it is probable that all three speeches belong to 349 B.C., and that the traditional order of the speeches is right. It is strange that in the case of a speaker so free from vagueness as Demosthenes, the speeches themselves should not throw more light upon the order in which they come. But the main situation is the same

throughout, and the interval between them is brief. Philip's attack is directed not yet against Olynthus, but against the confederate cities. Demosthenes, moreover, is in a sense tongue-tied; he is leading up to a measure on which he dares not bring a regular motion. By the law of Eubulus, the Festival Fund (p. 16) could not be appropriated to war purposes, and the proposer of such a measure was liable to an indictment. It is this that hampers Demosthenes all through the *Olynthiacs*. He is aware that no substantial good can be done till the financial system is reformed, and, therefore, while pleading for Olynthus and proclaiming the urgency of the crisis, he also impresses on his hearers that a change of administration is the primary requisite. But the prevailing faction was strong, and the subject had to be warily approached. In the *First Olynthiac* he states the two alternative methods of raising funds, with a feigned acquiescence in whichever method the people approves. In the *Third Olynthiac* he boldly pronounces that the Festival Fund must be applied to war. This marked advance would alone be almost decisive in favour of keeping the *Third Olynthiac* in its present place. The relation of the other two speeches to one another is a far more doubtful point.

To return to the *First Olynthiac*. The petition of Olynthus seems to have met with little opposition. Before Demosthenes spoke, it had probably been resolved to conclude the treaty, and to send help.[1] What Demosthenes demands is prompt action, and the simultaneous despatch of two citizen forces, one to defend Olynthus, the other to harass Macedon.

The crisis itself, he says, is an eloquent call to action. The succour you send to Olynthus must consist of Athenian troops, and be sent promptly;

[1] The tone of the speech points to this conclusion; and the use of the article τὴν βοήθειαν (§ 2) is also significant.

with it must go an embassy to announce its coming, and to defeat Philip's intrigues in the city. The King's absolutism, helpful as it is in war, happily creates a mistrust in free communities. The Olynthians see by the fate of other cities that they have now to fight, not for glory or for a strip of territory, but to save themselves from ruin and slavery. A longed for opportunity has presented itself to you. Olynthus, by no intervention of yours, has fallen out with Philip, and may be made a fast friend. Seize the moment, and beware of repeating former errors. Think of Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, Methone, Pagasæ, all lost through our neglect. "Always letting slip the present, and fancying that the future will take care of itself, we have ourselves raised Philip to a height of power greater than that of any previous king of Macedon" (§ 9). By the grace of the gods we can to-day repair something of the past, and wipe out the shame. But if now we abandon Olynthus, the highway is opened for Philip to go whither he will. Judge what he *will* do by what he *has* done. Contrast "that activity which is part of his habit and very being" with your indolence. "If it is to be his firm principle ever to outdo the past, and yours to take nothing heartily in hand, what, think you, can we hope to be the end? In the gods' name, is there one among you so simple as not to know that, if we are so careless, the war yonder will soon be here? And in that case, Athenians, I fear it will be with us as with men who borrow lightly at a high interest. They have a brief spell of prosperity, and then they lose their capital itself. So, I fear that we may turn out to have paid dearly for our indolence, that our pleasure-seeking ways may force us in the end into many a hard and unwelcome task, and that even our home possessions may be at stake" (§§ 14, 15).

The second part of the speech (§§ 16-20) contains

his positive advice. The assistance sent to Olynthus must be twofold, in order to be effective. One force must be despatched to save the Chalcidic towns, another to harass Macedon. As for the money, there was a fund ready to hand (so cautiously does he indicate the Festival Fund), if it were thought well to use it. Failing that, nothing was left but extraordinary taxation—in one way or other supplies must be forthcoming. Demosthenes expressly declines to frame a motion concerning the Festival Fund; he merely expresses his view that the receipt of a salary from the treasury ought to be conditional on service.

The third division of the speech (§§ 21-27) is in its main thought similar to the first; under another aspect he shows how favourable the moment was for action. Philip's position, he says, has weaknesses in it not visible at first sight. He has been disappointed at the resistance he has met with. His allies, the Thessalians, true to their character, are showing signs of wavering, and the Illyrians would gladly throw off the yoke. In Philip's necessities behold your opportunities. Turn them to account, as he would do were he in your case. Above all, remember that now you have to choose between war abroad and war at your own door. Once Olynthus has fallen, who is to prevent him from marching on Attica? Thebans? Why—though it is a harsh thing to say—they will aid him. Or Phocians? They cannot help themselves. And an invasion, if it comes, will mean ruin and shame.

The peroration is a brief appeal to the rich, to the young, and to the people's advisers, each to take his share in a cause in which all have an equal interest.

The speech missed its chief aim. Alliance was indeed made; but if any succour was sent it was merely the mercenary force under Chares, which from other sources we know to have been despatched in 349 B.C. From certain passages (*Olynth.* i. §§ 16, 17;

*Olynth.* ii. § 11) it might seem that the *First* and *Second Olynthiac* were both delivered before assistance was sent. But the tone of the *Second Olynthiac* implies that it is designed to meet a mood of despondency, due probably to some miscarriage in the war. In this light we can see the special force of §§ 27-29. From these paragraphs the inference is natural that complaints were raised by a clique of politicians against the general who was out on service. We may conjecture that Chares, being short of proper supplies from home, had been indulging his predatory tastes.

Though the *Second Olynthiac* would, on this supposition, follow the *First Olynthiac*, there is a close resemblance between the point of view taken in each. The introductions to the two speeches are very similar (*Olynth.* i. §§ 5-10; ii. §§ 1-4); and Philip's relations towards Thessaly are described in almost identical language. Only it must be observed that the leading idea of the *Second Olynthiac*—that Philip's power is less formidable than it seems—is merely sketched in the *First* (*Olynth.* i. § 21 ff.) In the **Second Olynthiac** the thought is developed under various aspects, always as an incentive to increased energy on the part of the Athenians. Philip's external weakness is portrayed in his relations with his allies (§§ 5-10), his inner weakness in his relations with his own subjects and friends (§§ 14-21). These are the central divisions round which the rest is grouped. There is a subtle symmetry in the structure, which only yields before a close analysis. After the exposition of the first idea, an objection is answered (§§ 9, 10), and practical exhortation follows (§§ 11-13). A corresponding method is observed in dealing with the second idea.

Philip's power, says Demosthenes, is based on perjury and wrong; by bribes and promises, he has cheated in succession Athens, Olynthus, and Thessaly.

His artifices are now exhausted, and his allies, whose eyes are opened, will fall away. Forts and havens do not in themselves constitute power: on justice alone can a durable structure be reared. Bear aid then, and that instantly, to the Olynthians; enter into negotiations with the Thessalians, but be sure that you back up your words with actions, for Athens has a name for facile speech, and her promises are distrusted. Macedon in itself, and apart from allies, is not formidable. The people have little sympathy with the ambition of their prince, and with a glory of which they do not reap the fruits; they are weary of incessant wars, which cut them off from home life, and shut the ports upon the hard-won products of their industry. Philip's famous bodyguard is of little worth; his jealous dislike of excellence banishes men of ability, and none are left as his companions but brigands and buffoons. "At present, no doubt, prosperity casts these blemishes into the shade: success has a wonderful power of hiding such base elements from view. But the first check to his arms will bring all to light. And I think we shall not have long to wait, if it be the gods' will and your resolve. In the human body while a man is in good health he is not aware of local ailments, but on the first touch of illness, all starts into life, rupture or sprain, or any other unsoundness in the system. So too with states and sovereigns; so long as they carry on war abroad, their defects escape the general eye; but when once war meets them at close quarters, it lays bare their weaknesses" (§§ 20, 21).[1]

Philip, you say, is favoured by fortune. Yes, but

[1] The idea of this passage is possibly borrowed from Plat. Rep. viii. p. 566 E. It is remarkable that the same illustration is almost verbally repeated in *The Crown* (§ 198). There, by a bolder application, Æschines is the latent unsoundness which disturbs the body politic.

Athens is more highly favoured, if only she would do her duty. "But here we are sitting still, and doing nothing; and the sluggard cannot command the services even of his friends, much less those of the gods. No wonder indeed that he, always in the field, always in activity, everywhere present, never letting an opportunity slip or a season go by, prevails over us who are putting off, passing votes, and asking questions. This does not surprise me. . . . What I am surprised at is, that you, Athenians, who in former days fought the cause of Greece against the Lacedæmonians, who, rejecting many opportunities of selfish aggrandisement, spent your own substance in contributions, and bore the brunt of danger in the field,—and all to protect the common rights,—that you now shrink from service, and are slow to contribute in defence of your own possessions" (§§ 23, 24). Hitherto you have been accusing one another, trusting to others rather than to yourselves, and letting time go by. Your fortune can never mend until your conduct is changed. Nothing is now left for us to keep—we have to recover all. The work is ours, and must be done immediately; ourselves and our property must be put at the disposal of the state. Not until we do our part, can we call our generals to account. Ill-supplied by you, they embark on enterprises of their own; they are recalled, and brought to trial for misconduct. While you are wrangling and governing by a clique of orators and generals, the public interest suffers; one class bears the burdens, the others pass votes of censure. When will you become your own masters, and cease to follow the blind bidding of leaders? The sum and substance of my advice is this, that you should all contribute your share to the war, all serve in turn, and give to all an equal hearing in your counsels, judging each proposal on its merits, and apart from personal influence.

No reinforcements, it would seem, were despatched between the time of the *Second* and *Third Olynthiacs*. The three main expeditions which we know to have been sent during the war, are each connected with an embassy from Olynthus, and of such repeated embassies there is no hint in the speeches. In the *Third*, no less than in the preceding Olynthiacs, the outbreak of the war is treated as quite recent (*Olynth.* iii. § 6: cf. i. § 7; ii. § 1). Demosthenes still speaks as if all had yet to be done; for the first expedition of relief under Chares he probably regarded as too ineffectual to deserve the name. Olynthus itself, as distinct from the Chalcidic towns, is not represented as in more pressing danger than before. Yet the **Third Olynthiac** is separated from the other two by a marked difference of character. The buoyant confidence with which, in the two first speeches, the orator had welcomed the opportunity, has given way to a tone of anxiety and passionate warning. Touches of light irony no longer find place. With indignant remonstrance he strives to dispel illusions; he rebukes and chastens an undue exultation, caused doubtless by trivial successes of mercenaries. In this mood it was to be feared that the people would forget the lessons of the past, and content themselves with being spectators of the war instead of actors in it. So Demosthenes abandons his attitude of reserve, and speaks out some hard truths for which the ears of his audience had been gradually prepared. In attacking the administration of Eubulus he strikes at the heart of the mischief. For the first time he openly declares that the fund now appropriated to the festivals must be devoted to war. A war tax, which he had before put forward as the only alternative, was a progressive tax upon property, and fell on all the citizens, except the poorest (p. 24). It was unpopular and difficult to raise, and fit only to be a supplementary or occa-

sional expedient. Demosthenes demands that the law by which the surplus revenue was passed to the Festival Fund shall first be formally repealed. At Athens a statute could not, as in Roman law, be implicitly abrogated. A body called the Nomothetæ were appointed every year to revise the laws; they were, in fact, a jury invested with the functions of a legislative committee. Demosthenes asks that such a commission should deal with the Theoricon; the repeal of the existing law would clear the way for a definite motion. The question of the Theoricon runs through every division of the speech; each line of argument converges upon this point (§§ 10-13, 19, 31, 33 ff.) The epilogue (§ 33 ff) sketches rapidly the working of a scheme by which the distribution of the Festival Fund might be regulated without being abolished. A skeleton of the speech is here added.

The speakers, says Demosthenes, who talk to you of punishing Philip have taken no reckoning of facts. The time is past when this language might have been used; our first concern now is how to save our allies. I feel some difficulty, however, in advising you, for hitherto you have failed from want of will, not of knowledge. I must ask you, therefore, to bear with me if I speak to you with some plainness.

You remember three years ago how you resolved to send an expedition against Philip—how reports came that he was ill, and the expedition was abandoned. There is another such crisis to-day; do not repeat the old mistake. It has long been your wish that Olynthus should be at war with Philip; events have worked out your wish. Let us then aid Olynthus vigorously, and with all our heart. When Olynthus has fallen, Athens will be endangered. From hostile Thebans or impoverished Phocians there is nothing to hope. We shall be constrained, instead of aiding others, to seek aid ourselves.

We are resolved, you say, to help Olynthus; but how is it to be done? Do not be startled at my answer. Appoint a legislative commission, not to frame new laws (you have enough already), but to repeal such existing laws as are mischievous—those, I mean, by which the funds which ought to be applied to war are distributed among festival-seers at home, as well as those which permit evasions of military duty. Until these laws are formally abrogated, you cannot expect any one to bring ruin on himself by venturing on a salutary proposal.

Resolutions by themselves are useless; had it depended on resolutions, Philip would have been chastised long ago. Let us now act, and in good earnest; let us not throw the blame of past failure upon others, when all are equally in fault. The only practical method of attaining our end is to deal with the Festival Fund; show me any other means, and I will gladly accept it. "But I wonder if it ever has been, or ever will be, that when a man has spent his all on what is bad, he should have what he has lost to spend aright" (§ 19). Let us face hard realities, and not be misled by our wishes. It would be as mean as it would be foolish to suffer Philip to enslave Greek states, and all for want of supplies.

I do not wantonly court unpopularity. I would but imitate the candour of the statesmen of early times, who did not humour their audience when great interests were at stake. The subservience of later-day politicians has exalted them, and at your expense. Look on the two pictures,—Athens of old, and Athens as she is.

"For five and forty years our fathers ruled over a willing Greece; more than 10,000 talents they brought into the Acropolis; the king of Macedon paid them that submission which a barbarian owes to Greeks; many glorious trophies they erected in

memory of their own prowess by land and sea; alone of all men they have left an inheritance of renown which envy cannot touch" (§§ 24, 25). Such were they in their relations to Greece. In their own city the public edifices were of incomparable beauty and grandeur, private houses were of a modest simplicity (see p. 15). Turn now to the present. At a time when the field was free, and there was none to contest the prize with us,—for Sparta had fallen, and Thebes had her hands full,—"when we might have held our own securely, and been umpires of the claims of others, we have been robbed of our territory, we have spent more than 1500 talents to no purpose; the allies whom we gained in war have been lost to us in peace through yonder leaders; we have trained into greatness our enemy and rival. If not, I would ask any one to come forward and tell me whence, but from the heart of Athens, has Philip drawn his strength. But, I am told, things abroad may be bad, our home affairs are now better. What are the proofs? The parapets that we whitewash, the roads that we repair, the fountains, and such like fooleries? Look now at the men of whose administration these are the fruits. They have exchanged beggary for wealth, obscurity for eminence; some have erected private houses more magnificent than the public buildings; and as Athens has been abased, so have they been exalted" (§§ 27-29).

What is the cause of the change? It is this. Formerly the people had the courage to fight its own battles, and was master of its statesmen. "Now political leaders have the disposal of emoluments; all business passes through their hands. You, the body of the people, emasculated, stripped of treasure and of allies, are reduced to the rank of menials and supernumeraries, only too happy if your friends dole you out festival moneys, and get up special processions,

and, to crown your manly conduct, you feel grateful for being offered what is your own. Meanwhile, they coop you up within the very walls of the city, and lead you to your pleasures; they make you tame and obedient to the touch. To my mind it is impossible that lofty and generous sentiments can be inspired by mean and paltry actions. The sentiments of men must bear the exact impress of their habits" (§§ 31, 32).

If you will return to the ancient ways,—if you will serve and work and give of your abundance, you may yet achieve some solid good. You may free yourselves from these pittances which are like the diet physicians prescribe to their patients. "As the sick man's diet neither imparts strength nor allows him quietly to die, so these doles of yours are not enough to be of substantial benefit, nor do they allow you to pass to something better in despair" (§ 33). In time of peace let the citizens still enjoy the bounty of the state; in time of war let the state exact service from all,—service in the field from the young, service in organising and supervising from the old. What is bounty in the one case will be salary in the other. It is not enough for us to sit idle, listening to reported victories of this or that man's mercenaries; we must work ourselves in our own cause, and not desert the post of virtue bequeathed us by our ancestors.

"I have said, I think, all that I deem expedient; I pray that you may take whatever course is likely to conduce to the good both of the country and of yourselves."

No immediate action, as far as we know, followed this speech. But early in 348 B.C. new troubles arose. Through Macedonian intrigue, and against Demosthenes' advice, Athens engaged in a costly and futile enterprise on behalf of Plutarchus in Eubœa; and at a moment when her undivided energies were

needed to save Olynthus, she had a double war on her hands. The prospect was alarming, and Demosthenes' policy concerning the Theoricon was for the moment accepted by the people. On the motion of Apollodorus it was resolved that the surplus revenue should go to war purposes; but the measure was presently reversed, and its author prosecuted and found guilty.

In the spring of 348 B.C., Philip, who had been temporarily called away to quell a rising in Thessaly, was opening a second campaign against Chalcidice. One by one the allied cities fell before him; some yielded to his arms, the gates of others opened to his gold. He advanced within a few miles of Olynthus, curtly telling the inhabitants that either they must quit Olynthus, or he Macedon. Already a small body of Athenian cavalry had been sent on from Eubœa to Olynthus. A last and pressing appeal for aid now came. The Athenians despatched a considerable force of citizens, not of mercenaries; but the north wind was contrary, and before the succour could arrive, Olynthus, after a gallant defence, had fallen. Philip determined to leave here a signal record of his vengeance. Olynthus and her thirty-two confederate towns were levelled to the ground; her 10,000 inhabitants were sold into slavery. A traveller in those regions, says Demosthenes seven years later, could not even have traced the site of cities (*Phil.* iii. § 26). No act of Philip's life gave a greater shock to Greek feeling. Whether from policy or from temperament, Philip was, as a rule, a magnanimous enemy; even the prejudices of Greeks he was careful not to wound. It is true that Olynthus was a revolted ally, and that Greek history afforded cruel precedents in such cases, yet these precedents hardly applied to a prince who was still a foreigner and outside the Hellenic world. The terror, how-

ever, inspired by the act mastered all other feelings. The moment was a decisive one for Greece. Men's imaginations were overawed, and the perspective of events was fatally disturbed. Philip followed up his conquest by the use of arts in which he was skilled. Amid great rejoicings he held the Olympic festival, instituted in Macedon upon the Greek model. Here he made himself of easy access to all. Some thought it their wisdom to come to a timely understanding with the conqueror, and were soon captivated by his gracious advances. They brought back with them to their several homes a taint, which became a spreading corruption throughout Greece. Others watched events at a distance with a wavering loyalty and enfeebled courage.

## CHAPTER IV.

### HIS PUBLIC LIFE AND SPEECHES. FROM THE FALL OF OLYNTHUS TO THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES (346 B.C.)

THE Eubœan war of 348 B.C. gave rise to an unpleasant incident in Demosthenes' life. A certain Midias, of whose insolent and vulgar opulence we have a vivid picture, had an old feud with Demosthenes, dating from the time of the suit against Aphobus. An award had then gone against him. He had already taken vengeance on the arbitrator by procuring his disenfranchisement, and had watched his opportunity against Demosthenes. The Eubœan war, which was strenuously opposed by Demosthenes, was supported by Eubulus and his adherents, including Midias. Thus party differences came in to inflame personal dislike. It so happened that Demosthenes had undertaken to furnish the chorus for his tribe at the Great Dionysia in 348 B.C. Midias, with malignant pertinacity, took every means to spoil the performance; he even tried to tamper beforehand with the judicial award. On the day of the performance he struck Demosthenes in the face before the whole theatre. Demosthenes laid a Probole, or preliminary complaint, before the people, and a vote was passed declaring Midias to be guilty of contempt of the festival (ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν). The vote by itself carried no legal sanction;

it remained to be confirmed by a tribunal. Demosthenes, rejecting all offers of compromise, carried to its last stage the procedure of the Probole, under which the extreme penalty of the law, extending to death or confiscation, might be enforced. The peculiar features of the outrage were that it was committed against an official personage, and at a religious solemnity; and these are the points that Demosthenes presses home.

The speech **Against Midias** has received both in ancient and modern times an admiration which it is difficult fully to share. Lord Brougham goes so far as to say that it "excels in spirit and vehemence perhaps all his other efforts." There is, no doubt, in it a genuine and fiery indignation; both in its strength and in its weakness, it is an admirable example of ancient invective. The pathos, which in Demosthenes is commonly disguised or subdued, is here prominent. All the figures of rhetoric can be illustrated from the speech; the diction itself has often a poetic cast, betraying strong emotion. Demosthenes has invested the subject with such dignity as it admits of. Each of the main divisions of the speech is wrought up into a kind of peroration, in which the wider aspects of the outrage are presented. But a "box on the ear" cannot even by genius be elevated into the higher order of ideas; the very solemnity of the scene at which it occurred makes the effect a trifle ludicrous. A stinging sense too of personal wrong is often dominant in the speech, and class jealousies, which in his public life Demosthenes strove to allay, are appealed to in a tone which recalls a tribunician harangue in early Roman history. But lighter touches are not wanting. The description, for instance, of Midias himself is amusing. Elected to a cavalry command on the strength of his riches, so stingy was he that he paraded on a borrowed horse, which, however,

he could hardly sit in a procession through the market-place (§§ 171-174). The one public burden he incurred was a trierarchy; or rather it was a desertion and a speculation disguised as a trierarchy (§§ 166–7). "Where then are his brilliant doings? Where are his official services, his splendid outlays? For myself I cannot see, unless it be in this—that he has built a mansion at Eleusis large enough to darken all the neighbourhood—that he keeps a pair of white horses from Sicyon, with which he conducts his wife to the mysteries or anywhere else he fancies—that he sweeps through the market-place with three or four lackeys all to himself, and talks about his bowls, and drinking horns, and saucers, loud enough to be heard by the passers-by" (§ 158). But there are also passages of calm and grave eloquence. There is one such in the peroration: "Just ask yourselves and seek what it is that makes you who are jurors for the time being the supreme power in the state, whether the number empanelled be two hundred, a thousand, or what not. It is not, you will find, that you, unlike the rest of the community, are marshalled in arms, that yours is the best bone and muscle, that you are in the first bloom of youth. Nothing of the kind. It is owing to the strength of the laws. And what is the strength of the laws? If any one of you is injured and cries for aid, will they run up and lend help? No; they are dead letters and nothing more. This they cannot do. Where then lies their power? In their being enforced by you, in their being made always valid for all who need them. Thus the laws are strong through you, and you through the laws. You are bound, therefore, to defend them as you would yourselves against wrong, to regard all injuries done to the laws, whosoever the author prove to be, as injuries to the community. No public services, no pathetic appeals, no personal influence, no device of art, must

avail to shield the transgressor of the laws from paying the penalty" (§§ 223-225)

Apart from the blemishes inherent in the subject matter of the speech, there remain marks of incomplete revision. These are explained by a statement occurring first in Aeschines (*Ctesiphon*, § 52), which is left uncontradicted by Demosthenes, and is repeated by Plutarch and others, that Demosthenes in the end compromised the suit for half a talent. It was not the half-talent, we may be sure, that tempted him to forego his revenge. Such was not the temper he showed in the long suit with his guardians, or in the earlier stages of this very affair. It has been plausibly suggested that he dropped the case in obedience to political motives. At the end of the year in which this speech was written (347 B.C.), he is found acting in conjunction with the party of Eubulus, as one of the embassy sent to negotiate peace with Philip. To this new connection he may have sacrificed some personal feelings. But this leads us back to the main thread of the history.

The fall of Olynthus in 348 B.C. produced a sudden change of front in the policy of Eubulus. Embassies were sent in all quarters to unite the Greeks in a national war. This is the first occasion on which Aeschines comes much into notice. He had been in turn an usher in his father's school, a tragic actor, and a clerk in the Assembly. His brilliant and versatile gifts opened for him a way into public life, and here he became a follower of Eubulus. He now undertook a mission to Arcadia. At a meeting in Megalopolis he inveighed against the traitors who had sold their country, and denounced Philip as "a blood-guilty barbarian" (*βάρβαρόν τε καὶ ἀλάστορα*, Dem. *Emb.* § 305). It was not long since that Megalopolis had received a cold rebuff from Athens (352 B.C. p. 41), and the summons to arms naturally met here with

no response. But other states paid as little heed. Intent on their local quarrels they looked to the mediation of Philip with hope rather than fear.

This failure to bring Greece into union with Athens left only one course open. Demosthenes and all other thoughtful men saw that after a war of unbroken disaster some breathing-space was needed. Even before the taking of Olynthus, Philip had indirectly informed the Athenians that he was prepared to treat with them. The subsequent capture of Athenian citizens in Olynthus produced a profound impression, and informal negotiations were set on foot for their release. About the same time (347 B.C.), Thebes had appealed to Philip against the Phocians, and envoys from Phocis reached Athens urgently beseeching aid in holding Thermopylæ. The Athenians, as in 352 B.C., sent prompt succour. Phalæcus, the Phocian general at the pass, refused, from suspicion or jealousy, to admit the Athenian troops. To the Athenians this conduct suggested painful doubts whether Phalæcus might not have a secret understanding with Philip. If so, it was one more argument in favour of peace. Philip, on his side, was well disposed to listen to overtures. It was an essential part of his scheme to make an unopposed entry into Greece. He meant to march through Thermopylæ as the champion of the god. All the subsequent negotiations, all the delusive assurances with which he entertained the Athenians, were directed to this end, though he himself must have been surprised at the docility with which the Athenian ambassadors lent themselves to his plan.

The first official overtures came from Athens. Philocrates proposed, and Eubulus seconded the proposal, that ten ambassadors should be appointed to treat for peace with Philip (end of 347 B.C.) The envoys chosen included Philocrates, Demosthenes,

and Aeschines. The passage of history on which we now enter is in many respects exceedingly obscure. We are almost wholly dependent on assertions made by Demosthenes and Aeschines, and these assertions often are not merely inconsistent with one another, but self-contradictory. Our main sources of information are the speeches delivered, three years after the events, by Demosthenes and Aeschines, *On the Embassy*, and those delivered by the same orators, sixteen years after the events, in the trial *On the Crown*. The speech of Demosthenes *On the Peace* (346 B.C.), and that of Aeschines *Against Timarchus* (345 B.C.), are incidentally valuable. It may be observed that the further the speeches are removed from the events, the more reckless are their statements; and it is peculiarly unfortunate that we derive almost all our knowledge from forensic speeches, which by a recognised Greek practice abound in misrepresentation. Further, it appears that Aeschines is more hopelessly at variance with himself than Demosthenes. But both orators are anxious to disclaim, as much as possible, their part in a peace, which, with its author, soon became greatly discredited. Only where their testimony concurs or does not conflict can we feel ourselves on any sure ground.

A detailed account of the first embassy is found only in Aeschines, and has rather the value of anecdote than of political history. He tells of the surly and suspicious manners of Demosthenes on the journey; of his insolent belief in his own eloquence, how he boasted that he had "exhaustless springs of argument" ready, and would "stop Philip's mouth with a good sound cart-rope" (Aesch. *Emb.* § 21). Then how in the audience-chamber at Pella he completely lost his presence of mind, and after an obscure preamble broke down. In pointed contrast with this failure, Aeschines complacently records his

own speech, enforced by proofs drawn from mythical no less than from recent history, and clearly establishing the title of Athens to Amphipolis. As a statesman, Aeschines is more damaged by this speech, on which he prided himself, than he would have been by a failure, such as that which he ascribes (and probably with truth) to his rival. Philip must have smiled at the cogency of his argument as addressed to a victorious belligerent. On the way home—if we may believe Aeschines—Demosthenes occupied himself partly in binding his colleagues to keep silence about the *fiasco* at Pella, partly in laying traps for them by means of puerile challenges to repeat before the Assembly their praises of Philip. The envoys brought back a letter from Philip (March 346 B.C.), which they presented to the Council. The letter was distinctive of its author. "He intended to do them great services, which he would have stated more explicitly had he been sure of obtaining alliance as well as peace" (Dem. *Emb.* § 40). The actual terms, however, were merely a recognition of the *status quo*, that each side should keep what at the time they possessed.

The matter was debated at Assemblies held on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion (March). Two main points had to be determined. The first related to Philip's conquests—was he to keep them all? Here there could be little doubt; the very basis of the peace was the *status quo*, and, indeed, after a war of nine years, in which all the losses had been on one side, no other terms could have been looked for. The second point was the vital one. Who were to be included in the peace? The motion proposed by Philocrates, who had, doubtless, received his instructions from Philip, was that peace and alliance should be concluded between Philip and his allies on the one part, and Athens and her allies on the other;

but two allies of Athens were expressly excluded, the Phocians and the town of Halus in Thessaly. This proposal seems to have been supported in its entirety by Aeschines; Demosthenes supported it, with the exception of the disastrous clause excluding the Phocians and Halus. The Assembly resolved to strike out this clause, thus implicitly including Phocis and Halus in the list of allies. But, as it turned out, this availed nothing. At the Assembly held six days later, for the purpose of administering the oaths to the Athenians and their allies, the Macedonian plenipotentiaries refused to admit the Phocians as Athenian allies. To have yielded here would have been to surrender the cardinal point on which Philip's calculations turned. If peace were made with the Phocians, the plea for his armed intervention in Phocis would be gone. On the other hand, the Athenians were no less deeply interested in maintaining alliance with those who held Thermopylæ, the key of Northern Greece. It was a hard dilemma for the Assembly. Philocrates and Aeschines now became the interpreters of Philip's intentions, and took on them to reassure the people. The king's enigmatical letter received from them a definite construction. He was unable, they said, at present to regard the Phocians as allies owing to his relations with Thebes. But once the treaty was concluded he would be the friend of Athens, he would protect the Phocians, humble Thebes, and restore to Athens Eubœa and Oropus. These audacious promises, made by envoys who had had direct dealings with Philip, fell on credulous ears. Worse instincts were also satisfied, for hatred of Thebes was still among the governing motives of Athenian policy. The oaths of ratification were accordingly taken, and the name of the Phocians was omitted. Though Demosthenes had opposed the original exclusion

of the Phocians from the treaty, we do not learn that he here entered a patriotic protest. On a later occasion when he exposed these same delusions, he could not get a hearing; probably he could not have got one now. Yet his silence is to be regretted. The idle hopes now excited continued to be worked upon till Philip was inside Thermopylæ.

It remained to receive the oaths of ratification from Philip and his allies. A second embassy, composed of the same members as the first, was appointed for the purpose. The peace was to date from the ratification of the treaty. It was to be feared that Philip would reckon not from the day that the oaths were administered at Athens, but from the day that they were administered to himself. All that he could secure in the interval he would look on as the fair prize of war. Demosthenes, therefore, did what he could to hasten the departure of the ambassadors. They lingered ten days in Athens, and then journeyed forward leisurely to Macedon. At Pella they awaited Philip's return from Thrace, in spite of instructions to repair to wherever Philip happened to be. It was now fifty days since they had left Athens, and meantime Philip had pushed his conquests in Thrace, and reduced to submission Cersobleptes, an Athenian ally. Precious time had been wasted, and the Chersonese had been daily more imperilled. On his arrival at Pella, Philip took the oaths himself, but nothing was yet done about his allies. Ambassadors from the chief states of Greece were now at Philip's court, each seeking to forestall his favour. Philip was perfectly affable to all, but wrapped his designs in profound mystery. While making no definite promises, he allowed vague and contradictory reports to circulate. The hopes of all were kept alive to the last, and joint action was precluded. In his progress southwards at the head of an army, he was still ac-

companied by a crew of bickering envoys. He specially invited the Athenian ambassadors to mediate between Halus and Pharsalus — a new pretext for bringing him nearer to his goal without raising an alarm. Demosthenes became more and more uneasy at the position of affairs. He wrote a despatch home, he says, but his colleagues objected to it, and sent their own version in its place. He resolved to take news in person, but here again he was hindered. At Pheræ in Thessaly the oaths were at last administered to Philip's allies, and the Phocians at the same time were expressly excluded from the treaty. The Athenian envoys arrived at Athens on the 13th of Scirophorion (June), after an absence of seventy days. When they left Philip he was three days' march from Thermopylæ.

Demosthenes, on his return, instantly laid his report before the Council. He exposed the impostures practised during the past months, and accused Aeschines and others of traitorous concert with Philip. He implored them still to save Phocis and Thermopylæ. Moved by his earnestness, the Council withheld the usual vote of thanks from the ambassadors. But in the Assembly held a few days later, another spirit prevailed. Aeschines assured the people that they need only keep quiet, and in a few days everything would turn out as they wished. Thebes, not Phocis, was Philip's real enemy, as would be seen by the event. Eubœa was to be given up to Athens in compensation for Amphipolis, and there was more in reserve — a hint at the restoration of Oropus. It was the old mystification again. A letter from Philip was also read, in which he apologised for the delay of the embassy, and took the blame upon himself. He conveyed general assurances of his good will, but that was all. Demosthenes rose, and declared that he knew nothing of the promises held out by

Aeschines, and did not believe in them; but he was hooted down. Philocrates observed that it was no wonder that he and Demosthenes were not of the same mind; Demosthenes was a water-drinker, and he liked his wine; and the people laughed. The vagueness of Philip's letter was made up for by the lucid commentary of Aeschines, who explained that the king's diplomacy was necessarily secret, and required confidential interpreters. On the motion of Philocrates, it was carried that, unless the Phocians surrendered the temple to the Amphictyons, Athens would compel them by force of arms. There were Phocians present at this act of betrayal. Up to this moment the Phocians had probably shared the prevalent illusions. They, too, had been led to believe that Philip's menacing attitude towards them was designed to veil hostile purposes against Thebes. In any case, they thought Athens could not but stand by them at the last. The present decree, however, was unambiguous, and disarmed resistance. On the 23d of Scirophorion, seven days from the passing of the decree, Phalæcus made his own terms with Philip, who thus, without striking a blow, became master of Thermopylæ.

The Athenians had despatched a third embassy to present the decree of Philocrates to Philip. This time Demosthenes solemnly declined to act. Aeschines also remained at home on the score of illness. But before the embassy had executed their commission, they were met by the news of the convention with Phalæcus. In the first transport of grief and disappointment, the Athenians carried resolutions for the defence of the city. Philip forthwith summoned the Amphictyonic Council to pass judgment on the guilty Phocians. The machinery was somewhat antiquated, and the states now represented in the Council were bitter enemies of Phocis; still it was venerable

from old association, and might give a colour to high-handed usurpation. The doom inflicted on Phocis was that it should cease to be a state. Twenty-two Phocian towns were dismantled; the inhabitants were dispersed into villages, deprived of their arms and horses, and subjected to a crushing tribute. The seat and votes of the Phocians in the Amphictyonic Council were forfeited to Philip, and the right of precedence in consulting the oracle was transferred from Athens to him. He was further chosen to preside at the celebration of the Pythian games (Aug. 346), to which, however, the Athenians refused to send their representative. Such was the end of the Sacred War, carried on now for ten years. Philip had attained the object which he had long pursued, by patience and diplomacy no less than by the active energies of genius. He had received admission into the Greek commonwealth at the religious centre of Greece.

But Athens still held aloof, and he could not dispense with her recognition. An embassy came to demand it. Popular indignation was roused, and the patriot party urged an unconditional refusal. Demosthenes, as once before at a less critical moment (p. 36), brought the counsels of prudence to bear on a heated assembly. The speech he delivered toward the end of 346 B.C., is known as the Speech **On the Peace.** He rebukes the Athenian habit of reflecting after the event. He reminds his hearers of three distinct occasions on which it would have been well had they taken his advice—at the time of the last Eubœan war, at the opening of the peace negotiations, and in the recent debates after the return of the second embassy. He claims no special prescience, but merely a pure and unbiassed judgment. He then proceeds to the subject in hand. The peace was, indeed, unworthy of Athens, but having been

made, it must not be broken. Everything must be avoided which would give the self-styled Amphictyons a pretext for combining against Athens. Many states of Greece had grudges against her of their own, and in the name of Amphictyonic union might push their hostility to more desperate conclusions than if they were acting singly. The Social War had proved how discordant ambitions might unite to produce unforeseen results. Without sacrificing honour, the Athenians must avoid imprudent action. Already they had acquiesced in the loss of Oropus, Amphipolis, Cardia, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, in order to ensure a balance of advantage; would it not be sheer folly to go to war with a whole confederacy for "the shadow of Delphi?"

This speech is the first of the second group (p. 61) of *Philippic* orations. It is brief and unimpassioned, containing merely a sober view of a difficult situation; and the expression remains on a level with the thought. The advice contained is sternly practical, and bitter alike to the speaker and the hearers. It has in it none of the higher inspirations of genius. By a strange exception to the Attic practice, the language of emotion hardly appears except in the concluding words. The cautious wisdom of Demosthenes in avoiding an occasion for an Amphictyonic war was fully justified by subsequent history; for the present, however, the danger was averted. It is to be regretted that three years later, in his speech *On the Embassy* (§§ 111-113), Demosthenes, in his anxiety to sever himself completely from Aeschines and his policy, is led to deny his own share in these transactions. But, widely unlike as were the two men's motives, the substance of their advice on this question cannot have differed sensibly. Each of them recommended the recognition of Philip's Amphictyonic title. Demosthenes grounds his advice on the par-

amount needs of the moment, and he throws out hints to show that he has no sympathy with the Philippising party. In peace upon such terms he saw an armistice rather than a durable settlement, and the next few years were a time of preparation for the decisive struggle.

## CHAPTER V.

### HIS PUBLIC LIFE AND SPEECHES. FROM THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES (346 B.C.) TO CHÆRONEA (338 B.C.)

During the years of nominal peace from 346 B.C. to 340 B.C., Philip carried on a diplomatic warfare, without ever coming to an open rupture. Larger horizons had, doubtless, already opened up to him outside Greece. He aspired to the leadership of the Hellenes in a war against Persia, but the temper of Athens stood in his way. Philip was not one who regarded moral forces as material obstacles which might rudely be set aside. Any attempt to treat Athens like Olynthus, and to violate the home and centre of Greek life, might arm against him a confederation of all the powers. He must if possible bring Athens to act with them, or at least not to act against him. Hence the terms of studied courtesy in which he addresses the Athenian people, his laboured apologies, his indignant disavowals of the very purpose on which he is engaged (all reminding us forcibly of the methods of Napoleon I.), his hints at enigmatic services which he has no intention of performing. Of those who gave credence and currency to these friendly professions, some were honest dupes. Isocrates, in 346 B.C., in the interval between the conclusion of the peace and the end of the Sacred War, speaks of ill-natured persons who pretended that

Philip had designs against the freedom of Greece, and he is almost ashamed to notice the groundless suspicion (*Philipp.* § 73). The destruction of Phocis was Philip's practical comment on these remarks. But the faith of Isocrates remained unshaken, and a letter he wrote to Philip, probably in 342 B.C., is conceived in the old strain. Philip continued to work out his ends by arts of his own. He kept the peace, but sought to isolate Athens by forming fresh alliances in every quarter. Demosthenes followed and thwarted each movement. His influence steadily grew; he was no longer an opposition speaker, he had become a recognised adviser and a leader of opinion. Round him gathered a patriot party, embracing in its ranks Hegesippus, Lycurgus, and Hyperides. But each step in advance was sharply contested and painfully won; and Eubulus, though his power was on the wane, still retained the control of finance. From such hands Demosthenes determined to wrest the administration. Conscious that a decisive struggle was imminent, he strove to impress his own conviction on others, and to prepare a national resistance. His leading thought during this period was to organise an Hellenic league against the usurper, to bring Greece into co-operation with Athens. The speeches beginning with the speech *On the Peace* (346 B.C.) down to the *Third Philippic* (341 B.C.), form a graduated series in which this idea is developed with increasing clearness and emphasis.

To the Peloponnesian states the first call was addressed. Philip, who had retired for a time from the scene of Greek politics to consolidate his power at home, reappeared in 344 B.C., and established an oligarchical regime in Thessaly. In the same year he interfered in the Peloponnese, where he aspired to play the part of Epaminondas in supporting the independence of Messene and Argos against Sparta. The reality

of his friendship was proved by subsidies of men and money. On the proposal of Demosthenes an embassy was sent, of which he himself was the chief member, to counteract these intrigues. He visited Messene and Argos; he pointed to Olynthus and Thessaly as warning instances of states which Philip by presents and promises had lured to their ruin. They had known, he said, Philip the benefactor; let them pray that they might never know Philip the deceiver. "Manifold are the contrivances of art for the defence and security of cities—battlements, walls, trenches, and the like—all made by human hands and costly to maintain. But there is one universal safeguard, planted deep in the hearts of thinking men, a safeguard which is good and salutary for all, and especially for free communities against despots. What is this? Mistrust. Guard this, hold it fast; if you keep it, you may rest assured no harm will come to you. What is the object you seek? Liberty. And do you not see that Philip's very titles are irreconcilable with liberty? Every monarch and despot is a foe of freedom, and hostile to law. Beware then, lest in seeking deliverance from war, you find a master!" (*Phil.* ii. §§ 23-25).

This mission to the Peloponnese was the origin, apparently, of an embassy sent to Athens in 344 B.C., on which occasion Demosthenes spoke the **Second Philippic**. The draft of a reply to the envoys was embodied in the speech, but the loss of this document leaves us to conjecture the precise situation. The speech taken alone would seem to be primarily an answer to Philip's remonstrances against the misconstruction put upon his conduct by the Athenians. But in any case its scope is far wider than the diplomatic issue of the moment. Demosthenes exhibits here the true relation of Philip to Athens and to Greece. The introduction reads like a preface to a

warlike proposal, but no such proposal follows. The speech is preparatory to action, not a summons to act; its aim is to enlighten and convince rather than to exhort. The style, though animated, is not marked by any passionate vehemence; only towards the end (§ 33) a clearer vision of his country's danger is borne in upon the orator, and his language reflects his emotion.

He begins by a sarcastic remark on the means taken to check Philip's progress; the Athenians talk while Philip acts, and each side succeeds best in their own line. Unless, then, the people are satisfied with such empty triumphs, they must alter their whole method (§§ 1-5). He then combats the easy faith with which the assurances of Macedonian partizans are accepted. Against Athens, he says, all Philip's efforts are aimed. His friendship for Thebes, for Argos, for Messene, betrays his motives. He is acquainted with the inglorious past of those cities, and with the traditions of your history. He does not tempt you into his alliance. "This is the noblest of all tributes to your character. You are thus pronounced to be the only people who could never be bribed to abandon the common rights of Greece, who never for favour or profit would barter away your Hellenic loyalty" (§§ 7-12). He next refutes the apologies offered for Philip. He points to the inconsistency between his promised policy in the Peloponnese and his actual policy in Bœotia—he who subjected the Bœotian cities to Thebes, will he free the Peloponnesian cities from Sparta? He shows how Philip, by a necessity of his position, was pursuing a settled plan of hostility to Athens (§§ 13-19). This he enforces by a summary of the arguments he had used in his mission to the Peloponnese. Argives and Messenians, it appeared, still remained deaf to wise counsel; Athenians had a clearer insight, and neglect on their part would be without excuse (§§ 20-27).

Having submitted his proposed reply to the envoys, he points in the epilogue (§§ 28-37), not by name, but still unmistakably, to Philocrates and Aeschines as the guilty causes of the present troubles. Their promises had deceived the people; let not the innocent hereafter suffer in their stead. "Believe me the day will come when Philip's doings will pain you more than they do now. I see things marching to their end; and though I have no wish to be a true prophet, yet I fear the evil is but too nigh already. When, then, it shall no longer be in your power to disregard events, when you shall no longer hear from me or from another that it is you who are menaced, but when you all see it with your own eyes, and know it for yourselves, you will probably yield to angry and bitter feelings. And as your ambassadors have kept from you the guilty secret of their own bribed services, those who endeavour to repair what through them has been lost may become, I fear, the victims of your displeasure. . . . While the storm then is still coming, still gathering, while we still hear one another's voices, I would remind each of you of what you know full well—who it was persuaded you to abandon Phocis, and made you to give up Thermopylæ (and ever since Philip commands these places he commands the road to Attica and to the Peloponnese)—who has caused you to take counsel, not about your rights or your foreign policy, but about your home possessions, and about war upon Attica, a war whose smart each one will feel only when it comes, but whose beginning dates back to that day. . . . Enough has now been said to waken recollection. That my words should be fully verified, grant, all ye gods, that it may never come to this! For myself, I could wish no man to suffer even a merited doom at the cost of danger and damage to the community" (§§ 32-37).

The anti-Macedonian party were soon emboldened

to begin the judicial proceedings hinted at in the *Second Philippic.* In 343 B.C. Hyperides impeached Philocrates, who retired into exile, and in his absence was condemned to death. About the same time Demosthenes resumed an accusation, which three years before he had laid against Aeschines, for misconduct on the second embassy. The charge was a delicate one for him to maintain, for it was only a narrow line that had separated his own advice from that of Aeschines at one period of the negotiations (p. 84). Hence in the speech **On the Embassy** he carefully limits the charge; Aeschines, he says, is not accused of having concluded peace, but of having concluded a shameful and ruinous peace. Technically the prosecution related only to the second embassy, but the previous part taken by Aeschines in framing the terms of the treaty is incidentally attacked. Demosthenes, however, in attempting to disclaim all responsibility for a peace which was now discredited, becomes fiercely polemical, and is led into many disingenuous, and some false, statements. His case is, moreover, complicated by the nature of the evidence available. He can bring no direct proof of Aeschines' guilt. The presumption of guilt rested on an inference derived from the conduct of Aeschines at different moments. The facts had, therefore, to be so marshalled as most forcibly to suggest the inference. Hence the peculiar disposition of the speech. While Aeschines follows the historical order of events, Demosthenes inverts that order. Each aims at producing an impression of honest artlessness, Aeschines by a straightforward and continuous narrative, Demosthenes by a would-be haphazard arrangement. Aeschines manages to ignore or evade the real issues by lingering over transactions which were not impugned, and by repelling at length collateral charges. The seeming artless-

ness of Demosthenes is one of the artifices he often employs to mask the weak points of a case. Some ancient as well as modern critics have seen in the absence of regular order a want of plan. But the orator in truth shows an exact appreciation of the materials at his command, and of their value as evidence. He has one capital and indisputable fact to start from, that the pledges and promises of Aeschines on his return from the second embassy mystified and deceived the people, and that the result was the seizure of Thermopylæ and the destruction of Phocis. This is the groundwork of his reasoning, and forms the chief article of accusation. The point is developed at length in §§ 29-97, and is elsewhere reiterated. But so far Aeschines is not proved corrupt. Demosthenes marks the possible alternative. Aeschines, he argues, must either have been honestly deluded or have been in guilty collusion with Philip. If the former, would he not, after the event had falsified his hopes, have abhorred the man by whom he had been deceived? But nothing of the kind; he shared in Philip's rejoicings at Delphi over the work of ruin, and since that time he has aspired to the friendship and advocated the cause of the conqueror. Such conduct can only be accounted for by corruption. This is the topic handled from §§ 98-149. The argument is not easy to meet, and Aeschines certainly fails to rebut it. The same conclusion had been previously arrived at from another side. The abrupt conversion of Aeschines from an ardent patriot, rousing Greece to a war against the foreigner, into a servile partisan, was capable only of one explanation (§§ 9-28).

Having established this strong presumption against Aeschines, he goes back upon the events of the second embassy itself. He exposes the fatal delay of the ambassadors, and their neglect of instructions (§§ 150-178). By relating the events in this connection

he is making up for the want of direct evidence; a treasonable colour is given to proceedings which might have been more leniently interpreted.

Here the first great division of the speech ends. The main position has now been made good; the rest is supplementary and corroborative, and may roughly be called the Epilogue (§§ 179-343). The first division of the speech is more distinctively forensic in character; the charges are formally stated, and the proofs adduced. The second half is rather in the deliberative manner. The range of topics is enlarged, principles are set forth, and a wider political outlook is taken. The special case of Aeschines is, in a passage of indignant eloquence, merged in a general view of the increase of traitors in Greece, and of the impunity accorded them (§§ 259-287). A powerful recapitulation (§§ 315-336) recalls to the jury the prime indictment.

With all its force and ingenuity the speech is of an unwieldy length, and suffers from excessive repetitions. Other intrinsic weaknesses have been indicated above. But the large and statesmanlike utterances which are scattered through it, and which abound in the latter half, atone for much that is ignobly personal or disingenuous. The bold disregard of technical rules of rhetoric claims some notice. Nowhere, unless in *The Crown*, are outward laws of symmetry so completely set aside in favour of a more subtle but still a presiding order. Narrative and proof are blended; the events, displaced from their proper sequence, are so disposed, that in telling their own story they suggest the desired inference. Refutation is not kept distinct from proof or narrative. The exact point at which the Epilogue begins may be variously fixed.

From the reply of Aeschines we can infer something as to the relation between the present form of Demosthenes' speech and the form in which it was

delivered. The general structure must have been the same, for Aeschines criticises its artificial order (Aesch. *Emb.* § 96). And Aeschines' answers have, on the whole, a minute correspondence with the objections as we read them in Demosthenes. The discrepancies are comparatively few, and of two kinds. Some consist in slight variations of detail, such as are almost always found between a speech quoted from memory and the same speech as delivered. Others are more important, and seem to imply that the version cited by Aeschines was, in some respects at least, fuller than ours. To take one instance, Aeschines quotes (§ 10) a story and a comparison which are totally absent from the extant speech. Whether the speech, as we have it, was abbreviated by Demosthenes for publication, or is an unrevised draft which was expanded in delivery, is not so easy to determine.

The result of the trial was, as we learn on good authority, that Aeschines was acquitted by thirty votes—a doubtful victory, and probably due to the influence of Eubulus, whose dominion in the law courts is in this very speech denounced.

In the years between 344 B.C. and 341 B.C., the tide of events turned partially against Philip. He sought to ally himself with other religious centres of the Greek world besides Delphi. In Elis he found a footing, which seemed to promise influence in Olympia. Another design, however, of supplanting Athens as guardian of the sanctuary of Delos was frustrated. His most important success was in Eubœa; there he established his despots at Oreus and Eretria. But both on the east and west he was foiled in the attempt to gain access to the Peloponnese. First, Megara was rescued by prompt succour from Athens. Baffled on this side, he turned his arms towards Epirus, and intrigued in Aetolia. He marched upon the important town of Ambracia, the possession of which would

have opened up Acarnania and the Corinthian Gulf. Here again the Athenians were beforehand; they had thrown a body of troops into Ambracia, and the way to the south was closed. An embassy to Acarnania, led by Demosthenes and backed up by Athenian arms, was successful in forming a league in that quarter. The danger of an invasion of Attica had for the present receded. Philip, in 342 B.C., entered on a new campaign against Thrace, and pushed further eastwards; a permanent conquest of the country between the Hellespont and the Euxine would serve him at once as a base of operations against Asia and would deal a vital blow to Athens.

In 341 B.C. Athens found herself menaced in her most vulnerable point abroad. The Thracian Chersonese had for about two centuries been regarded as an integral part of Athenian territory, and was the bulwark of her maritime empire in the north. If Thermopylæ held one gate of Greece, the Chersonese might be said to hold the other. It commanded the passage of the Dardanelles and the corn trade of the Black Sea. On its safety depended the very subsistence of Athens, for from the Black Sea came almost all the grain imported into Attica, amounting to about one-third of the total consumption.

Diopeithes, an Athenian mercenary, had in 343 B.C. attempted to force some settlers upon Cardia, in the Chersonese. Situated at the head of the isthmus not far from the modern Gallipoli, Cardia held a position of somewhat the same importance that Gallipoli holds now. The city had in 357 B.C. been recognised as independent, and in the late treaty had been enrolled among the allies of Philip. But the Athenians from long possession had not ceased to look on it as their own. Philip sent aid to Cardia, and Diopeithes retaliated by plundering districts of Thrace that were subject to Macedon. This led to a letter of menace

and remonstrance from Philip to the Athenian people. His partisans in Athens pressed for the recall of Diopeithes; Demosthenes saw the necessity of keeping a firm grasp on the Chersonese at a moment when war was imminent, and resisted the demand. Technical right was on the side of Philip, for armed violence towards Macedonian subjects or allies was a violation of the peace.

In his speech **On the Chersonese,** Demosthenes (341 B.C.) refuses to treat the question on a narrow technical issue (cf. his contemptuous phrase, § 57, *αὕτη ἡ διαδικασία*). He takes it out of the juridical sphere into that of politics. His argument, morally and politically valid, maintained that Athens, apparently aggressive, was in a very real sense acting on the defensive—that the peace existed only in name, and that Philip had long been at war, though war had not been declared. A permanent force, consisting in part of the troops of Diopeithes, must, he said, be kept in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont—a recommendation which he had in substance urged already in the *First Philippic* (351 B.C.)

Such is the essential and recurrent thought of the speech *On the Chersonese*, the most perfect, perhaps, of all the deliberative harangues of Demosthenes. It has in it almost every variety of tone. From a subdued sarcasm it rises into fiery scorn and passionate invective. He abases his audience by the picture of their lower selves, but presently reanimates them by the image of austere devotion which the ideal Athens presents. Three main topics find place in the speech; but they pass imperceptibly into one another, in the Demosthenic manner, without the marks of a rigid division. First, the situation is set forth in its true aspect (§§ 1-29); next, the orator, passing, as his custom is, to the moral side, combats the deep-seated apathy of the people (§§ 30-51); and finally, breaks

forth against the venal politicians who flatter the base appetites of the people, and deaden the public honour (§§ 52-75).

The passage of eloquent self-justification in §§ 67-72 contains the orator's conception of a statesman; the manner in which the personal element is here almost effaced in the desire to assert a great principle, is profoundly characteristic of Demosthenes.

The real subject of debate, says Demosthenes, is not the conduct or intentions of Diopeithes, but the safety of the Chersonese, which once lost cannot be recovered (§§ 1-3). We ought, we are told, to choose between peace and war. But Philip leaves us no choice in the matter; we are driven to act in self-defence, unless it be maintained that Philip may attack us anywhere except on Attic soil, but that we may not attack him even in Thrace (§§ 4-8). Again it is said, Diopeithes has been behaving as a freebooter, and his forces ought to be disbanded. Excellent advice, if Philip is also prepared to disband his forces. Otherwise it is the old story over again—Philip at the head of a permanent army, executing swift surprises, we hastening to the rescue when the mischief is done (§§ 9-12). The hidden purpose of such counsel is to paralyze us, while Philip is left free to march to Byzantium, to the Chersonese, or even to the borders of Attica. Our clear duty is to send funds and reinforcements to Diopeithes, not to lend ourselves to carry out the dearest wishes of Philip (§§ 13-20). "I desire, therefore, to question you[1] freely about our present situation, and to consider what we ourselves are now doing, and how we are conducting our affairs. We do not choose to raise money, nor do we dare to serve in person, nor can we keep our hands off the public funds, nor do we make over to Diopeithes the contributions of the allies, nor do we sanction the sup-

[1] Reading with S. *ὑμᾶς* not *πρὸς ὑμᾶς*.

plies he finds for himself; but we eye him maliciously, and question the source of these supplies, and pry into his plans, and keep up a jealous scrutiny. Nor yet, being in this frame of mind, are we inclined to attend to our own concerns, but, while with our lips we applaud those who hold language worthy of Athens, in act we co-operate with their opponents. It is your practice, when a speaker comes forward, to ask him, 'What then are we to do?' I should like to ask you, 'What then are we to say?' For if you will neither raise money, nor serve in person, nor keep your hands off the public funds, nor make over to Diopeithes the contributions of the allies, nor leave him to supply himself, nor resolve to attend to your own concerns, I know not what to say" (§§ 21-23). Diopeithes is obliged to provide for his troops as all Athenian commanders have done before him; he levies contributions under the name of "benevolences" (p. 20). There are some who, caring more for the Greeks of Asia than they do for the Greeks of their own country, accuse Diopeithes before the people. This can have but one result, to impair his authority abroad, and cut off his last resource. The proposal to send an army to watch and control him is an extreme of folly. If he must be recalled and brought to trial, a despatch will suffice (§§ 24-29).

The people conspire with their counsellors to shift the blame of their misfortunes upon some helpless victim; they fear to recognise the true culprit, who, they know, cannot be chastised save by force of arms. Pampered into timid inaction by their leaders, they find at last that their existence is at stake. What answer could you make to the reproaches of the Greek states, if they addressed you thus?—"Athenians, you send us constant embassies, you warn us against Philip; what have you done yourselves, while Philip was absent and ill? You have not so much as de-

livered two cities in Eubœa, hostile outposts planted against Attica; you have proved that, were Philip to die ten times over, you would not bestir yourselves" (§§ 30-37). If you ask my positive advice, I would say: "first convince yourselves that Philip is at war with Athens, that he has broken the peace, that he is the deadly enemy of the whole city, of the very ground on which it stands, nay, of every human being within its walls. . . . But with nothing is he so much at war as with our constitution, against nothing are his designs equally directed, on no single aim is he so much bent as on its destruction." Be assured that Philip's activity in Thrace is with a view to mastery in Attica. He does not rough it in that slough of despond for the sake of the millet and barley in the Thracian pits. In the face of this restless enemy you must maintain the existing force at the seat of war as a permanent army of reserve. All this demands heavy sacrifices, but these must not deter us. "Suppose you have the word of a god for what it is beyond mortal power to promise—that, if you continue quiet and make surrender of all, Philip will not finally turn his arms against you; still, by Zeus and all the gods, it is a disgraceful act, unworthy of yourselves and of your country's past, and of your fathers' achievements, to abandon all the rest of Greece to bondage for the sake of selfish ease. For myself, I would rather be dead than have offered such advice." We will act, you say, when there is necessity. The necessity most imperious to freemen has come, or rather gone—the necessity of honour. A slave's necessity is chastisement and the lash (§§ 38-51).

Some orators dwell largely on the advantages of peace, and on the waste and misappropriation of public money entailed by war. Their pacific counsels are superfluous; more fitly would they be addressed to Philip than to you. Such men grieve over the risk of

petty peculation; they look on with indifference while Philip is making all Greece his prey. They attempt to cast on us the odium of kindling war, as if war was not long since kindled. And war upon us means a war of extermination. "Philip well knows that you will not be his slaves; that you could not if you would, for you are used to empire" (§§ 52-60).

Now you cannot vanquish your enemy outside until you have punished the enemy within the walls; for Philip, who elsewhere has been forced to lavish kindness on a people in order to overcome them, has been able to inflict on you loss after loss without equivalent, and all because of the license granted to his advocates in Athens. "Thanks to this, some of them have exchanged penury for sudden wealth, a nameless obscurity for eminence and renown; while you from honour have sunk into obscurity, from affluence to destitution—for the wealth of a state consists, to my mind at least, in allies, credit, esteem, of all which you are destitute. It is because you disregard Philip's progress, and suffer events to drift as they will, that he has become prosperous and powerful, a terror to all men, Greeks or barbarians; you stand alone and degraded; splendid in the profusion of the market, but in every needful provision contemptible. . . . Then some chance speaker rises and says: 'What! you make no proposal, you do not hazard a motion, you are timid and spiritless.' Brazen, offensive, and impudent, I am not, and hope I never may be; yet I count myself more truly courageous than your dashing politicians. To impeach, confiscate, reward, and accuse, without regard to the public interest,—all this demands no exercise of courage. When a man's own safety is guaranteed him by speeches and measures which court your favour, he is bold without much risk. But he, who for your good often thwarts your wishes, who never

speaks to win your favour, but always to promote your interest; who, while pursuing a policy in which fortune prevails more commonly than forethought, makes himself responsible before you alike for the plan and for the issue—he is truly courageous, such an one does genuine service; not those who for an ephemeral popularity have sacrificed the country's highest welfare—men whom I am so far from wishing to emulate or from regarding as citizens worthy of Athens, that if the question were put to me, 'And you, what services, pray, have you done our country?' I would pass by the duties I have discharged as trierarch and choirmaster, the sums I have contributed, the captives I have ransomed, and other like acts of benevolence; I would merely say that my policy has nothing in common with such as theirs. Able I may be, as well as others, to accuse, to bribe, to confiscate, in a word, to act as they do; yet never have I chosen any such part, never have I been betrayed into it by avarice or ambition. My language has consistently been such as to place me below many in your eyes, but such as would exalt you, if you would but listen to me. Thus much I may be allowed to say without offence. Nor do I take it to be my part, as an honest citizen, to devise a policy which would speedily make me pre-eminent in Athens, and you last among the nations. The country ought to grow in greatness as the measures of patriots unfold; it is the duty of all to recommend always what is most salutary, not what is easiest. Nature herself will take the road to what is easy; it needs the lessons of a patriotic eloquence to conduct the hearers to what is salutary" (§§ 61-72). I am reproached with speaking merely and not acting. But I hold that speech is action in a statesman; his *word* is his *work;* his province is to counsel, it is for you to execute (§§ 73-75).

Demosthenes then sums up his advice. If the vigorous action he urges is taken, he expresses a hope (though in a tone of abated confidence) of a return to better days. But, without such action, all the eloquence in the world could not save the country (§§ 76, 77).

The **Third Philippic** followed after an interval of a few months, the situation being still unchanged. It has been pronounced by many ancient and modern critics to be the greatest of the popular speeches of Demosthenes. In one respect at least it rises above the speech *On the Chersonese.* The orator's vision is enlarged and yet intensified. He speaks as a Hellenic patriot rather than as an Athenian citizen. Every thought is here subordinated to the danger of Greece. He had not hitherto ventured to bring a formal motion, but the ground was cleared by the last speech, and the minds of the Athenians were ready to receive the plainest counsels. He now proposes that Athens should arm herself and head a Hellenic league. The despatch of envoys to the various states, incidentally recommended in *The Chersonese*, here rises into prominence. Though the tone of the speech marks a sense of danger more pressing than before, it is very far removed from despair. The hopeful expressions, both in the beginning and the end (§§ 4 and 76), are strikingly bold.

It is here more than usually difficult to convey by extracts any impression of the eloquence of Demosthenes. The force of the speech lies largely in rapid enumerations of recent facts (§§ 11, 12, 15-17, 26, 27, 32-35, 65-67), and in contrasts drawn from the past. Impassioned and compressed narrative takes the place of close argument. Many of the same facts appear in repeated allusions, but each time in a fresh setting and under new lights. Stroke follows upon stroke in swift succession. Each familiar name calls

up an eventful history and associations of its own, and the retrospect is charged with bitter memories. Such a historical review, cumulative in its effect, must be read continuously; the parts hardly bear to be separated from the contexture of the whole.

A critical question of much interest, as touching the method of Demosthenes' composition, attaches itself to the *Third Philippic*. The best manuscript, the Parisian S (as well as the Laurentian L which is of the same family), differs remarkably from the ordinary text by the omission of phrases and of whole passages. The variation seems due to a double recension; both texts probably proceed from Demosthenes himself. Good reasons have been brought for supposing the shorter text of S to represent the maturer correction of the orator.

Early in the speech (§§ 6-20) the question is raised, which had formed the groundwork of the speech *On the Chersonese*, Is it still possible to choose between peace and war? The treatment, however, is here broader and leads to more comprehensive conclusions. If the choice, says Demosthenes, were still open, he would be in favour of peace; but Philip speaks peace and acts war;[1] it was to procure such a one-sided peace as the present that he had dealt his bribes. If the Athenians were waiting for a declaration of war, they might learn by the examples of Olynthus, Phocis, Pheræ, and Oreus, that it was not Philip's practice to declare war till he was at the gates. Nor would he make an exception in favour of Athens; if she shut her eyes, it was not for him to enlighten her. If they looked, however, not at words but at deeds, they might convince themselves that from the day that Phocis was destroyed, Philip had been at war; unless it were maintained that to bring up siege-batteries did not mean war, till the batteries were planted

[1] A maxim recommended and carried out by Napoleon I.

against the walls. They were bound then to defend the Chersonese and Byzantium, but that was not enough; larger issues were now involved, for all Greece stood in imminent peril.

In the second division of the speech (§§ 21-35) he gives the grounds of this conviction. A new fact was visible in Greek history. Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, when in turn they were supreme, had been jealously watched by the other states and their excesses checked; but Philip was allowed full power to do as he would —"to fleece, to pillage, and to enslave" state after state. Rapidly he enumerates the violent deeds of him, whose "ambition neither Hellas nor the land of the barbarians can contain." The Greeks, "self-blockaded in their cities" (διορωρύγμεθα κατὰ πόλεις), saw and heard all, without one effort to combine and save Greece, each one resolved to make the most of his own brief respite, while his neighbour was perishing; though there was none so far off, but that Philip came to him at last with the certainty of a fever's access. The sufferings that Greeks had formerly undergone at the hands of Sparta and Athens were sufferings inflicted by true-born Greeks. Philip's domination was so far worse than theirs, as the waste and ruin of an estate by a slave was worse than mismanagement by the lawful heir; for Philip was no Greek, nor even a barbarian of respectable origin. And to fill the measure of his insolence, the destroyer of Greek cities presided at the Pythian games, and issued his mandates to all. The Greeks looked on as they might at a hailstorm, praying that they themselves might be spared, but without an effort to prevent it. Even their own private wrongs they took quietly—so far were they from redressing the wrongs of Greece. They faced one another in a torpor of mistrust.

Next he asks the cause of this change (§§ 36-69),

and he finds it not in any accident of individual life. "Something there once was in the heart of the masses which there is not now, something which prevailed over the wealth of Persia, which kept Greece in freedom, which was unvanquished in battle by land or sea." This secret force was a hatred of bribery. "New principles are now imported, wherewith Greece is sick even to death. And what are these? Envy, if a man has taken a bribe; ridicule, if he confesses it; pardon, if the guilt is proved; hatred of those who censure him; and every other appendage of corruption." Wealth, population, all the material elements of strength, were by this pervading vice rendered impotent and unavailing. The sense of Panhellenic interests, which their forefathers manifested in stern decrees, had died out. Bribed counsellors possessed the ear of the Assembly; and yet Olynthus, Eubœa, and Oreus were so many standing warnings of cities which had met their fate by listening to the counsels of treason.

Lastly, Demosthenes introduces his own substantive proposal (§§ 70-76), with the prefatory words, that if the rest of the world consented to be slaves, Athens, at least, must do battle for freedom. Let them, while their strength was unspent and while honour survived, first arm themselves, and show Greece that they were in earnest; next, send envoys everywhere to organise a national league. But he insists and repeats that to their own efforts they must primarily trust, that Athens was now the last stay of Greece. "If you think that Chalcidians or Megarians will save Greece, while you shirk the contest, you are mistaken. . . . The task is yours: this is the privilege won and bequeathed to you by your ancestors at the cost of many and great dangers.

"This," he concludes, "is what I have to say, these are the measures I propose. Adopt these measures, and

it is my belief that even yet our affairs may be retrieved. If any man has better advice to offer, let him speak forth and declare his counsel. And, be your decision what it may, grant, all ye gods, that it may be for our good!"

The years 340 B.C. to 338 B.C. were a period of great awakening for Athens. Demosthenes was now supreme director of the state, and by these years he himself (in *The Crown*) claims to be judged. The literary record of his eloquence fails us just at the point where it achieved its highest successes. None of the speeches of this period are preserved. The earlier harangues were committed to writing by the orator, in the hope that their influence might outlive the moment of delivery. But speech now passed into instant action, and attained its end; and the only memorial of these orations is contained in a few splendid pages of history. First Eubœa was wrested from Philip. Athens became the centre of a Hellenic league comprising Eubœa, Acarnania, Corinth, Achæa, Corcyra, Megara. By the force of his eloquence Demosthenes won back to Athens the estranged Byzantines, whose city, soon afterwards besieged by Philip, was relieved by Athenian arms. From west to east, wherever a patriotic resistance was organised, Demosthenes was the soul of the movement. At the same time he combated internal abuses. He had begun his public life with a proposed measure of navy reform, and now in the teeth of intrigue and opposition he carried a measure at once more simple and more complete. Under the existing system all who were liable to the charge of the Trierarchy contributed an equal share. By the Trierarchic Law of Demosthenes the share of each was in proportion to his rated property, and the burden equitably adjusted between rich and poor. A social grievance was thus removed. The measure was justified by its practical

working. Evasions and delays were now almost unknown, and among the most striking features of the war was the increased efficiency of the marine. Another of his measures was a still greater triumph. In the *First Olynthiac* (349 B.C.) he had delicately approached the question of the Festival Fund; not until 339 B.C. could he carry his long wished for reform, by which the surplus of the yearly expenditure went not to the Theoricon, but to war purposes. Thus, at the final crisis, the Athenian populace learnt to renounce some cherished pleasures.

For a brief space it seemed as if all might yet be retrieved. But another Sacred War, opportunely kindled, brought Philip once more within Greece to exercise "the protectorate of religion" (Aesch. *Ctes.* § 129). The precise point at which intrigue began cannot be determined; but events so followed one another as to bear all the marks of a studied plot; and in this plot Aeschines would seem to have been a chief accomplice. Once inside Thermopylæ, Philip forgot his mission against the guilty Locrians, and seizing Elatea, commanded the passes into Bœotia.

The sequel is well known from the famous narrative in *The Crown*;—the evening tidings brought to Athens—the consternation in the city—the hastily convened Assembly—the long silence and pause of expectation till Demosthenes arose and gave his counsel—his embassy to Thebes, resulting in alliance between Thebes and Athens. Here was the crowning achievement of his eloquence. Old jealousies were silenced, and the rival cities stood loyally together till Chæronea, where "the liberties of Greece were buried in the graves of the fallen" (Lycurg. *Leocrat.* § 50).

## CHAPTER VI.

### HIS PUBLIC LIFE AND SPEECHES. FROM CHÆRONEA (338 B.C.) TO HIS DEATH (322 B.C.)

THE part that Demosthenes had henceforth to play was reduced to narrower limits. Athens, indeed, still retained municipal independence; unlike Thebes, she had not yet received a Macedonian garrison, and Demosthenes, recognising the altered situation, devoted himself to internal affairs. He still looked forward to Philip's death as a possible moment for the enfranchisement of Greece; but the doom inflicted on the rebellious Thebes by Alexander (335 B.C.) threw back such hopes into a more distant future. With the marvellous conquests of Alexander in Asia, Macedonian influence became dominant at Athens; yet popular sympathy did not desert the patriots. The year 330 B.C. afforded a decisive test of feeling. To this year belongs the speech on *The Crown*, the last speech of Demosthenes, and the noblest monument of ancient eloquence. The case had its origin in these circumstances.—In 338 B.C., after the battle of Chæronea, Demosthenes had held a double office; he had been placed on the Commission for the fortification of Athens, and had been made treasurer of the Theoricon. Early in 336 B.C. Ctesiphon proposed that he should receive a golden crown for his services, and that the proclamation of the crown should be made

in the Theatre at the Great Dionysia; that is, in the presence of all the strangers assembled at Athens for the festival. The measure was passed by the Council, and thus became a προβούλευμα (bill). It still needed the ratification of the Assembly to become a ψήφισμα (decree). Aeschines at this point stopped the progress of the bill by a notice that he would bring a Graphê Paronomôn (p. 31) against Ctesiphon. The grounds of his indictment were three: (1) that it was not true that Demosthenes had done good service to the state, and the laws forbade the insertion of a falsehood in the public records; (2) that he had not yet passed his audit, and that it was illegal to crown an official in such a position; (3) that the proclamation of the crown in the Theatre was unlawful.

That charges so different as those contained under the first and the other two heads of the indictment should be capable of being combined shows a curious state of legal procedure, and illustrates the misapplication and abuse of the Graphê Paronomôn. The so-called falsehood under the first head was not a question of fact, but a question of opinion upon politics. It could only have found a place in this accusation by a loose extension of the phrase *unconstitutional* to denote all that was *inexpedient* to the state. The manœuvre was a skilful one, by which Aeschines here contrived to associate the policy of Demosthenes with an irrelevant technicality. That the real issue, however, lay in the first article of indictment was, in spite of disguises, recognised by Aeschines no less than by Demosthenes. The question was whether the policy of Demosthenes had been condemned by the event. Of the other points of the charge the second was legally sound. The rule of law was clear, though it had been often violated in custom. The third was more doubtful. Aeschines admitted that there was one exceptional case in which the crown might be

bestowed in the Theatre; but it applied, according to him, only to crowns bestowed by foreign states. The letter of the law seems to have been here in favour of Demosthenes, but in the absence of more complete documentary evidence some uncertainty must remain. For six years Aeschines did not venture to bring the case into court. Even after Chæronea, Demosthenes received marks of unabated confidence from the people. It was not till the complete triumph of the Macedonian power that Aeschines saw his opportunity. Philip had died in 336 B.C., Alexander had crossed into Asia in 334 B.C., and in 331 B.C. had won his great victory at Arbela. The next year witnessed the failure of Agis' attempted rising in the Peloponnese. The patriot party seemed silenced, and Aeschines now brought his long-delayed action in presence of all Greece.

It was no ordinary criminal case. It marked the last moment in a personal duel carried on for sixteen years between famous antagonists. It was, moreover, the closing scene of a conflict between parties—a conflict which had broadened into a national struggle. Judgment had to be passed on two rival policies, between which it was not possible to be neutral.

The speech of Aeschines is as usual clear [illegible]d in arrangement. He proceeds at once to the technical points, and states them so as to set off the legal strength of his position. At the end of the speech he enforces them once more. In the body of the speech he reviews the career of Demosthenes in four periods: I. From the beginning of the war with Philip about Amphipolis to the peace of Philocrates (357–346 B.C.); II. From that peace to the renewal of the war (346–340 B.C.); III. From the renewal of the war to Chæronea (340–338 B.C.); IV. From 338 B.C. up to the present time. There is one remarkable note of weakness in the speech. Aeschines, intent apparently on catching votes on both sides,

himself halts between two opinions. He never definitely either approves or condemns the general policy of resistance to Macedon. Though the dominant tone seems to betray Macedonian sympathy, an opposite sentiment is in parts visible. The treatment of periods I. and IV. is designed to discredit Demosthenes with the patriot party. The charges against him in the first period, and in part of the second, almost retort those of Demosthenes against Aeschines in the speech *On the Embassy*. And in the fourth period he is accused of having neglected three occasions of rising against Alexander. This puzzling ambiguity of view is hardly explicable, except on the supposition that Aeschines, secure of the Macedonian support, thought to better his case by proving that, judged even as an anti-Macedonian and a patriot, Demosthenes was insincere.

Demosthenes in his reply deals rapidly with Period I. During that period he had held no accepted position at Athens, and he speaks of it as strictly irrelevant to the main charge. He confines himself almost entirely to the peace negotiations of 346 B.C., which had been impugned by Aeschines. His version of these negotiations is marked rather by boldness of outline than by faithfulness to fact. Had he commented on the earlier years of this period, within which fell the *First Philippic* and the *Olynthiac* orations, he would have occupied a strong vantage-ground. But he had no wish to waken exasperating memories of warnings despised. Throughout the speech he is at pains to establish a solidarity between himself and the Athenian people. The periods, therefore, on which he expatiates, and on which he rests his claim to honour, are the second, and still more, the third—years in which he had become supreme, in which Athens, at one with him, had taken up the struggle and failed. The stress of the accusation had been

laid upon the final war (340–338 B.C.), and Demosthenes is content to accept the challenge. He points triumphantly to those days when doom was gathering for measures and actions conceived in the spirit of the imperial city. The fourth period he passes over in silence, but for the brief allusions in §§ 320-323. Events of that period, subsequent to the decree of Ctesiphon, were in truth outside the scope of an oration in defence of that decree. Moreover it was a time in which speech and action were alike fettered; and the cautious reserve of *The Crown* in its references to Alexander does but foreshadow the new epoch which commenced after Chæronea.

Demosthenes, in reviewing his own life, follows in the main the divisions into periods marked out by Aeschines. But the narrative with him is by no means continuous. Period I. of Aeschines is covered by §§ 18-52 of *The Crown*; Period II. by §§ 60-109; Period III. by §§ 160-187 and §§ 211-251. The motive which governed this arrangement will become clearer by exhibiting the structure of the whole. Roughly speaking, the design is to keep the technical points of law in the background—they are inserted between Periods II. and III.—to begin and end with public policy, so adjusting the emphasis that a preponderating weight may fall upon Period III.

In form an apology the speech is in reality a glowing eulogy, not so much on the orator himself as on Athens that trusted him. Such a skeleton of the speech as I can here add is no more than a guide to studying the multiform and intricate structure of the whole.

The Exordium (§§ 1-8) is distinguished by a solemn invocation of the gods, an exceptional beginning in Greek oratory. In §§ 9-53 Demosthenes refutes certain charges, which he says are in fact alien to the case. These chiefly concern the events of 346 B.C.,

and attach themselves to Aeschines' first period. He describes the state of Greece before the negotiations of 346 B.C. (§§ 18-24); he tells of the delay in the ratification of the treaty (§§ 25-30), of the ruin of Phocis (§§ 31-41), and of the immediate effects upon the Greek world (§§ 42-51).

His formal reply to the indictment is contained in §§ 53-125. His answer to the first charge consists in a review of his own policy, foreign (§§ 60-101) and domestic (§§ 102-109), in the years of peace from 346–340 B.C. (Period II. of Aeschines). Among the achievements of his foreign or Hellenic policy he singles out the liberation of Eubœa, and the deliverance of Byzantium and of the Chersonese. The one measure of home policy which he records is the reform of the trierarchy. Early in this division of the speech he thrice raises a question which runs through the very tissue of *The Crown*, a question which Aeschines never fairly faces. I quote one of these passages: "What course ought Athens to have adopted when she beheld Philip intriguing for empire and dominion over Greece? What language ought I to have held, what measures to have proposed, I, your counsellor at Athens—for this point is of capital importance—I, who knew that from all time down to the day when I first spoke in public, my country had ever striven for pre-eminence, for honour, and for renown; and had spent more blood and treasure in the cause of glory and in the interests of Greece at large, than any other Greek state had spent upon its own private ends: I who saw that Philip himself, with whom we had to contend, had in pursuit of sovereignty and power accepted the loss of his eye, the fracture of his collar-bone, the mutilation of his hand and leg, gladly resigning to Fortune any part of his body which she might be pleased to take, if only with the rest he might live on in honour and renown? Here again, I

ask, who would dare to say that a man born and bred at Pella, a place at that time petty and obscure, had a right to such an innate grandeur of spirit as to aspire to the empire of Greece, and to harbour the project in his thoughts; while you, Athenians, who day by day in every word you hear and every sight you see contemplate the memorials of the prowess of your forefathers, might be so intrinsically base as uninvited and unforced to surrender to Philip the liberty of Greece?" (§§ 66-68).

In § 110 he professes to have concluded the examination of his public policy, and proceeds to the technical side of the indictment. His reply here (§§ 110-125) is cursory and unsatisfactory. On one head—the crowning of an official before he had passed his audit—the defence is most sophistical.

The special charges are now refuted, and, as if the speech were drawing to a close, he assumes the right to a freer handling, such as is generally reserved for the epilogue. The portion which follows, from §§ 126-159, may indeed be called a pseudo-epilogue. It is an attack upon Aeschines in his private (§§ 126-131) and in his political (§§ 131-159) life. But it is designed to serve as a transition to the closing scene of the great drama, a scene which exhibits Demosthenes in sharpest contrast with his rival. While recounting the part played by Aeschines in kindling a new Amphictyonic war, he is led, by apparent accident, to resume the thread of his own policy, and to trace it onward in a memorable description, from the seizure of Elatea and the Athenian embassy to Thebes, to the last struggle with Philip (§§ 160-251). This period of glory and disaster (Period III. in Aeschines' division) furnishes him with the noblest inspiration of his eloquence. The self-vindication contained in the reflections (§§ 188-210), which interrupt the narrative of events, forms the climax of

the speech. Having shown that the statesman is responsible only for prudent counsels, but that the issue of events is in the hands of the gods, he ventures on a farther step :—

"As, however, he bears so hardly upon the results, I am ready to make a statement which may sound startling. I ask every man, as he fears Zeus and the gods, not to be shocked at my paradox until he has calmly considered my meaning. I say that, if the event had been manifest to the whole world beforehand, if all men had been fully aware of it, if you, Aeschines, who never opened your lips, had been ever so loud or shrill in prophecy or in protest, not even then ought Athens to have forsaken this course, if Athens had any regard for her glory, or for her past, or for the ages to come. *Now*, of course, she seems to have failed; but failure is for all men when Heaven so decrees. In the other case, she, who claims the first place in Greece, would have renounced it, and would have incurred the reproach of having betrayed all Greece to Philip. If she had indeed betrayed without a blow those things for which our ancestors endured every imaginable danger, who would not have spurned, Aeschines, at *you?* Not at Athens—the gods forbid!—nor at me. In the name of Zeus, how could we have looked visitors in the face, if, things having come to their present pass —Philip having been elected leader and lord of all— the struggle against it had been sustained by others without our help, and this though never once in her past history our city had preferred inglorious safety to the perilous vindication of honour? What Greek, what barbarian, does not know that the Thebans, and their predecessors in power, the Lacedæmonians, and the Persian King, would have been glad and thankful to let Athens take anything that she liked, besides keeping what she had got, if she would only have

done what she was told, and allowed some other power to lead Greece? Such a bargain, however, was for the Athenians of those days neither traditional nor congenial, nor supportable. In the whole course of her annals, no one could ever persuade Athens to side with dishonest strength, to accept a secure slavery, or to desist at any moment of her career from doing battle and braving danger for pre-eminence, for honour, and for renown. . . .

"If I presumed to say that it was *I* who thus inspired you with a spirit worthy of your ancestors, there is not a man present who might not properly rebuke me. What I do maintain is that these principles of conduct were your own; that this spirit existed in the city before my intervention, but that, in the successive chapters of events, I had my share of merit as your servant. Aeschines, on the contrary, denounces our policy as a whole, invokes your resentment against me, as the author of the city's terrors and dangers, and, in his anxiety to wrest from me the distinction of the hour, robs you of glories which will be celebrated as long as time endures. For, if you condemn Ctesiphon on the ground that my public course was misdirected, then you will be adjudged guilty of error: you will no longer appear as sufferers by the perversity of fortune.

"But never, Athenians, never can it be said that you erred when you took upon you that peril for the freedom and safety of all! No, by our fathers who met the danger at Marathon; no, by our fathers who stood in the ranks at Platæa; no, by our fathers who did battle on the waters of Salamis and Artemision; no, by all the brave who sleep in tombs at which their country paid those last honours which she had awarded, Aeschines, to all of them alike, not alone to the successful or the victorious. And her award was just. The part of brave men had been done by all. The fortune ex-

perienced by the individual among them had been allotted by a Power above man."[1]

The real epilogue begins at § 252, and forms the remainder of the speech, which now marches forward with the conscious strength of victory. Aeschines had accused Demosthenes of being the evil genius of Athens; Demosthenes contrasts his own fortune with that of Aeschines in a passage of overpowering abuse outmatching the scurrility of the accuser (§§ 256-269). Then, with rapid self-recovery, he ascends out of this region to take a wider view (§§ 270-275), and the next reply on a personal point is marked by more gravity and self-control (§§ 276-284). In §§ 285-290 he appeals again, as he had already done before (§§ 248-250), to the people's verdict on him after Chæronea. The concluding passage (§§ 291-324) is a summing up and enlargement of what has preceded; and, though the topics handled are directly suggested by the charges of Aeschines, the breadth and generality of the principles stated or implied transcend the special application. I quote the following as an instance of dignified self-eulogy:—

"Of this shameful and notorious conspiracy and baseness, Athenians, or rather—not to trifle with words—of this treason to the liberties of Greece, Athens by my counsel stands guiltless before the world, as do I before you. And yet you ask, what is my title to honour? I will tell you. It is that, when every other public man in Greece, beginning with yourself, had been corrupted first by Philip, and now by Alexander, I could not be wrought upon or tempted by opportunities, by soft words, by large promises, by hope, by fear, or any other motive, to give up any one of what I deemed to be the rights or interests of my country. Never have I offered my counsels to this people in

[1] This passage is quoted from Professor Jebb's translation of it in *Attic Orators*, ii. p. 412, etc.

the spirit of you and your fellows, going over with a swing of the balance to the side of profit, but in straightforwardness, integrity, and incorruptibility of purpose; in guiding more momentous affairs than any man of my time my whole administration has been sound and upright. Such is my title to honour.

"And as to those fortifications and entrenchments which you turned to scorn, I deem them commendable and praiseworthy—assuredly I do; but I place them on a level far below my political measures. Not with stones, not with bricks, did I fortify Athens, nor do I count these the proudest of my achievements. If you would fairly look at my works of fortification, you will find them in arms, cities, stations, harbours, fleets, horses in plenty, and men to defend them. These are the lines I drew round Attica, so far as was in human foresight possible; these are the works with which I fortified our territory, not the circuit of the Piræus or of the city alone" (§§ 299, 300). . . . "Had there been found in each state in Greece a single man such as I have been at my post among you; nay, had Thessaly possessed but one man, had Arcadia possessed one, like-minded with myself, not a Greek, either within or without the Pass, would have been in the plight they are in to-day" (§ 304).

The passion of this peroration is unique in the history of Greek eloquence. The speech ends as it began, in a prayer; but the modest opening bears little likeness to the terror of the final imprecation:—"Never, ye gods, vouchsafe assent to such a prayer! Rather, if it may be, inspire even these men with a better mind and heart; but, if they are indeed past healing, bring them, and them alone, to swift and utter ruin by land and sea; and to us who yet remain grant the speediest release from the terrors that hang over us; grant us a sure salvation!"

The verdict was a decisive defeat for Aeschines,

who, not obtaining one-fifth of the votes, went into retirement at Rhodes, where he opened a school of rhetoric.

One dark passage in Demosthenes' life, which has cast a shadow over his character, remains to be told. In 324 B.C. Harpalus, the treasurer of Alexander, took flight and appeared before the Piræus with troops and embezzled treasure. The more vehement patriots were eager to welcome him, and join him in revolt. But ordinary prudence forbade an open breach with Alexander; and on the motion of Demosthenes the harbour was closed against him. Again he presented himself without his mercenaries, as a refugee and not as a rebel, and this time he was admitted. Presently his surrender was peremptorily demanded by the lieutenants of Alexander. Such compliance, it was felt, would be base; and Phocion, no less than Demosthenes, resisted the demand. It was resolved, again on the motion of Demosthenes, to detain Harpalus and lodge the gold in the Parthenon in trust for Alexander. The amount of the treasure was stated by Harpalus previous to his arrest to be 720 talents. The actual sum deposited was found to be 350 talents. What had become of the deficit? Meantime, however, Harpalus had escaped from prison, and no evidence was forthcoming about the missing treasure. All manner of suspicion was rife, and popular excitement ran high. Something must be done to satisfy public feelings; and Demosthenes carried a decree that the Areopagus should investigate the case. It was six months before the Areopagus sent in their report; nine culprits were named, and Demosthenes headed the list, charged with having received twenty talents. He was prosecuted, fined fifty talents, and being unable to pay was imprisoned.

Modern opinion has inclined to the view that

Demosthenes was not guilty, that he was sacrificed to an alliance between the Macedonian party and the disappointed patriots, such as Hypereides, who were indignant at their cause being, as they thought, betrayed. The sentence would then, as Grote says, be political, not judicial. It must at least be allowed that fable and anecdote have gathered round the charge, which has assumed different and inconsistent shapes. Plutarch's circumstantial account (*Dem.* ch. 15) is the best known, and the least credible. No allusion to it is found in the speeches of Hypereides and Deinarchus for the prosecution; the story appears in various versions, and is in part connected with the name not of Demosthenes but of Demades. The materials for a final decision are wanting. Anecdote apart, the main fact with which we have to deal is the verdict of the Areopagus. Not even to save a great man's character may we lightly set aside their deliberate judgment. The Areopagus still retained their ancient fame for austere impartiality. In this very case their authority was such that the court seems to have required no further evidence for the facts than their report; it only remained to pass sentence. But it is said, at what moment can Demosthenes have been corrupted? Not, it is argued, before the arrest of Harpalus, for up to that point he opposed Harpalus; not after the arrest, for Harpalus had no longer control of the treasure. But we must not overlook the moment when Demosthenes resisted the immediate surrender of Harpalus; the reprieve so gained afforded ample ground for gratitude.[1]

Now, supposing that Demosthenes did, as the Areopagus affirmed, "receive twenty talents from Harpalus," he is not yet convicted of bribery in its worst sense. The Greek distinction between re-

[1] Nor is it unlikely that Demosthenes may have also promised to connive at the prisoner's escape.

ceiving money for, and against, the interests of the state is here important (p. 12). There is nothing in the events as they are narrated to show that Demosthenes served his own private ends or sold the public interests. At each stage of the proceedings his counsel was wise and patriotic; and indeed his whole career refutes the notion that either his speech or his silence could be bought. Yet he was often obliged to engage in dubious transactions for purposes of state. Many of his greatest diplomatic services could not have been effected otherwise; in recent years he had not scrupled to aid the revolt of Thebes with Persian gold; but his enemies in all cases charged him with vulgar bribery. In the affair of Harpalus his conduct may admit of similar explanation. War at present he saw would be folly; yet he looked forward to a national resistance which would tax all the resources of Athens. He had hinted to the people at a day when they might have to melt down their women's ornaments, their precious vessels, and the temple offerings (Deinarch. *Against Dem.* § 69). The sum of twenty talents may seem but a small nucleus for a war-fund, yet it may have been accepted as a pledge of future bounties. If such were his projects, secrecy was essential; he must at all hazards disclaim the gift. On this view he stands acquitted of personal cupidity; and though his conduct will not bear to be tried by a high standard, yet the morality of the day would not have condemned it.

Demosthenes escaped from prison and went into exile. "On the shores of Troezen and Aegina," says Plutarch, "he might often be seen sitting, and gazing with tearful eyes towards Attica." But in 323 B.C. Alexander died, and Greece made one more effort, worthy of her best days, to shake off the yoke. Under Leosthenes, a skilful general, the Lamian war opened brilliantly. Demosthenes, now reconciled to

Hypereides, joined the envoys to the Peloponnese, and aided the movement with all his eloquence. A motion for his recal was soon carried at Athens. His return was a triumph. A galley was sent to Aegina to fetch him; from the Piræus a procession, headed by archons and priests, escorted him to the city.

The joy was of short duration. The battle of Crannon (322 B.C.) crushed the hopes of Greece. The Athenians had to admit a Macedonian garrison, to remodel their constitution, and to give up their leading orators. Demades carried in the Assembly a decree condemning Demosthenes and Hypereides to death.

Demosthenes had already quitted Athens; his pursuers found him seeking refuge in the temple of Poseidon in Calauria. Archias, who had once been an actor, was the agent hired by Antipater to hunt down the fugitives. At first he tried with soft persuasions to tempt forth Demosthenes from his asylum. Demosthenes, who was seated near the door, looked up and said, "Archias, you never won me by your acting, nor will you now win me by your promises." Angry threats now took the place of promises. "Now," said Demosthenes, "you speak like the Macedonian oracle: before you were only acting. Wait a moment till I write a word to my friends at home." He then went into the inner part of the temple, took out a roll, and putting the pen to his mouth bit it, as was his manner when writing. Soon he felt the poison he had sucked beginning to work; and throwing back the covering he had wrapped about his head, fixed his eyes on Archias, and said, "The sooner now you play the part of Creon in the tragedy and cast forth this body unburied, the better. But I, gracious Poseidon, quit thy temple while yet I live; as for Antipater and the Mace-

donians, they have not spared even thy sanctuary from defilement." He tottered forward, and, as he had just passed the altar, fell with a groan and yielded up his life (Plutarch *Dem.* ch. 30).

Demosthenes died at the age of sixty-two (322 B.C.) "It was on the sixteenth day," adds Plutarch, "of the month Pyanepsion, the saddest day of the feast of the Thesmophoria, which the women celebrate with fasting in the temple of the goddess." Forty years later the Athenians set up a bronze statue of the orator, and decreed that the eldest of his family should have public maintenance for ever in the Prytaneum.

## CHAPTER VII.

### HIS PRIVATE SPEECHES.

Aristotle notes among the differences between the forensic and deliberative types of eloquence, that the deliberative style gives less scope for chicanery, and admits fewer digressions and personalities, less of invective and emotional appeal. So, too, Dionysius says that the audience of a law-court require glitter and entrancement, while for the Assembly there is need of exposition and help. These distinctions might be fully illustrated from Demosthenes. Nowhere in the speeches he addressed to the Assembly does he, when denouncing a corrupt system, even mention an opponent by name. But his court speeches descend to scurrilous personalities. Especially in public causes his invective is intemperate; political animosities, that had been suppressed in serious debate, here find free expression. "I hate these men," is the passionate avowal of Demosthenes (*Embass.* § 223). Speeches such as those *On the Crown* and *On the Embassy*, where there is a blending of the deliberative and the judicial element, show the most abrupt contrasts—grave statesmanlike counsel alternating with low abuse. Demosthenes spoke, no doubt, in bitter earnest; yet we must not measure his feelings by the violence of his language. Cari-

cature was an understood part of judicial eloquence, as it was of the old Attic comedy. To attack a man's private life, his origin, his family, or his friends, was an accepted form. If it were omitted, the jury would probably feel themselves defrauded. In private causes invective was kept within bounds, but ample room was still left for falsehood and exaggeration. Yet we have not any reason to think that the scandals, which were welcomed as a seasoning to discourse, appreciably affected the verdict.

But the Athenians were also connoisseurs in fine language, and their artistic sense had to be satisfied. It was urged against one of Demosthenes' clients that he was an objectionable fellow, who walked fast and talked loud. He pleads guilty, but offers an apology; "it is nature's doing," he says, "and it cannot be undone; if it could, there would be nothing to distinguish between man and man" (*Against Pantæn.* §§ 52-56). If the jury were not disposed to be lenient to clumsiness and ugliness, still less could they tolerate ungraceful speech. Demosthenes saw that these fastidious critics must be charmed in order to be won. So he concedes much to them; he goes beyond his practice in the Assembly; for though the deliberative speeches, too, cost him minute artistic toil, yet in them there is no phrase, no word, that is not pertinent to the subject; no ornament for its own sake; all is subordinated to a serious practical end. But in the forensic speeches there are occasionally lively digressions, racy fictions, and displays of power, whose main object is to please.

The Athenian theory of citizenship required each man to speak in his own cause. His public duties, whether in the army, in the Assembly, or in the law-courts, were exercised by himself, and not through another. The custom had a remarkable effect on Greek forensic oratory, and made it widely different

both from the Roman and from the English type. The unlettered peasant or the busy tradesman, in going to law, would originally apply to some more learned friend, who would advise him and probably give him the sketch of a speech. Gradually, as eloquence became an art, a class of professional speech-writers grew up towards the end of the fifth century. They were called "logographers," and in their hands Attic oratory was moulded. They seldom appeared in court; when they did speak for a client, it was by grace of the court they spoke, not as advocates proper, but as friends of the litigant. The litigant himself was bound first to say something on his own behalf. He might then, after a few words, beg leave to call on some more capable person to put his case; he himself was too inexperienced, he had weak health or some other defect. As a rule, however, the logographer's work was limited to giving legal advice and to writing a speech for the client to deliver; and he was employed chiefly in civil cases. Part of his art was to remain undetected, to assume the character and catch the tone of each client in turn, to feign the embarrassment of one who finds himself unexpectedly in a law-court, to seem to be improvising as he goes on. He must hide the compass of his own resources, and not let the jury suspect the presence of a paid expert. If a minute knowledge of law is shown, it must appear to have been merely got up for the occasion. Such a speech will be brief, for it has to be learnt by heart by one who is not a trained speaker; its idiom will be that of daily life; it will be simple in structure and free from artifice. Its persuasive force will be due to clear and vivid narrative rather than to ingenious argument. The more impetuous movements of oratory will be avoided, as likely to put the jury on their guard and so destroy the illusion. The feelings will be moved not so much

by express appeals as by an air of truthfulness and candour.

This form of dramatised speech-writing was brought to perfection by Lysias. But the legal fiction that the speaker was his own advocate was daily becoming more transparent. Isæus at times threw off the disguise and wrote openly as a master. Demosthenes proceeded farther in the direction of Isæus. We have already seen (p. 31) that the speeches he composed for others to deliver in public causes are in truth political orations, enforcing his own views and expressed in his own language. He writes without fear and without reserve, the more so that he writes as an anonymous author. His tone is that of the statesman, not of the logographer. How a client managed to learn a speech so elaborate as, for instance, the speech *Against Aristocrates*, is a matter for wonder; and we may suspect that there were large omissions in delivery. But the greater number of the court speeches, being of a purely private character, are brief and comparatively straightforward. It is true that here also he made little effort to sustain the character of the speaker. These speeches, all but two, are written for plaintiffs, not for defendants; and the militant energy of Demosthenes' genius inclined him to put forth all his strength and skill in attack. He comes into the combat as an athlete armed at all points; guileless simplicity is in him a forced attitude. He knows the laws intimately and disengages their principles; he examines and discusses evidence in a searching manner which makes it impossible to mistake him for the "plain man"; he grapples with an opponent in strenuous argument, he forestalls objections and leaves no escape. The sober colouring of Lysias has been warmed into a more glowing tint; there is a quickened life, a more resonant tone, greater variety and passion. The latest private speeches,

in their phrase and in the structure of their periods, approach nearly to the deliberative harangues.

In a few instances, however, Demosthenes is careful to observe dramatic proprieties, and his skilful portraiture then falls little, if at all, below that of Lysias. Such is the speech **Against Conon**, where the action is one for assault and battery, the plaintiff Ariston being Demosthenes' client. It opens with a vivid picture of camp life on the Attic frontier. Ariston was there on garrison duty together with the defendant's sons, who spent the afternoon in drinking and the evening in playing drunken pranks. Ariston, whose tent happened to be pitched near theirs, was the chief sufferer. He and his messmates at last laid a complaint before the general. A severe reprimand was administered, but on that very evening the young men made an outrageous attack on Ariston, almost ending in bloodshed. The quarrel bred in the camp was carried to the city. One evening as Ariston was taking his usual walk in the Agora with a friend, Ctesias, son of Conon, caught sight of him, raised a shout, and instantly disappeared into a house where a drinking-party was going on. The guests issued forth, and presently encountered Ariston in the street; and, while some of them held the friend, Conon and his son tripped up Ariston, plunged him in the mud, jumped on him and kicked him so violently that his lip was cut through and his eyes closed up. Conon then crowed over his prostrate foe, in imitation of a victorious fighting cock, while his comrades bade him do the flapping of the wings with his elbows. The bruises brought on a long illness in which Ariston was at the point of death. The defendant tried to laugh it off as a practical joke. "Ah," says Ariston to the jury, "but you would have found it no laughing matter if you had been present when I was dragged, and stripped, and kicked, and after leaving my house

quite well was borne home on a litter; when my mother rushed out, and the women cried and wailed as if there had been a death in the house, so that some of the neighbours sent to ask what had happened" (§ 20). Conon himself in his younger days had belonged to a kind of "Mohawk Club," called after a Thracian tribe, "The Triballi." His sons were members of a similar society, which is graphically described (§§ 34, 35).

The whole story is told and commented on with exquisite grace. The tone is that of a middle-aged man of precise habits, who knows little law, and would have known less had it not been for the defendant; anxious to seem calm, but not quite able to smother his indignation; a little wanting in a sense of the ludicrous, and so keenly alive to his own respectability—which is a recurring topic—that he must apologise for being aware that such rowdyism even exists—an admirable butt, we may imagine, for members of a Mohawk Club out on a campaign.

We now pass to another speech **(In reply to Callicles)**, less perfect in form than the last, but almost as dramatic, and marked by touches of naïve humour. The opening words are these: "Well, Athenians, there really is no greater nuisance than a bad and grasping neighbour, as I myself have had the luck to find out." This somewhat pettish, impatient tone, quite in keeping with the young defendant's character, is sustained throughout. The plaintiff, Callicles, and the defendant held adjacent mountain farms, separated only by the road. The present action is one for damages, caused by the stoppage of a watercourse, which used, Callicles alleges, to pass through the defendant's land. The defendant's father, however, had built a wall and diverted the water into the road; hence there was an overflow, and Callicles' farm was flooded. On the other hand, the defendant contends

that the wall was built more than fifteen years before his father died, and no objection had been raised at the time, "though, of course, there was often rain then as well as now" (§ 4); that the enclosed land was not part of a watercourse, but private property long ago planted with vines and figs and other trees, and containing a family burial-ground. "Who would plant trees in a watercourse? Or who would bury his ancestors there?" (§ 13). The stream, too, did not come down from a neighbour's land and pass out into the next neighbour's land; it flowed down the road both above and below him. Why then divert it? Who ever heard of a watercourse *by the side* of a road? The public road is its proper channel. (This quite seriously, for a road in Greece was and is often the bed of a torrent.) Nor would his next neighbour below thank him if he were to turn the water into his land. "If then," he says, "I may not drain it off either into the road or into private ground, in heaven's name, gentlemen, tell me what am I to do? Callicles, surely, won't compel me to drink it up" (§ 13). If all who suffered from excess of water in those parts were to go to law with him about it, his fortune would need to be many times greater than it was in order to stand it. But, as the plaintiff's mother had let out, there was little harm done, though there was much lamentation; a few bushels of barley had got wet, and an oil-jar had been upset without being damaged. The truth was, Callicles coveted his neighbour's farm; that was the secret of his litigation. "In going to law with me," says the defendant, "I hold him to be a thoroughly abandoned and benighted man" (§ 13).

Among the most powerful and persuasive of the private speeches is the speech **For Phormio**, who was at this time head of the chief banking house at Athens. He had been first foreman to Pasion, the founder of the firm, and afterwards his successor. Apollodorus,

Pasion's elder son, who distinguished himself by a spendthrift and ambitious generosity, and was now in a financially desperate case, put in a claim against Phormio for a certain sum of banking stock supposed to be due to him under Pasion's will. On Phormio's behalf it is pleaded that several years ago a compromise had been made extinguishing all claims, and that this compromise was a legal bar to the present action. Further, Apollodorus' whole story is shown to be without foundation. The jury were so completely convinced of the justice of Phormio's case, that they would hardly give Apollodorus a hearing in reply.

Apart from the great merit of the speech, it ought to be read for a certain painful interest it has acquired. Taken in conjunction with the first speech *Against Stephanus*, it is supposed to reflect gravely on the character of Demosthenes. The latter speech, whose genuineness could hardly have been doubted but for the desire to vindicate the orator's morality, is written for Apollodorus in a suit he brought against Stephanus for giving false witness in the Phormio case. Thus Demosthenes, as is thought, acted dishonourably in pleading on opposite sides.

The charge, however, against him appears in somewhat different shapes. Aeschines accuses him of having communicated beforehand to Apollodorus a speech he had been paid to write for Phormio (Aesch. *Emb.* § 165). Plutarch merely says that he wrote speeches for and against Apollodorus in his quarrel with Phormio; that it was like selling two swords from the same workshop to be used on opposite sides (*Life of Dem.* ch. 15). Aeschines no doubt, as usual, sets his rival's conduct in the darkest light, while Plutarch's version of the story is borne out by the speeches as they have come down to us, and has a better claim to acceptance. The morality of Demosthenes' conduct may in this case perhaps be dubious,

but it is not so palpably bad as has been supposed. The "logographer" must be kept distinct from the modern advocate. He entered into a far less binding relation with his client; he did not appear for him and in his stead; he held no responsible office and took no public part in the proceedings. Nor did he belong to any corporate society, among whom there existed a clear code of etiquette and of honour. He was an anonymous writer, making his livelihood by his pen. Moreover, the actual charge against Demosthenes is not that he wrote speeches on opposite sides in the same suit, but in successive suits, one of which arose out of the other. Even an English barrister, under such circumstances, could not well refuse to take a brief against a former client, supposing that the client had not retained his services in the second suit. Yet the outside public would probably be a little shocked at "lawyers' morality." The case was an exceptional one at Athens, as it is now, and attracted the more attention since it involved a well-known name. But there was an uglier side to the matter. In the second trial Demosthenes maintains that Stephanus, who was called as a witness for his client in the first trial, was guilty of perjury. Also, he attacks his late client's character with a coarse violence and a wantonness which goes beyond the conventional invective of the law-courts. He writes for Apollodorus as Apollodorus would have written himself, not sparing even the speaker's own mother. And it is precisely here rather than in the change of sides that we feel the real discredit lies.

It has been ingeniously suggested that political causes brought about a union at this time between Demosthenes and Apollodorus. The date of the first speech *Against Stephanus* is the end of 349 B.C. or the beginning of 348 B.C. It was early in 348 B.C. that Apollodorus, at a critical moment, aided Demos-

thenes' policy by making a tentative proposal, at the risk of his civic rights, in relation to the Festival Fund (p. 75). On such terms, perhaps, did Demosthenes consent to support him in his lawsuit.

One argument of some weight may be alleged against the genuineness of the first speech *Against Stephanus.* Seven speeches delivered by Apollodorus have come down to us among the works of Demosthenes. Two of these (*Against Callippus* and *Against Nicostratus*) would seem, on internal chronological evidence, to have been spoken before Demosthenes' suit with his guardians had even begun, and one of them (*Against Timotheus*) before it was concluded. This, then, would be a decisive reason for rejecting them. A certain presumption, it may be said, is thus raised against the remaining speeches for Apollodorus; the author of the three speeches just mentioned was probably the author of all. And, it is urged, we can further account for the reception of these spurious speeches among the collected works of Demosthenes; for this collection (made at Alexandria by Callimachus) was based on no critical recension; it embraced such anonymous writings as had any obvious bearing upon Demosthenic speeches, and was not intended to prejudge the question of genuineness. Thus, it is said, the speeches for Apollodorus came to be inserted as the companion speeches to that written *For Phormio* against Apollodorus.

But another view is also possible. We may assume the first speech *Against Stephanus* to be the work of Demosthenes—a speech with marked Demosthenic qualities, and about which no doubt was raised in antiquity—and yet not accept all or any of the other speeches written for Apollodorus; for, reasoning as before, we may urge that the admission of a single genuine speech would naturally bring with it into the collection other doubtful or spurious speeches written

in the same client's behalf. And in fact such would seem to have been the view of those ancient critics who rejected some, but not all, of the speeches for Apollodorus.

Much of the literary criticism which in recent times has undertaken to discriminate between genuine and spurious works of Demosthenes rests on no solid basis. The evidence of style alone is most uncertain, and authorities here differ as much as in the detection of Homeric interpolations. We may grant in certain speeches that there are rhythmical irregularities, and a want of finish in the phrase, without on that account rejecting the speeches themselves. Demosthenes did not always put forth his whole strength in unimportant court speeches, or add the last touch to what he wrote. The very carelessness which is thought suspicious may sometimes be dramatically appropriate to the speaker. The safest course for moderns is not to reject, on purely stylistic grounds, such speeches as were pronounced genuine by Dionysius, whose delicate perception of Greek idiom we can never hope to equal. Some few speeches, however, may on other grounds be pronounced rhetorical forgeries, being vague and declamatory, wanting in coherence and historical precision; and in such cases modern historical criticism has generally borne out the literary doubts of Dionysius. But by far the greater number of the private speeches which go by the name of Demosthenes are written, if not by him, by some of his contemporaries,[1] and are authentic records of the period to which they profess to belong. Their actual authorship matters but little. Their chief value lies in this—that they contain de-

[1] The speeches written by a logographer seem to have become the property of the client for whom they were written; and such floating compositions were easily attached to famous names. This is one reason why the court speeches are more doubtful than the rest.

tailed information on Attic law, and reflect every phase of social and mercantile life in the fourth century B.C.

It would be interesting to know whether Demosthenes pursued the work of a logographer throughout his life. It is clear that during the years of his political leadership, and when his influence was at its height, he took very little part in private lawsuits. The latest of his undoubtedly genuine private speeches (*Against Pantænetus*) falls between the speech *On the Peace* (346 B.C.) and the *Second Philippic* (344 B.C.) But if the speeches *Against Phænippus*, *Against Phormio*, and *Against Dionysodorus*, are also his, it would seem that, after the accession of Alexander, and the more definite triumph of Macedon, he took refuge from an enforced political inaction in the employment of his younger days. But the point is one which must remain uncertain unless these vexed questions of authorship can be finally solved.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### DEMOSTHENES AS A STATESMAN AND AN ORATOR.

We may now form some general estimate of Demosthenes. Unlike Cicero, he is known to us only as a citizen, not as a man. His speeches, great in their self-forgetfulness, reveal next to nothing of his private life, and the few letters which have come down under his name, even if we admit them to be genuine—a most doubtful supposition—are, with one exception, public documents addressed to the Council and people of Athens. Even his private correspondence, if it existed, would not, we may be sure, be marked by the candid confidences and genial humour which in Cicero are so fascinating. In that grave and unbending nature, to which politics were an absorbing passion, there was little room for domestic affections or for the play of the social instincts. Yet it is a mistake to think of him solely as the author of Philippics, or to allow the main episode to obscure the life. It was not the struggle with Macedon that gave a bent and a purpose to his thoughts. From the outset it was his aim to revive public spirit in Athens, to purify the home administration, to bring vigour into the conduct of foreign affairs. Before Philip was seen to be a dangerous antagonist the organic lines of his policy had been traced.

But while his career is stamped by an essential unity, a gradual enlargement of view is visible. From the first we find Athens standing out before him as a living personality with a well-defined character (τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἦθος, *Lept.* § 13, *Timocr.* § 171). Certain features disengaged themselves at once, generous qualities such as were the birthright of a noble well-bred people, disinterestedness, magnanimity, pity for the oppressed, a delicate and scrupulous honour. He had studied the history of Athens and gathered from it all that was noblest in her past, uniting the elements in an ideal portrait which became to him henceforth a power that moved his imagination and controlled his reason. This portrait of national character he set before his countrymen as an object of loving imitation. Athens must identify herself with her best moments, and be made to feel that she was never more truly herself than when at her grandest. The dormant feelings of patriotism and self-respect must be elicited. Instinct must be developed into virtue.

Demosthenes was always free from the narrow prejudices of an Athenian. In his later life he was accused by Aeschines of Bœotian sympathies; and in his first popular harangue (*On the Symmories*, § 33) his tone towards Thebes, then an object of bitter hatred, is strikingly temperate. In the same speech (§ 6) he declares the exceptional obligations of Athens towards Greece at large, and marks the limit thus imposed upon her private vengeance. The part of Athens in the speech *For the Megalopolitans* (p. 40) is to deliver the oppressed (§§ 14, 15): "Circumstances may change with changing ambitions, but the policy of Athens is the same." But generous instincts are not as yet perfectly harmonised with other motives. The principle most insisted on in the speech *For the Megalopolitans* is that of the balance of power (cf. *Aristocr.* §§ 102 ff.), and in

the speech *For the Rhodians* the claims of democracy against oligarchy are the decisive consideration.

In the early *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs* the sense of Athenian interests is still dominant. But after the taking of Olynthus the Hellenic character of the struggle became daily more manifest, and Demosthenes' view was enlarged with the growing dimensions of the danger. The Athenian was sunk in the Hellene. Starting from appeals to self-interest, he passed into another region; insensibly he led up from the menaced independence of Athens to the vision of a death-struggle between barbarism and Hellenism, between lawless aggression on the one side and dignified freedom on the other. Athens was bound to take up the championship of Greece, apart from her own safety or selfish advantage. The tone of *The Crown* is not adopted by Demosthenes to vindicate a policy which had failed. It is anticipated by a statement scarcely less empathic in the speech *On the Chersonese* (§ 49; quoted p. 104): it is the settled conviction of the *Third Philippic.* We have seen how in the next two years he was able to elevate his hearers, both in Athens and outside it, to a similar height of national devotion. It was his part to overcome petty jealousies, to blot out old scores by acts of conciliation towards Eubœans, Thebans, and Byzantines; to deprecate the insistance on strict rights. In each state he appealed to what there was of best in the local traditions. "He reminded," says Plutarch, "the Thebans of Epaminondas, and the Athenians of Pericles." The triumph of this high-minded policy was attained in the famous embassy to Thebes and the union of the cities before Chæronea. The generous spirit of Demosthenes was censured by his rival. It was alien to the practical politicians of the day, and it hardly finds expression elsewhere within the range of Attic oratory.

Thus had his character developed as doom closed round the city. He had learned to look on the cause of Athens as one with the cause of Greece. His early and instinctive admiration of all that was generous in conduct meets us again in *The Crown*, in a reasoned defence of Athenian magnanimity (§§ 95-100, § 238 ff.) The first of these passages is prefaced with the words: "Communities, like individuals, should ever strive to mould their future by the noblest chapters of their past." These "noblest chapters," of Athenian history, as he interpreted them, were moments inspired by a high enthusiasm that disregarded vulgar expediency. The level of Panhellenic patriotism attained by Demosthenes was higher than was reached by Pericles, and was equalled, if at all, by Epaminondas alone.

On the study of Thucydides Demosthenes had been nourished. Apart from such legendary anecdotes as that he copied out Thucydides eight times, there is ample evidence, in spite of few direct imitations or verbal reminiscences, that he was penetrated by the thought of the historain. He had learnt from Thucydides that events are the outcome of character; that they are not startling or dramatic incidents, the work of an arbitrary will, but phenomena whose reason lies deep in the moral disposition of nations and individuals, and the law of whose succession can be discovered. Such a view, akin to that which Sophocles embodied in poetry, was applied in his own field by Thucydides with such a penetrating analysis of motives as to make of history a new science. To observe character, and especially the broad lines of national character, under such a master, became a great training in politics. A searching inquiry into real causes is as distinctive of the orator as it is of the historian. Demosthenes will not be put off with illusions or superficial explanations, he must trace back external

events to their hidden source. Character with him is all in all. His first political speech exhibits this thought already formed (*On the Symmories*, §§ 14, 15, p. 37); every Philippic is instinct with it. "Is Philip dead? No, he is only ill. Dead or ill, what difference to you? If anything befalls him, you will instantly raise up another Philip for yourselves" (*Phil.* i. § 17). Again, it was the speeches of Thucydides that first taught him what a luminous force is added to debate by attaching facts to their principles, and by combining particular with general ideas; although, in the application of the discovery, he followed his own method. From Thucydides he learnt that mastery is assured to calm intelligence backed up by sustained and vigorous effort; and that speech is of value only so far as it contains in it the promise and potency of action. Before undertaking to interpret Athenian history, and to read Athenian character, he had trained his political reason in the most fortifying study that ancient literature afforded.

The influence, however, upon him of his elder contemporaries was not insignificant. Subsequent tradition loved to tell how he had been the pupil of Plato and of Isocrates, a tradition wholly unsupported by evidence, and an instance of the perpetual attempt to affiliate great men together as master and pupil. At first sight we may see nothing but contrast between the strenuous and robust eloquence of Demosthenes, with its face set towards action—an eloquence in which reason was vivified by contact with passion—and the dreamy splendour of Isocrates, who wrote from his study, spending ten years in publishing a pamphlet, while events had outstripped his pen; who was neither philosopher nor politician, but had an unsteady foot in either world. Or again, Plato drawing up the constitution of his ideal city, what had he to do with Demosthenes, whose thoughts were centred in Athens,

who, in no wise blind to her faults and failures, found in her a city with a great part to play, and with noble traditions to be reanimated?

Yet these men, differing widely in opinions, held certain principles in common. Demosthenes owed to Plato and to Isocrates the idea that ethical motives ought to be introduced into the life of states, that political morality has a serious meaning. Isocrates sought to raise the dignity of eloquence by applying it, not to trivial themes, but to serious political discussion, and by giving it a moral content. The rules of private conduct were, he held, applicable to states; justice was for the interest of nations as well as of individuals, and was even more binding on nations "by reason of their immortality" (*Peace*, § 120). Shortly before the birth of Demosthenes he began to set forth these views; but his passionless homilies fell on inattentive ears. It needed a stronger thought and a living voice to convert such abstract principles into truths which could shape action. Demosthenes was able, as Isocrates was not, to draw on the ideal world without ever losing sight of the real. The fusion he effected between morals and politics admits of many illustrations; a few instances may here be given.

In the political organism he saw a moral institution. To him, as to Plato, democracy reflected character, and was among the influences by which character was moulded. But they estimated its worth very differently. To Plato it denoted, first, a form of government under which each man did what was right in his own eyes; next, a state of the soul in which there was no equilibrium of forces, no sovereign and controlling power. Now, Demosthenes is aware that democracy is in a peculiar sense liable to fall under the sway of passion, and he therefore insists on individual virtue as a condition of its existence. Plato thought virtue and democracy an impossible union, for democracy

implied lawlessness. Demosthenes, on the other hand, held democracy to be the reign of law as opposed to oligarchy, the reign of caprice (*Timocr*, §§ 75, 76). The idea is not confined to him; but while it occurs elsewhere as a rhetorical commonplace, it is to him a vital and fruitful conception.

As the state was in his view a moral institution, so the statesman had corresponding functions. This was a doctrine which Plato had made familiar; but Plato, observing the poor success of statesmen in regenerating mankind, despaired of the commonwealths of earth, and condemned as failures Pericles and all others who had been "bad tamers of wild animals." Demosthenes, too, demands from the statesmen other qualities besides the intellectual; not only to "see events in their beginnings, to forecast the future, to forewarn others," but also "to limit to the utmost the range of those vices which are inherent in the very idea of a state, . . . and to promote harmony, kindly feeling, and the impulse towards duty" (*Crown*, § 246). The statesman is no mere administrator; nor, on the other hand, is he a sage or a moralist, though it is his duty to guide and to enlighten the public conscience. Two conditions are here indispensable. First, he must show a fearless sincerity. The duty of speaking out the truth at all costs, of not ignoring facts, is laid down in the earliest of his political speeches proper. He conformed faithfully to his own ideal. Plutarch (*Life of Dem.* ch. xiv.) describes his courage in uttering rude truths and withstanding the passions of the people in language which recalls Thucydides' description of Pericles (ii. 65, 8). Like Pericles, he was able, as we have seen, to abate an extravagant confidence no less than to brighten moments of despair. Constitutionally timid as he probably was, his whole life eloquently refutes Aeschines' charge of cowardice before a crowd. As years go on the figure of the

statesman stands out in his speeches in bold relief against that of the sycophant. The two portraits are first drawn in *The Chersonese* (§§ 68-72), and are completed in *The Crown* (§§ 189 ff.)

The second requisite in a statesman is a profound sense of responsibility. Demosthenes frequently applies the words ὑπεύθυνος and εὔθυναι, which denote the official responsibility of the magistrate, to the moral responsibility of the statesman. Good intentions, "of no mean force," as Burke says, "in the government of mankind," are not enough. A man must form a proper estimate of his own powers. He is not compelled to conduct public business, but having once undertaken it, he may not set up honest incapacity as a plea for failure. Such a plea would be small consolation to ruined allies, and to their wives and children. This is forcibly urged in the speech *On the Embassy* (§§ 99 ff.) *The Crown* contains the matured expression of the orator's opinion on this head. The responsibility he there accepts is greater even than before: he consents to be judged in the light of the event. Now, however, schooled in hard experience, he recognises more fully the limits of human control over circumstance. If the statesman fails, it must not be through want of foresight, of moral purpose, or of sustained energy.

The Stoic Panætius, we are told by Plutarch, declared that "the principle which appears in the greater number of the speeches of Demosthenes is, that the honourable (τοῦ καλοῦ) alone is to be chosen for its own sake. This is the principle of *The Crown*, of the speeches *Against Aristocrates*, *Against Leptines*, and of the *Philippics*. In all of these he seeks to lead his countrymen not towards that which is most pleasant, most easy, or most profitable; he often calls on them to set safety and wellbeing below honour and duty" (*Life of Dem.*, ch. xiii.) Demosthenes, as we

have seen, maintained that this was the embodiment of the spirit of Athens (*e.g. Lept.* § 13), and Philip's recognition of the fact was the noblest homage that he could have paid their city (*Phil.* ii. § 10). The moral elevation of view which distinguishes him is not found in an equal degree in any other orator, so far as I know, except in Burke. It establishes a profound inner resemblance between the two men, and produces a unity of thought underlying obvious differences of style. The large and enlightened wisdom impressed upon their works, running counter to the prejudices of the day, is in a great measure due to this cause. The sentence that sums up the speech on *Conciliation with America* is conceived in the very spirit of Demosthenes :—"Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom; and great empires and little minds go ill together." For them no one department of politics stood isolated; each derived its meaning from its relation to the whole. A pervading moral purpose bound together even their occasional utterances. Home and foreign policy were to Demosthenes inseparable. He protests against repairing failure abroad by measures which left untouched the heart of the evil at home. His method was remedial, not palliative. He took in the social, economic, and military bearings of a measure in one view. His trierarchic law (340 B.C.), whose various aspects he himself indicates (*Crown*, §§ 102-109), achieved at once a reform of the navy, corrected a social grievance, and equalised the burdens upon capital. His scheme for applying the Theoricon to war purposes, carried after a struggle of eleven years (339 B.C.), was another measure of comprehensive scope (cf. pp. 16 ff., 112). In reviewing his early court speeches (*Against Androtion*, *Against Timocrates*), we have seen how out of technicalities of law and details of finance he rises to efforts for purifying

the administration and reducing corrupt influence. Economic reform was to him, as to Burke, a matter of constitutional and social import (Burke's speech on *Economic Reform*). One case, primarily economic, is enlarged by him into a matter which touched the very foundations of public morality and expediency. The discussion, raised on the law of Leptines, was whether certain hereditary exemptions granted by the people for distinguished public services should be revoked (p. 33). One part of the argument of Demosthenes is recapitulated in these sentences from the *Letter to a Noble Lord* on the subject of Burke's pension. "I ever held a scant and penurious justice to partake of the nature of a wrong. I held it to be in its consequences the worst economy in the world. In saving money I soon can count up all the good I do; but when by a cold penury I blast the abilities of a nation, and stunt the growth of its active energies, the ill I may do is beyond all calculation." Another point still more insisted on by Demosthenes is thus expressed by Burke in an earlier speech in which he is himself advocating retrenchment: "A critical retrospective examination of the pension list, upon the principle of merit, can never serve for my basis" (*On Economic Reform*). The views of the two orators on every question of public policy will be found to depend on some principle, and that principle has its root in morals.

The instability of unrighteous power is thus described by Demosthenes:—"It is not possible, Athenians, it is not possible to found a solid power upon oppression, perjury, and falsehood. Such an empire may endure for the moment or for the hour; nay, it may perhaps blossom with the rich promise of hope; but time finds it out, and it drops away of itself. As in a house, a vessel, or any similar structure, the foundations should above all be strong,

so should the principles and groundwork of conduct rest upon truth and justice" (*Olynth.* ii. § 10). No bolder assertion of a moral title as the only enduring claim to empire is to be found among Burke's denunciations of our rule in India. Similarly in the *Leptines* (§ 136) the broad command is laid down: "Beware not to exhibit as a nation conduct which you would shrink from as individuals." But Demosthenes in another passage of the same speech admits that the analogy between the state and the individual is incomplete. The state, for instance, cannot always form friendships on precisely the same grounds as an individual (§ 50). Like Aristotle, he holds that the state may and ought to employ a bad man if he is useful.

He also sees that there are certain limits which determine the application of moral maxims to international relations. Some reciprocity of ideas is necessary, otherwise the nobler morality may lead to extermination. The rule of force, he points out in the speech *For the Rhodians* (§§ 29, 30, p. 42), is the existing basis of international law; and Athens cannot take up an isolated and unaccepted standard of morality in the face of unscrupulous enemies. This would be "not justice, but cowardice." Nowhere, however, does he lay down precise rules for the conduct of a state in cases where justice and self-interest are in apparent conflict; in general he assumes their identity. Yet he recognises that there may be a duty higher than even that of self-preservation; he holds it to be the proud distinction of Athens that there were moments in her history when, for the sake of Greece and at the imperious call—the ἀνάγκη—of honour, existence itself was staked. He rebels against the fallacious verdict of outward events. When in *The Crown* he asserts his calm conviction that defeat in a cause so noble was better than victory otherwise

attained, the true discipleship of Plato is revealed. The language is the echo of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. It may seem near to Stoicism, but the temperate allowance made for human weakness has in it a tenderness that is not stoical.

Demosthenes was naturally averse to a metaphysical treatment of politics. There is nothing in him of open revolt against the political philosophy of Plato, as there is in Burke against that of Rousseau. Rarely does he delay, as he does for a moment in the *Leptines* (§ 110), to protest against theorising on a constitutional question. Yet his cast of mind was as profoundly opposed as that of Burke to all deductive methods, metaphysical or geometric. Burke constantly maintains that political reason computes not by mathematical but on moral principles. To the Duke of Bedford, who took on himself to appraise Burke's political services, and his claim to a pension, he writes thus: "I have no doubt of his Grace's readiness in all the calculations of vulgar arithmetic; but I shrewdly suspect that he is little studied in the theory of moral proportions, and has never learned the rule of three in the arithmetic of policy and state." We are reminded of Demosthenes' reply to Aeschines, who would estimate his rival's worth in the spirit of a vulgar bookkeeper. The illustration employed by Aeschines seemed to imply that the services of Demosthenes might be totted up, and his failures set off against them in the ledger, item against item, no regard being had to the quality of the facts compared or the moral value of the results. The reply of Demosthenes amounts to this, that political calculations cannot be reduced to simple addition. "That Aeschines, however, is not warranted in requiring you to alter your estimate, I shall easily show, not by casting up figures—political arithmetic is of a different order—but by a brief enumeration of

events, while I call on you my hearers at once to audit the account and to attest the facts." Then, after a summary of events, he proceeds: "A striking resemblance, is there not, between the arithmetic of figures and of facts?" (*Crown*, §§ 227-231). This may be called Demosthenes' protest against the mathematical method. Another passage in the same speech is a virtual protest against *à priori* principles of any kind being applied to politics. Aeschines had enumerated the qualifications of a statesman, and trying Demosthenes by this standard had found him wanting. Demosthenes indignantly refuses to be tried by the arbitrary ideal of an opponent. "You draw your ideal," he says, "of the patriotic statesman, just as if you had given a statue to be made by contract, and it was then delivered to you without the points specified in the contract. Or as if statesmen were known by definitions, not by acts and measures" (*Crown*, § 122).

The method pursued by Demosthenes as by Burke was the historical method. Montesquieu, as its modern founder, won a warm, perhaps an exaggerated, admiration from Burke; Thucydides, the philosophic historian of antiquity, moulded the mind of Demosthenes. The latter is no doubt guilty of several historical inaccuracies, yet in spite of these he shows a more minute knowledge of history than any other ancient orator, and an infinitely deeper insight into its meaning. Compared to the brilliant and ill-read Aeschines, he may be called a genuine historical student. With this ampler knowledge goes the power of summoning up telling illustrations, which are with him among the most powerful instruments of proof. The examples he takes are often from well-known or recent events, and depend for their force chiefly on the setting (see the *Third Philippic*). At times he recalls some slighted chapter of history, and with a few

bold strokes lights up the page. "The time of those events has indeed gone by, but the time for reading the lessons of the past is ever present to the wise" (*Crown*, § 48). Whatever be the allusion, it is free from antiquarian pedantry and has a direct bearing upon the subject in hand. He does not, like Aeschines, support an argument by a reference to a mythical or semi-mythical past. He is always practical and precise, with a strong grasp of the actual. The mastery of facts and precedents which he and Burke display, may have been due in no slight degree to the legal as well as the historical training of the two orators.

But here comes the notable point, that which distinguishes these two from all other orators and statesmen—the close alliance between facts and principles. Not that their method of bringing out principles is the same. Burke often expounds them in the manner of a philosopher—the secret of many of his failures in Parliament. In Demosthenes the principle gradually emerges from the facts. It is not supplied as a thing ready made. The orator stimulates and provokes his hearers to reflection; they and he must reason together till the truth seems to spring from the contact of their minds. As the facts are presented first on one side then on another, the illuminating principle breaks in. It may be stated briefly and even cursorily, but this it is which has vivified the whole. Among the causes which give to the eloquence of Demosthenes and Burke an enduring value beyond any other eloquence, ancient or modern, none is to be ranked above this, that a close grappling with detail is found combined with large generalisations from experience and the broad assertion of moral truths.

Even the personal element in these orators is largely redeemed by being attached to principles. Self-praise rarely in Burke, never, I think, in Demosthenes, becomes vainglorious. In *The Crown* it is elevated

into something resembling a noble profession of faith. The lofty self-assertion of the passage already quoted (p. 106) from the speech *On the Chersonese* (see especially the later sections), deserves to be placed beside Burke's declaration: "I know the map of England as well as the noble lord or as any other person; and I know that the way I take is not the way to preferment." Or again, the saying attributed to Demosthenes, when he was called on to undertake an unjust prosecution: "Your counsellor I will always be, even if you wish it not; a sycophant you shall never find me, even if you wish it" (Plutarch, *Dem.* ch. xiv.)—this surpasses the utterance of Burke when elected member for Bristol: "Your faithful friend, your devoted servant, I shall be to the end of my life; a flatterer you do not wish for."

The invective both of Burke and of Demosthenes is furious and unmeasured. But Demosthenes has this that is peculiar to him: his deliberative eloquence is free from personal attacks. Intent on great political issues, he never once even names an opponent before the Assembly—at least, in any speech undoubtedly genuine.[1] In the law-courts, and more especially in criminal cases, there was a tradition of invective (p. 130). At times, however, an intensity of hatred finds the stereotyped phrases of abuse inadequate, and vents itself in those passages which so greatly disfigure the speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines *On the Embassy*, and the speech on *The Crown.* But while the speech of Aeschines *On the Embassy* never rises above a mean and personal discussion, that of Demosthenes deals also with great questions, such as the responsibility of a statesman. The contrast is still greater between the speech *Against Ctesiphon* and the speech *On the Crown.* What is

[1] This is one among many arguments against the genuineness of the *Fourth Philippic* in its present form.

true in this respect of Demosthenes is, though less perfectly, true also of Burke. Neither of them lingers long in the region of the personal. The air is soon cleared, and we are again upon the heights.

An apparent want of plan is the most salient characteristic of structure in almost all the speeches of Demosthenes, if we except the private orations. Modern oratory seems to demand a business-like perspicuity of arrangement. Such, too, was the practice of Aeschines. But Demosthenes is studiously irregular. He transgresses all the ancient rules of technical rhetoric. He seldom makes any formal partition into heads. Narrative, refutation, and proof, are blended or displaced according to the requirements of the case. The exordium alone stands clear and sharp; the epilogue is not always strictly defined. Yet there is nothing accidental in the disposition. Certain architectonic ideas of order preside over the whole. There is in each case a given effect to produce, and all is subordinated to this object. There is therefore no uniform type of structure. The grander the scale of the design, the less rigorous the laws of outward symmetry. Thus the longest speeches of Demosthenes, those *On the Embassy* and *On the Crown*, are the most intricate in arrangement (pp. 96 ff., 116 ff.) Genuine works of art, they cannot be dissected or analysed by the listener, who has to yield for the time to the generous deception; at the end an impression of organic unity remains. From his master, Isæus, Demosthenes learnt these structural effects. But what tends to become artificiality in Isæus is art in Demosthenes. Isæus often betrays his purpose. Demosthenes seems natural, simple, and unperplexed. He starts a thought and sets it aside to return to it later and expand it. He announces a scheme which he does not follow (*e.g. Embassy*, § 4). He anticipates, digresses, recapitulates, and appears to be im-

pelled by a spirit of improvisation. Yet in every speech there is some persistent central thought; all the details are grouped and massed round it; with each movement it rises into fresh prominence. It was a remark of Pitt's that in addressing a popular assembly you must either be copious on the points you wish to emphasise or repeat them, and that he preferred copiousness to repetition. Demosthenes preferred repetition to copiousness; but in this sense, that he frequently came back upon the dominant idea, and enforced it, not with verbal repetition, but with fresh illustration. This is a capital feature in his eloquence. He is resolved to secure one of the high places of the field. From different quarters his forces converge upon this point; each avenue of escape is blocked beforehand. Feints and diversions are resorted to merely to conceal the premeditated plan. No petty skirmishes prevent him from striking at the heart of the enemy's strength.

Aristotle with admirable truth laid it down that logical proof is the first essential of rhetorical persuasion. There is an idea now prevalent, derived rather from the study of Roman than of Greek literature, that ancient oratory appeals chiefly to feeling, and modern oratory to reason. But in fact all the greatest orators, ancient as well as modern, have been great reasoners. It may be more plausibly maintained that there are in Demosthenes few of those long chains of argument for which Fox, for instance, was remarkable. But even this statement is subject to some deduction. There are many of the forensic speeches to which it does not apply; an interpretation of a complex law, such as is found in *The Aristocrates*, is a sustained argumentative process. His deliberative eloquence is more popular and more varied in its method: proof is less formally developed; but a continuous thread of thought is maintained, and whatever tends

to provoke reflection, to quicken the reasoning faculty, is welcomed and pressed into the service. To stifle a free intelligence, and to win by moving appeals, is a short-lived triumph which Demosthenes rejects. He would set his audience thinking. All he asks of them is to reason with him — *λογίζεσθε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν.* Among his most constraining instruments of persuasion are historical examples, and chiefly those which are drawn from recent and familiar events. Each fact, each name, sets some emotion vibrating. There is stroke upon stroke with little breathing space between — "creber utraque manu pulsat"—and each blow is forging a link in the chain. The method is not demonstrative, but it is essentially argumentative. The inference, if not explicitly drawn, is immediately suggested.

Another logical weapon which Demosthenes loves to wield is the dilemma; and rarely has it been possible to use it with such telling effect as is done in the speech *On the Embassy* (§§ 102 ff., see p. 97). His natural strength and dexterity in argument are shown in many forms; above all in a certain combative quality of his genius which he developed into a commanding faculty of attack. Like Pitt he was not content with defending himself, he presently turned the tables and assumed the aggressive. The speech *On the Crown* is a memorable case in point; minor instances occur in *The Embassy* (*e.g.* §§ 134-146, §§ 89, 90) where objections are met by unexpected retorts.

But the form of reasoning most distinctive of him is when he closes with his adversary and grips him in strict and cogent argument. Then comes out the pliant strength of the athlete, and his daring swiftness of movement. Among the marks of such passages are a dramatic animation of manner, a quick interchange of question and answer, a pressing vehemence,

sudden surprises and novel turns of thought or phrase, an incisive irony. Alternative possibilities are stated and disposed of, or a principle is tested in its detailed application. The method is peculiarly effective in recapitulation, in securing, inch by inch, ground which has been disputed and partially won. This was the second great lesson he learnt from Isæus; and from the forensic sphere he imported it into the deliberative. This "agonistic" virtue is perhaps the severest test of popular eloquence. Cicero has little of it; Burke is totally without it; Fox had it; Gladstone has it, though in a less conspicuous degree than other qualities; but Demosthenes here stands supreme.

It is not possible with Demosthenes, as it is with lesser orators, to map out a speech into parts and say: here is an appeal to feeling; here is pure reasoning; for thought is everywhere interpenetrated with feeling, reason is itself passionate. That which fuses all into unity is the force of an intense personality, which cannot convince the intellect without kindling the emotions. The breath of passion may give life for the time to the orator's word, but alone it cannot give permanence. A great speaker of our day would, with the addition of one quality, take rank among the highest. John Bright has almost every Demosthenic gift except that of strong and persistent reasoning. He is easily led away into an emotional digression; some of his noblest passages are loosely connected with the subject, they are not wrought into the texture of the thought. The two most perfect types in which the eloquence of impassioned reason has hitherto expressed itself are found in Demosthenes and Burke.

When warmth circulates through the whole speech it is the less necessary to concentrate it on the peroration. Demosthenes in this respect obeyed an Attic rule. The Athenians, distrusting their own sensibility,

resented emotional pressure, and the orator, especially towards the close of his speech, avoided all semblance of doing moral violence to his audience, and addressed himself mainly to their reason. In early Attic oratory the law of a final calm was scarcely ever violated. By degrees more colour and animation made their way into the epilogue; but pathetic outbursts in the Roman manner were still excluded, and the last sentences were studiously unimpassioned.

The close of an Attic speech recalls the close of an Attic tragedy in its sedate harmony, and in the place it gives to artistic convention and euphemistic phrase. Most of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches end in a solemn wish or prayer, and the last word of all is frequently one of lucky import. Take, for instance, the end of the *Third Philippic* (p. 110): "This is what I have to say, these are the measures I propose. Adopt these measures, and it is my belief that even yet our affairs may be retrieved. If any man has better advice to offer, let him speak forth and declare his counsel. And, be your decision what it may, grant, all ye gods, that it may be for our good" (ὅ τι δ' ὑμῖν δόξει τοῦτ', ὦ πάντες θεοὶ, συνενέγκοι); or again, the last sentence of the *First Philippic*: "May that prevail which is for the common good of all" (νικῴη δ' ὅ τι πᾶσιν ὑμῖν μέλλει συνοίσειν); or of the *First Olynthiac*: "On all accounts may it turn out well" (χρηστὰ δ' εἴη πάντος εἵνεκα). Four of his court speeches end thus: "I see no reason to add anything; you fully apprehend, I think, what has been said"—a formula also found twice in Isæus. The peroration of *The Crown* has been already noted as a signal exception (p. 123); there a passionate imprecation precedes the blessing. The generation that succeeded Demosthenes admitted pathetic perorations with less reserve. Lycurgus his younger contemporary, ends a speech in the following words, where the pathos and the personification are some-

what modern in character: "Deem then, Athenians, that a prayer goes up to you from the very land and all its groves, from the harbours, from the arsenals, from the walls of the city; deem that the shrines and holy places are summoning you to protect them; and, remembering the charges against him, make Leocrates a proof that compassion and tears do not prevail with you over solicitude for the laws and for the commonweal."[1]

"One might," says the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*, "as soon face with steady eyes a descending thunderbolt, as oppose a calm front to the storm of passions which Demosthenes can arouse." Some feelings, however, he seldom wakens. His highly-wrought sensibility, due partly to the wrongs of childhood, was very different from a natural and healthy pathos, in which, as in humour, he is deficient—again in this respect resembling Burke. In this field of the emotions he wisely puts himself under severe self-control. While the pathos of Cicero is tender and effusive, and adapted to stir a jury, the pathos of Demosthenes is austere and Thucydidean in its reserve, and unquestionably better suited to political discussion. The desolation of Phocis, as told of in *The Embassy* (§§ 65, 66), is no moving picture of ruin, but an outline of fact, where pity for suffering is merged in a fiery scorn and indignation against its authors. The instance is a typical one. It is hardly necessary to contrast with this the melodramatic pathos of Aeschines.

Quintilian claims a superiority for his countrymen over the Greeks in wit as well as in pathos. So far as the wit of Demosthenes is concerned, the claim may readily be conceded. Here he bears no comparison with Cicero. His pleasantries were ponderous and sometimes coarse. The writer above quoted says

[1] Lycurg. *Leocr.*, translated by Prof. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, ii. 380.

that "where Demosthenes strives to be jocose or witty he makes us laugh at him rather than with him;" and we find in one of the letters ascribed to Aeschines that "no one ever laughed at Demosthenes' jokes except Ctesiphon" (Aesch. *Ep.* v.) It is only in a few court speeches, where he is writing in the character of his client, that he has any of the charm peculiar to Lysias. The naïve and innocent humour of the speeches *Against Callicles* and *Against Conon* has already been referred to (pp. 133-135). In his political orations he is bitterly in earnest; the people preferred smart sayings to hard duty, and he will not indulge them. His eloquence, like his character, has in it a biting and pungent flavour. Humour on his lips is frozen into sarcasm; scorn takes the place of raillery, irony of wit. Touches, however, of grim humour, reminding us of Aristotle, do occur, chiefly in illustrations; as in *The Crown*, where Aeschines, giving his counsel after the event, is compared to the physician who prescribes for his patient after the funeral. The speech *On the Chersonese* has a subdued sarcasm and subtle irony running through the first half (*e.g.* §§ 5, 10, 27, 36); more often the irony is disdainful and indignant, as in a famous passage of the *Third Philippic* (§§ 65, 66).

The style of Demosthenes is now accepted as the type of all that is simple, direct, and forcible. Yet to read him with ease is one of the latest fruits of Greek scholarship. His vigorous compression of thought, and inversions of the natural order of words for the sake of emphasis and of rhythm, require continuous attention on the part of the reader. An intimate study of Thucydides has left its visible stamp on the early deliberative speeches. It is doubtless with special reference to these speeches that Dionysius, the best of the ancient critics, observes that, "in the style of Thucydides and Demosthenes, there is much that is

obscure and needs a commentary" (*Lys.* ch. 4). Demosthenes, at the opening of his career, seems to have regarded a stately and archaic dignity as appropriate to political debate. Plutarch says that the people could not bear his first attempts as being over-elaborate; and, indeed, parts of the speech *On the Symmories*[1] (354 B.C.) might have been written by Thucydides himself. There is the same pregnancy and involution of thought, and a similar love of strained antithesis. The early forensic speeches have traces of over-elaboration of a somewhat different kind—an exact balancing of clauses, a jingling of final syllables, an almost pedantic avoidance of a hiatus between vowels, and some exaggerated ornament. The great organ of speech, afterwards perfected by the orator, was not yet flexible to his use.

From about 352 B.C. onwards, his eloquence, in all its branches, becomes more varied, more abundant, and gives out fuller tones. The deliberative speeches gain warmth and colour. The conversational vivacity now introduced into them is one of many points of contact which they have with modern parliamentary oratory. Henceforth Demosthenes moves in ampler periods; these he blends with compact sentences. While drawing largely on the popular idiom, he adapts it to artistic expression. Words and phrases of every-day life, which hardly find a place in other orators, are moulded into new combinations so as to seem natural without being commonplace. His similes, sparingly used, and seldom developed in detail, derive much of their force from their apposite homeliness (pp. 59, 60, 68, 74, 109). The metaphors are more daring; but here too there is little expansion, the image being,

[1] The different manner adopted by the orator at this period in the Assembly and the law-courts is well shown by a comparison of this speech with the *Leptines*, which belongs to the same year, but is easy, fluent, and lively.

for the most part, gathered up into a single word or phrase which is struck off in the heat of passion. Yet, though the dominant impression left on us by Demosthenes is that of severe and disciplined strength, he appeared to a Greek taste to be at times so elaborately ornate that Aeschines criticised him on this score, and Dionysius admits the fact while he offers a justification. It is in allusion to this manifold and versatile faculty of Demosthenes that Dionysius calls him a very Proteus (*Dem.* ch. 8). Elements which are elsewhere found scattered are fused and wrought into one by his genius.

The union of consummate artistic skill with a directness of aim that is seemingly unconscious of literary effort, is a capital feature in his eloquence. Ornament for its own sake he disdained; no orator has so few showy passages, or is less adapted for a book of extracts. To use his own phrase (*Chers.* § 73), to speak was, in a sense, to act. His genius, severely practical, rejects all that is not strictly pertinent to the subject in hand. Finish of workmanship is not lost, however, on any popular assembly, and the audience in his case was a nation of artists, who enjoyed a political debate as they did a dramatic or a musical festival. He was resolved to make his eloquence something more than a spectacle; but to do so he must first satisfy every artistic requirement. Those very speeches which are alive with the fire of passion have been laboriously prepared in the closet. The evidence of the speeches themselves here falls in with tradition. Demosthenes avows and justifies his own scrupulous premeditation in a special case (*Midias*, § 191). Sometimes he repeats himself almost verbally in different speeches; for a Greek, with an artist's love for perfect form, when he had once expressed his thought in the best way possible, saw no reason for afterwards expressing it in the second best way.

His general avoidance of a hiatus between vowels—a practice derived from Isocrates—is highly significant. Modern criticism has discovered the limitations of this rule, and distinguished the larger freedom of the later speeches from the strict usage of the earlier period. The most important result of the inquiry is this: that the chief anomalies in respect of the hiatus occur in precisely those passages or speeches which, on other grounds, we believe to have been imperfectly revised. We naturally infer that it was only by slow processes of correction that the hiatus was subjected to the laws which now govern it. The rhythm is such as to warrant the same general inference. Its complex and subtle harmonies, resembling those of a Pindaric ode, are pronounced by Dionysius (*de Compos.* pp. 189-206) to be due to no instinctive process. More recent investigations fully bear out this view. The rhythm of Demosthenes, though modelled on that of Isocrates, is even more unique in ancient oratory than that of Burke is among the moderns.

The exact relation between the written and spoken speeches of Demosthenes can never be definitely settled. We know that he seldom extemporised, and that when he did so he was liable to be carried away by transports akin to madness.[1] His careful and anxious preparation was probably in part a safeguard against his own impetuosity. We know, too, that in the speech *On the Embassy* there must have been a general, though not a detailed, correspondence between the spoken and the written form. So much may be inferred from the reply of Aeschines. But these considerations do not carry us far. The main difficulty in the way of believing that we have the

[1] The vulgarisms of phrase imputed to him by Aeschines, and nowhere found in the extant speeches, were as unknown to Dionysius as to us, but may perhaps have escaped from him in some of these sudden outbursts.

deliberative speeches in the form in which they were delivered, lies in their remarkable brevity and compression. We must be careful not to exaggerate this difficulty under the influence of modern notions. It is only in recent times that we have come to think that a great speech must necessarily be a long one; till the close of the last century, when Burke set a new example, speeches of two or three hours' length seem to have been almost unknown in our own Parliament. And at Athens there were special causes which helped to keep debate within moderate limits. To Athenian perception it was plainer than it is to ours, that the highest strength lies in clearness combined with terseness, and that the first requisite of speech is that it should be apt. The questions debated, moreover, were more familiar and invoked less complex issues; the Assembly was generally held in the open air, and the audience on great occasions might number, perhaps, 6000 or 7000 people. The last fact alone would tend to shorten the deliberative as compared with the forensic speeches. The longest deliberative speech of Demosthenes could not in its present form have taken much more than an hour to deliver. Yet, making every allowance on this head, we shall be inclined, I think, to hold that occasional amplification must have been necessary in order that the political speeches, whose full force we begin to feel only on repeated reading, should tell with full effect even on an Athenian audience.

In our final judgment on Demosthenes we cannot separate the orator from the statesman. If we regard his whole policy as a grand mistake, our estimate of his eloquence must be affected by this view. It has been sometimes said that he did not appreciate the forces opposed to him, that he showed a want of political penetration. The weaknesses, however, which he exposed in the Macedonian power, were

not imaginary. That power, he said, had been reared on frauds and broken promises; there was a corrupt court, a discontented people, suspicious allies (*Olynth.* ii.); behind the prince there was no permanent state organisation (*Phil.* iii. § 72). He expected that the Macedonian, like other military monarchies, would crumble away at the death of the despot. A phenomenon unique in history defeated these calculations. Philip was succeeded by a son greater than himself.

But never at any moment in the contest with Philip did Demosthenes shut his eyes to the danger, or lull his countrymen into a false security. To convince and to enlighten was his constant aim. He saw the conditions of ultimate victory with a terrible prescience. He knew the utmost that Attic oratory could do when pitted against an absolute monarch, wielding all the resources of war and of diplomacy. A reflective reason controls his most impassioned speeches, and his measures are marked by a business-like precision. Gifted with a sense of the opportune, which is an element of genius, though it is often misconstrued into inconsistency, he could stand forth to counsel peace when the interests of the state required it. By virtue of a commanding eloquence he carried on the struggle for thirteen years almost single-handed. There were moments up to the last when the turn of the scale was doubtful. A few years before Chæronea the national life awoke from its long slumber before his potent breath; had the awakening come a little earlier, the issue might have been, if not reversed, postponed for another generation.

Isocrates invited Philip to extend to Athens the beneficent interference he had shown in Thessaly. There have been those, both in ancient and in modern times, who have censured Demosthenes for ranging himself on an opposite side. Polybius (xvii. 14)

maintains that those whom he branded as traitors in Arcadia, Messene, Argos, Thessaly, Bœotia, were in truth benefactors to their respective cities; that the Peloponnesian states in particular enjoyed under Macedon a freedom before unknown; and that Athens, as shown by the event, was unwise in resisting. Polybius, writing under the shadow of Roman greatness, views the struggle of free Greece against Macedon as he would the rebellion of subject Achæa against Rome; and he is not in a position to value aright political independence. But even if he is taken on his own narrow ground, his statement may be disputed. Demosthenes denies it by anticipation, and history confirms him when he says that the disloyal states of Greece came off worse than Athens at the hands of the conqueror (*Crown*, § 65).

Modern objections have generally been couched in a somewhat different form. The victory of Demosthenes, it is said, would have retarded the progress of the world. Demosthenes, says Cousin, "represented the past of Greece; he failed disgracefully." "Our sympathies should be on the victorious side, for it is always that of the better cause, that of civilisation and humanity." But surely there is a limit to the foresight we may demand from statesmen. Demosthenes was, doubtless, mistaken in speaking of Philip himself as "a barbarian," as "the enemy of Athens and of the very ground on which she stood." Philip had genuine Greek sympathies, of which Demosthenes was not aware. Yet, as we have seen, there was a very real sense in which Philip, as head of his nation, was the representative barbarian (p. 51). It was only by effacing what was Macedonian and absorbing what was Greek, that the triumph of Philip became the triumph of civilisation. Demosthenes could not have foreseen the Ares of Macedon being transformed, as on his coins, into the Athenian Apollo, or forecast the

intellectual empire which out of defeat was to be built up for Greece. Nor even, had he obtained a vision of all this, is it so clear that he ought to have counselled his countrymen otherwise than he did. It may well be doubted whether the bequest of a weakened sense of national dignity and independence would not have been a loss to the world greater than the gain of hastening forward events by a few years. In any case it is perilous work when a statesman sits in the seat of the prophet, and substitutes his own surmises on the tendency of things for the "salutary prejudice called our country."

The swift decline and death of the Hellenic spirit within Greece proper, following upon the Macedonian supremacy, may be gathered from the hymn in which, fifteen years after the death of Demosthenes, Athens welcomed Demetrius within her walls. A few lines of it may here be quoted :—"Hail, son of mightiest Neptune, and of Aphrodite, for the other gods are far hence; they hear not, or they are not, or they heed us not. But as for thee, we see thee in presence, not in wood or in stone, but in very truth; our prayers are unto thee."

"Such," says Athenæus (vi. 63, 64), "was the song of the warriors of Marathon not only in public but in their own homes, those who had punished with death prostration before the King of Persia, and had slain the myriad hosts of the barbarians." We may still feel grateful to one who, though it was in a losing cause, strove to arrest so sad a decadence.

# TABLE OF THE WORKS OF DEMOSTHENES.

THE following is a list of the writings handed down among the works of Demosthenes. On questions concerning genuineness there is little approach to unanimity of view (see p. 139); but the tendency of recent critics (*e.g.* of Blass as compared with A. Schaefer) is to be more conservative. The results here given are those to which critical opinion now seems on the whole to incline. The writings marked with † were doubted in antiquity, those marked with * not till modern times.

## I. DELIBERATIVE SPEECHES (*συμβουλευτικοὶ λόγοι*).

### *Genuine.*

| | |
|---|---|
| On the Symmories (xiv.) | 354 B.C. |
| For the Megalopolitans (xvi.) | 353 B.C. |
| First Philippic (iv.) | 351 B.C. |
| For the Rhodians (xv.) | 351 B.C. (but see p. 43.) |
| First Olynthiac (i.) | 349 B.C. |
| Second Olynthiac (ii.) | 349 B.C. |
| Third Olynthiac (iii.) | 349 B.C. |
| On the Peace (v.) | 346 B.C. |
| Second Philippic (vi.) | 344 B.C. |
| On the Chersonese (viii.) | 341 B.C. |
| Third Philippic (ix.) | 341 B.C. |

(Philip's Letter (xii.) is probably genuine.)

### *Spurious.*

| | |
|---|---|
| †On Halonnesus (vii.) [by Hegisippus] | 342 B.C. |
| †On The Treaty with Alexander (xvii.) | 335 B.C. |

### *Rhetorical Forgeries.*

†Fourth Philippic (x.)
*Answer to Philip's letter (xi.)
*On Financial Organisation (*περὶ συντάξεως*, xiii.)

## II. FORENSIC SPEECHES (δικανικοὶ λόγοι).

### A.—In Public Causes (δημόσιοι).

| | |
|---|---|
| Against Androtion (xxii.) | 355 B.C. |
| Against Leptines (xx.) | 354 B.C. |
| Against Timocrates (xxiv.) | 353 B.C. |
| Against Aristocrates (xxiii.) | 352 B.C. |
| Against Midias (xxi.) | 347 B.C. |
| On the Embassy (xix.) | 344 B.C. |
| On the Crown (xviii.) | 330 B.C. |

#### *Spurious.*

| | |
|---|---|
| †Against Neæra (lix.) | between 343 and 339 B.C. |
| †Against Theocrines (lviii.) | about 340 B.C. |

#### *Rhetorical Forgeries.*

†Against Aristogeiton, I. II. (xxv. xxvi.)

### B.—In Private Causes (ἰδιωτικοί).

#### *Genuine.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Against Aphobus, I. II. (xxvii. xxviii.) | 363 B.C. |
| *Against Aphobus for Phanos (xxix.) | 363 B.C. |
| Against Onetor, I. II. (xxx. xxxi.) | 362 B.C. |
| *On the Trierarchic Crown (li.) | between 361 and 357 B.C. |
| Against Spudias (xli.) | ? |
| *Against Callicles (lv.) | ? |
| Against Conon (liv.) | ? |
| For Phormio (xxxvi.) | 350 B.C. |
| *Against Stephanus, I. (xlv.) | 349 or 348 B.C. |
| †Against Bœotus, I. (xxxix.) | 348 B.C. |
| Against Pantænetus (xxxvii.) | 346 B.C. |
| Against Nausimachus (xxxviii.) | probably about 346 B.C. |
| *Against Eubulides (lvii.) | 345 B.C. |

#### *Spurious.*

(The first five of the following speeches, as also the speech Against Neæra, are for Apollodorus; but whether by a common author or not is very uncertain.)

| | |
|---|---|
| *Against Callippus (li.) | probably 369 B.C. |
| †Against Nicostratus (liii.) | between 368 and 365 B.C. |
| †Against Timotheus (xlix.) | 362 B.C. |
| *Against Polycles (l.) | about 358 B.C. |
| *Against Stephanus, II. (xlvi.) | 348 B.C. |
| †Against Euergus and Mnesibulus (xlvii.) | between 356 and 353 B.C. |
| *Against Zenothemis (xxxii.) | ? |
| †Against Bœotus, II. (xl.) | between 348 and 346 B.C. |
| *Against Macartatus (xliii.) | about 341 B.C. |

| | |
|---|---|
| *Against Olympiodorus (xlviii.) | about 341 B.C. |
| †Against Lacritus (xxxv.) | ? |
| †Against Phænippus (xlii.) | prob. not before 330 B.C. |
| *Against Leochares (xliv.) | ? |
| *Against Apaturius (xxxiii.) | not before 341 B.C. |
| *Against Phormio (xxxiv.) | about 326 B.C. |
| †Against Dionysodorus (lvi.) | 323 or 322 B.C. |

## III. EPIDEICTIC SPEECHES (ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι).

*Spurious.*

†Epitaphius.
†Eroticus.

## *PROEMS or INTRODUCTIONS (probably genuine and before 350 B.C.)

## *LETTERS (very doubtful).

The MSS. of Demosthenes may be divided into three main families, represented respectively—

(1.) By the Parisian S or Σ of the tenth century, which is far superior to all the rest. It not only has fewer mistakes and interpolations, and agrees best with ancient quotations, but it has many minor marks of accuracy; the order of the words in particular preserves a distinctively Demosthenic rhythm and character. Its value was first seen by Bekker, whose *Oratores Attici* (1822-3) placed the text of Demosthenes on a new and secure basis. Baiter and Sauppe, the Zurich editors, have followed S still more scrupulously; sometimes, perhaps, with an excessive reverence; for S, like other excellent MSS., contains some absurd errors. Of the same family is the Laurentian L of the thirteenth century.

(2.) By *Marcianus F* (at St. Mark's, Venice) of the eleventh century, the MS. which is the basis of the Aldine edition of 1504; and by *Bavaricus B* (at Munich), a copy of *F*, and probably of the thirteenth century.

(3.) By *Augustanus I* or A¹, formerly at Augsburg, now at Munich, probably of the eleventh century, and the basis of Reiske's edition of Demosthenes in the *Oratores Attici* (1770-1775).

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